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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with the role of state-owned companies and labour unions in 
influencing research and development (R&D) activity in two related contexts: when firms act 
as independent competitors, and when firms collaborate in their investments by forming a 
research network, but still remain competitors in the product market. 
The first chapter investigates the use of R&D subsidies, both in a mixed and a private 
market. Wc show that the socially optimal R&D subsidy is positive and increasing in the 
degree of technological spillovers both in a private and in a mixed duopoly, although it is 
lower for the former than for the latter. A comparative statics analysis of welfare levels 
reveals that privatisation is likely to be welfare reducing, at least for a relatively small number 
of private firms. 
The second chapter develops a model of endogenous network formation in order to 
explore the incentives for, and the effects of, R&D collaboration in a mixed oligopoly. It is 
shown that the complete network, where each firm collaborates with all others, is uniquely 
stable, industry profit-maximising and socially efficient. This result contrasts with earlier 
contributions that assumed a purely private oligopoly, where under strong market rivalry a 
conflict between stable and efficient networks is likely to emerge. 
The third chapter explores how the sequencing of R&D investment and wage 
determination influences investment, employment, profits, union utility and welfare. We find 
that a fixed wage contract leads to higher investment, as it implies a disciplinary effect on the 
union's wage claims. Thus the efficiency effect of a fixed wage contract generates higher 
profits, union utility and overall welfare. 
The fourth chapter explores how unionisation structures that differ in the degree of 
wage setting centralisation influence the stability properties of R&D networks among private 
firms. Our analysis reveals that less centralised union structures can lead to denser R&D 
networks. Thus our study suggests that labour market deregulation towards less centralised 
union structures can be seen as an alternative foundation for the fact that R&D networks have 
become a more prevalent phenomenon over the recent years. 
Keywords: mixed duopoly, R&D subsidies, process innovation, spillovers, networks, 
privatisation, wage contracts, R&D collaboration, unionisation structures. 
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Introduction 
In recent years, firms operate in an increasingly complex environment where innovation 
takes a variety of forms such as new organisational arrangements, production processes and 
products. Innovation is a crucial determinant of firms' competitive position and therefore, it 
appears to affect their survival in the long-run. Empirical evidence suggests that, under certain 
circumstances, firms pursue product and process innovations as members of research groups 
and/or by investing independently. Moreover, the economic environment where firms operate 
is characterised by the presence of their workers' formal organisations and, in some instances, 
by the presence of companies owned by the state, which are concerned with objectives other 
than pure profit maximisation. We are thus led to the view that in some economic contexts 
innovation activity is shaped by labour market institutions and state-owned firms. The objective 
of this thesis is to explore the role of labour unions and state-owned firms in influencing R&D 
activity, both cooperative and non-cooperative. 
A globalising perspective in the way business is conducted has been accompanied by the 
emergence of new forms of collaboration between firms. Although strategic alliances were 
initially aimed at granting firms access to new markets, firms now instead seek partners to 
create sustainable competitive advantages in order to enhance their product-market positioning. 
In addition, the need to quickly respond to rival innovations, to be omnipresent and exploit 
technological opportunities that may arise in different markets has driven firms to establish 
new partnerships. In many instances, the need to implement the so-called "follow-my-leader" 
strategy becomes apparent and, in other occasions, firms simply cooperate not because they 
actually trust their partners, but in order to gain access to private information and exploit 
synergies that may arise from cooperation. As an illustration of the need to develop expertise 
across different disciplines consider the following example. 
Consider a car manufacturing company. The production of a car requires expertise in a 
variety of interrelated fields involving not only mastery of mechanical technologies but also 
expertise in telecommunications technology, new materials technology and semiconductor de-
velopment, among other things (Narula and Hagedoorn, 1999). It becomes thus clear that 
mastery of all these disciplines by means of wholly owned subsidiaries is not a viable option, 
because it increases considerably the associated risks and costs of production. Moreover, pro-
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duction technologies are subject to short cycles, and products become obsolete faster - in some 
cases, even before a patent is granted. These observations suggest that firms need to engage in 
research alliances in order to stay current with the latest technological advances. Existing em-
pirical evidence documents a rise in more flexible, non-equity forms of cooperation (e.g. R&D 
networks) over equity forms (e.g. Research Joint Ventures). Chapter 2 explains in detail their 
differences and discusses the relative merits of different forms of cooperation. 
The example above was intended to illustrate the nature of R&D collaboration between 
firms. However, it is important to emphasise that for various reasons firms do not always 
engage in research partnerships but instead seek to fully internalise their innovation activities. 
These reasons have to do with company culture and size as well as with the size of the country 
where the company is located and the technological sophistication of each particular industry. 
For example, the automotive company Volkswagen prefers to internalise its innovation activity 
while Nissan prefers to innovate jointly. Note also that large firms typically do more R&D and 
so participate in a larger number of R&D projects relative to smaller firms. The country size 
is another important determinant of the incentives for R&D collaboration and, in particular, 
it appears that firms located in large countries are more self-sufficient, so that typically they 
maintain a smaller number of alliances. The presence of cooperative research in the form 
of R&D networks is more often observed in hi-tech industries, such as telecommunications, 
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology. 
An important feature of the innovation activity is that it involves not only private but also 
state-owned firms which in a broader perspective comprise research institutes, independent labs 
and universities (Poyago-Theotoky, 1998). Mixed oligopoly is an imperfectly competitive form 
of market in which public firms compete with a multitude of private firms. Typical examples 
are the industries of automobiles, steel, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology. Public and private 
firms do not always compete but often engage in R&D cooperation. Empirical evidence suggests 
that public-private partnerships are important in generating technology advances, adding to the 
stock of knowledge and enhancing overall wellbeing in an economy. To cite a few examples, the 
European Council for automotive R&D, launched in 1994, is principally a research partnership 
between car manufacturing companies, governments, universities and research institutes, with 
the purpose of sharing technological know-how for the development of environmentally clean and 
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efficient energy technologies (Sperting, 2001). Furthermore, Norway's current portfolio includes 
a variety of projects aimed at the development of fuel cells and related hydrogen technologies. 
These projects are organised as research consortia of various firms, carrying a complex set of 
partnerships with one another, including participation of state-owned companies as well, e.g. 
Statoil in Norway (God0 et aI., 2003). Motivated by these empirical examples, this thesis is 
concerned with the study of R&D cooperation between public and private firms (as in chapter 
2). It also investigates R&D competition with a view to assessing the desirability of privatisation 
by looking at its effects on social welfare (as in chapter 1). 
Another important feature of the R&D activity stems from the fact that labour markets are 
typically unionised. The presence of union(s) has implications for the firms' incentives to carry 
out R&D investments. Although the bargaining power of the union is not empirically observed, 
there are some adequate proxies for it: the union density and strike activity (Mauleon, Sempere-
Monerris and Vannetelbosch, 2008). Both proxies have an influence on the union's ability to 
appropriate a relatively large share of the employer's rents which may result from participation 
in innovation projects. The empirical evidence on the impact of unionisation on R&D is mixed, 
pointing towards a negative relationship for the US (Connoly, Hirsch and Hirschey, 1986; Hirsch, 
1992; Bronars and Deere, 1993), even though the emerging evidence appears less unified for the 
case of Europe (Machin and Wadhwani, 1991; Menezes-Filho, Ulph and Van Reenen, 1998a, b). 
The same mixed association has been demonstrated by theoretical studies on this issue (Grout, 
1984; Tauman and Weiss, 1987; Ulph and Ulph, 1989, 1994, 2001; Lyons and Sekkat, 1991; 
Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre, 2002; Haucap and Wey, 2004; Manasakis and Zikos, 2007) 
suggesting that the relationship between unionisation and R&D depends, to a large extent, on 
the specific assumptions underlying each model. 
Chapter 3 explores how the sequencing of R&D investment and wage determination in-
fluences investment, employment, profits, union utility and total surplus. Cost-reducing in-
vestments by the firms increase their own production efficiency, thereby increasing output and 
profits. A higher demand for output and thus for labour induces the union to push for higher 
wages, acting in an opportunistic manner (Banerjee and Lin, 2003; Buehler and Schmutzler, 
2008). The higher wages that ensue offset some of the benefits from carrying out R&D. However, 
the firms also recognise that a higher wage works towards increasing the costs of their rivals, 
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given the presence of an industry union. The latter effect of cost-reducing investment - the 
raising rivals' cost effect - is crucial for our understanding of strategic behaviour in unionised 
oligopoly. This scenario is compared with the case that the sequencing of R&D investment and 
wage determination is reversed, namely firms undertake their investments after the union has 
set the wage level. This comparison allows us to shed some light on the role of the raising rivals' 
cost effect in influencing firms' investment decisions and the relationship between unionisation 
and R&D under different forms of wage contracts. 
A related observation is that the level where collective contracts are negotiated and formally 
set exhibits substantial differences across countries (OECD, 2004). For example, wage negoti-
ations in the US, UK, Canada and Japan take place at the level of each individual enterprise; 
in Ireland, Norway, Portugal and Finland wage contracts are determined at an industry level; 
and in Belgium, Spain and Sweden wage bargaining is characterised by an intermediate degree 
of centralisation in that an industry union sets firm-specific wages. It is important to note that 
most countries have progressively adopted less centralised wage setting systems. At the same 
time, we witnessed a surge in the number of R&D alliances over the recent years. An objective 
of this thesis (as in chapter 4) is to explain the stylised fact that R&D collaboration has become 
a more prevalent phenomenon by looking at the deregulation in labour markets towards more 
flexible wage setting institutions. 
Before proceeding, it is important to clarify the following two points. First, in the thesis 
R&D competition does not take the form of a tournament. In a tournament a single firm wins 
the innovation prize, that is, there are winners and losers. Our interest, however, is to study 
non-tournament models of R&D competition where there can be many (potential) innovators. 
Beath, Katsoulacos and Ulph (2001) point out that this can be due to the fact that firms pursue 
different research paths leading to the same innovation ou tcome. This means that even though a 
firm can patent its innovation, it cannot preclude other firms from spending equivalent amounts 
with a view to obtaining equivalent improvements in their production efficiency. Second, we 
concentrate on R&D aimed at reducing the marginal cost of firms (process R&D) and not at 
R&D intended to increase the quality of the firms' product (product R&D). While the direct 
effect of process R&D is to lower costs, the direct effect of product R&D is to boost demand 
by increasing consumers' willingness to pay (Symeonidis, 2003). 
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Chapter 1: Public Policy towards R&D in a Mixed Market with Spillovers 
The earliest and most influential models of mixed oligopolies were developed by De Fraja 
and Delbono (1989), Fjell and Pal (1996), White (1996), Matsumura (1998) and Pal and White 
(1998). These models investigated the desirability of privatisation in various contexts: when 
the regulator uses policy instruments; in the presence of foreign firms; when the sequence of 
firms' moves is changed; and under the possibility of partial privatisation. As noted above, 
there is substantial evidence regarding the presence of public firms in R&D intensive industries. 
Perhaps a reflection of this observation was the formal investigation of innovation issues in 
mixed oligopolies (notably, Delbono and Denicolo, 1993; Poyago-Theotoky, 1998; Ishibashi and 
Matsumura, 2006). In these models, a single welfare-maximising (public) firm engages in a 
patent tournament with a profit-maximising (private) firm. However, these studies have not 
considered the role of subsidies in regulating R&D activity. 
To the best of our knowledge, the present chapter is the first study to look at efliciency-
enhancing (or cost-reducing) R&D in the context of a mixed duopoly with R&D subsidies and 
spillovers. Our objective is two-fold. First, we highlight the significance of R&D subsidies 
and spillovers for the R&D investment of the public and private firm. It is well-known that 
the existence of spillovers tends to discourage R&D spending by private firms, as firms cannot 
fully appropriate the returns to their R&D investments. Within a mixed market we study the 
effect of spillovers on the firms' investment decisions. We also identify the role of spillovers as 
a key determinant of the subsidy level. Our second objective is to compare the performance of 
mixed and private markets in cost-reducing investment and provide some guidelines regarding 
the privatisation of a public firm. In particular, we aim at delivering some tentative policy 
guidelines regarding the use of subsidies, both before and after a privatisation, and analyse 
whether privatisation would be welfare-enhancing if R&D subsidies were available. 
Our main findings can be summarised as follows. We show that the R&D subsidy is always 
positive and increasing in the degree of technological spillovers. Furthermore, the mixed market 
should be subsidised more heavily than the private one. This result relates to the presence of 
important failures of the R&D market to generate socially optimal levels in both settings. 
Next, we demonstrate how privatisation affects the level of R&D investment, output and 
total surplus. In particular, we find that privatisation reduces the R&D investment of the public 
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firm, but increases the investment of the private firm when the level of spillovers is relatively 
low. It turns out that total investment becomes smaller, which leads to a lower level of total 
output. Therefore, consumer surplus is lower after privatising the public firm, whereas total 
profit is higher unless the level of spillovers is very high. The resulting decline in consumer 
surplus below the level achieved in the mixed duopoly outweighs the corresponding increase in 
industry profit. Consequently, total surplus is lower in the private market than in the mixed 
market. Numerical simulations reveal that this result continues to operate as long as the number 
of private firms is relatively small - at least four in this setting. The last section in chapter 1 
attempts to take up this issue. 
Chapter 2: R&D Collaboration Networks in Mixed Oligopoly 
This chapter explores the incentives for R&D collaboration in a mixed oligopoly and the 
architecture of R&D networks that will endogenously emerge. Our interest in understanding 
this issue derives from the empirical observation that partnerships among public and private 
firms are common, as already discussed. Previous authors concentrated on R&D networks 
among private firms only. Two closely related papers are those of Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez 
(2001) and Song and Vanettelbosch (2007). Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) identified a 
conflict between private and collective incentives for R&D collaboration. This conflict is likely 
to arise when technological spillovers are not too small. More recently, Song and Vannetelbosch 
(2007) attempted to resolve this conflict by means of an R&D subsidisation policy. Considering 
a model of three firms selling a homogeneous good within an internationally integrated product 
market, they found that the underlying conflict is considerably reduced but still arises in the 
cases of very small or quite large spillovers. In addition, the governments should be allowed to 
subsidise R&D unless spillovers are very small. 
This chapter, unlike the existing literature, considers the influence of a public firm on the 
(stable) network architecture, with a view to shedding new light on the equilibrium industry 
structure and the relationship between industry structure and performance. In line with Song 
and Vannetelbosch (2007), we allow for R&D subsidies. The use of R&D subsidies is empirically 
observed and is further motivated by the presence of important market failures in this setting, 
as chapter 2 elaborates. 
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In particular, we address the following questions: (i) What are the firms' incentives to form 
strategic alliances whereby technological know-how is transmitted; and what is the architecture 
of the network(s) that will endogenously emerge? (ii) Are individual incentives for collaboration 
adequate from a social welfare viewpoint? (iii) What is the role of the public firm in reconciling 
individual incentives for R&D collaboration with social welfare considerations? 
To answer these questions, we develop a four-stage game. The order of moves is as follows. 
In stage one, firms choose their research partners by forming bilateral (or pairwise) links. Note 
that the collection of bilateral links defines a network of R&D collaboration. This gives rise 
to a wide class of (asymmetric) network architectures in the context of an industry consisting 
of three firms (the smallest number possible allowing for insiders and outsiders). Under the 
complete network all firms are connected with each other, whereas under the empty network 
there are no collaboration ties. The star network implies that one firm ("hub"), either public or 
private, is directly linked with the other two firms ("spokes"), whereas the latter are indirectly 
connected via the "hub". Finally, in the case of a partial network only two firms maintain a 
collaborative link. In stage two, the government announces a level of R&D subsidy to maximise 
social welfare. Then, in stage three, firms choose simultaneously and independently their R&D 
efforts; and finally, in stage four, firms compete a la Cournot in the product market. 
We first examine the relation between R&D effort and the number of links. Our main results 
on this issue are as follows. First, the public firm increases its R&D effort when it establishes 
a new link. The efficiency effect of a new link is to reduce the public firm's cost that works 
towards enhancing the demand for output, thereby making more valuable further increases in 
its own effort. Second, a private firm exerts a higher R&D effort both in the case that it 
partners the public firm and a private firm. A private firm recognises that by increasing its 
own R&D effort the public firm will put in a higher effort because it takes into account private 
profit. However, if the private firms collaborate under a private partial network that leaves the 
public firm in isolation, the higher R&D effort of the private firms reflects an attempt to limit 
the competitive strength of their public counterpart. Furthermore, the increase in the firms' 
R&D effort is more pronounced at a higher spillover rate within a given network because of the 
greater potential for inter-firm communication and learning. 
Next, we analyse the firms' incentives to establish collaborative links. Here, we obtain the 
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following key resnlts. First, our analysis reveals that the complete network will endogenously 
emerge. Note that without the public firm, partial networks can be stable (see Goyal and 
Moraga-Gonzalez, 2001; Song and Vannetelbosch, 2008). [ This reflects the presence of a public 
firm that destabilises partial networks (where one of the firms is not connected to the other 
two), making uniquely stable a network in which all firms are research partners. Second, we 
show that the complete network remains stable even if we allow for deviations by a coalition 
of firms. Contrary to our result, however, the complete network among private firms is never 
stable in the event of coalitional deviations in this setting (Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez, 2001; 
Song and Vanettelbosch, 2007). 
Finally, we compare the different networks from an efficiency viewpoint.2 Our analysis 
reveals that the complete network is uniquely efficient. This suggests that a public firm may 
reconcile individual incentives for collaboration with the collective ones. Put differently, our 
analysis suggests that a public firm can be used as a policy instrument for regulating innovative 
activity, because in a private market we are likely to observe a discrepancy between stability 
and social welfare, even though this conflict is reduced when the government subsidises R&D. 
Thus, the present chapter is a first attempt to study the role of a public firm in influencing 
the firms' incentives for R&D collaboration, a topic that has not been analysed in the previous 
literature. 
Chapter 3: Wage Contracts in Oligopoly with Spillovers 
This chapter moves away from looking at investment decisions in mixed markets in order 
to explore investment behaviour of privately owned firms in a unionised oligopoly. In particn-
lar, we investigate how the sequencing of R&D investment and wage determination influences 
investment, employment, profits, union utility, and social welfare. Thus our analysis helps un-
derstand the desirability of different contract types from the union's and the firms' perspective 
and the welfare implications thereof. 
I A network is pairwise stable if no firm has an incentive to alter the network structure by deleting one of 
its exi6ting links and no pair of firms want to establish Cl new link. Similarly, we say that a network is strongly 
stable if it survives all possible deviations by a coalition of firms. See chapter 2 (section 2.4.3) for the formal 
definitions. 
2We say that a network is efficient if it generates at least as high a level of welfare as any other network. The 
formal definitions are presented in chapter 2 (section 2.4.3). 
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The literature on cost-reducing investments in vertically related industries or in the pres-
ence of unions has paid relatively little attention on this issue, an exception being Banerjee 
and Lin (2003). In this chapter, we argue that the sequencing of R&D investment and wage 
determination is crucial for our understanding of investment decisions and union welfare in 
oligopoly. More specifically, we show that there is a raising rivals' cost effect when investment 
decisions are made prior to the wage selection (floating wage contract). That is, an increase in 
R&D investment reduces costs and expands output, thereby increasing the demand for labour. 
The higher labour demand induces the union to set a higher wage, which increases the costs 
of all firms, given the presence of an industry union (setting a uniform wage). There is thus 
a raising rivals' cost effect implying that downstream firms investing in cost-reduction become 
stronger competitors. This effect implies a strategic incentive for R&D that is prevalent under 
a floating wage contract. However, it is argued that this strategic motive is not strong enough 
to compensate for the lower efficiency of a floating wage contract due to wages increases, so 
that a fixed wage contract (where wages are set before the firms' investment decisions) leads 
to higher investment, which works towards higher profits and union utility. Thus, altering the 
sequencing of R&D investment and wage determination allows us to shed some light on the 
relationship between unions and R&D, a key issue of the literature on unionised oligopoly. 
We consider a two-tier market structure where a multitude of downstream firms face an 
upstream labour union. The production of one unit of the final good requires one unit of labour. 
Marginal production costs thus consist of wage costs plus the incremental cost of producing one 
unit of output. Our analysis further rests on the assumption that the union sets the wage 
unilaterally, whereas employment decisions remain at the discretion of the firms (monopoly 
union model). Alternative contracts specify the sequencing of cost-reducing investment and 
wage determination. Three conceivable contract structures emerge. Under a floating wage 
contract investment decisions are made prior to the wage selection, whereas under a fixed wage 
contract the sequencing of these choices is reversed. Finally, there is an intermediate type 
of arrangement, a reference wage contract, where investment and wage decisions take place 
simultaneously (rather than sequentially). In the last stage of each game, firms compete a la 
Cournot in the market of a homogeneous good. 
Within this context, R&D investments by the downstream firms affect the labour union. 
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That is, a higher investment in R&D reduces production costs and thus expands output. How-
ever, for a firm facing a floating wage contract this direct effect is moderated by wage increases 
due to a higher labour demand. It is clear that this countervailing effect is absent for a fixed 
wage contract, where wages are set prior to investment decisions, so that a fixed wage contract 
encourages R&D spending relative to a floating wage contract. An additional strategic effect 
of a floating wage contract should be taken into account: a higher wage drives up the costs of 
all downstream firms, given that wage decisions are made at an industry level. It turns out, 
though, that the lower efficiency of a floating wage contract cannot be matched by the strategic 
motive of cost-reducing investment - the raising rivals' cost effect. Thus, a fixed wage contract 
leads to a higher level of investment, employment, profits and union utility, which points to 
the benefits of this type of contractual relationship. Importantly, the desirability of a fixed 
wage contract reflects its higher efficiency, which, we argue, remains largely independent of the 
number of downstream firms, the extent of technological spillovers, the degree of wage setting 
centralisation, and the variable over which competition takes place in the product market. 
Some of the themes in this chapter have also been analysed in a number of other papers. 
Banerjee and Lin (2003) have shown that in the presence of an industry-wide input supplier, 
a fixed wage contract leads to higher investment and profits for the downstream firms. We 
extend their model by allowing for spillover effects among the downstream firms and analyse 
how such spillovers influence the main forces that drive the results in this setting: the raising 
rivals' cost effect and the level of cost-reduction. The presence of spillovers is shown to reduce 
the level of cost-reduction, and even more so concerning the potential for raising the costs of 
rival firms, so that a fixed wage contract can produce a higher level of firm profit than a floating 
wage contract. However, we identify the role of spillovers as a key determinant of the profit 
comparison between a floating and a reference wage contract. Thus, our analysis demonstrates 
that the assumption of zero spillovers should not always be considered "innocuous" in this 
setting. 
Lyons and Sekkat (1991) explore an alternative way of mitigating the union's opportunistic 
behaviour: subcontracting (or outsourcing) a particular stage of production may erode the 
union's bargaining power, so that vertical separation can lead to higher profits than integration. 
Our approach is different in several important ways. We focus instead on the sequencing of 
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R&D investment and wage determination as a means of mitigating the union's opportunism. 
Moreover, we allow for a downstream oligopoly, rather than monopoly, which is crucial for our 
understanding of the strategic incentives for cost-reducing investment - the potential for raising 
rivals' costs that emerges under a floating wage contract. Finally, the investment level in the 
present chapter is endogenously determined and technological spillovers are present across firms 
at the downstream section of the industry. 
Chapter 4: Wage-Setting Institutions and R&D Collaboration Networks 
The number of R&D alliances has increased markedly over recent years. At the same time, 
we witnessed an evolution in labour market institutions concerning the level where collective 
contracts are negotiated and formally set. Most European countries progressively adopted wage 
setting systems characterised by a lower degree of centralisation, allowing wages to become more 
flexible to reflect 'local' conditions at the firm-level. 
The relation between labour market institutions and R&D networks has received very little 
attention in the literature. In this chapter, we argue that the interplay between wage setting 
institutions and endogenous research networks is crucial for our understanding of strategic 
behaviour in a unionised oligopoly. Our analysis reflects the idea that the level within the 
industry at which wages are set determines firms' incentives for R&D collaborations. The 
resulting network of collaboration serves as a natural context for analysing firms' investment 
decisions, as exemplified by Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr (1996). 
In particular, the present chapter addresses the following questions: (i) What are the in-
centives of competing firms to establish R&D alliances, and what is the architecture of the 
network(s) that will endogenously emerge? (ii) What is the role of labour unions in influencing 
firms' incentives for R&D collaboration? (iii) Could it be the case that the empirically observed 
labour market deregulation offers an alternative explanation for the substantial increase in the 
number of collaborative agreements over the recent years? 
To answer these questions, we consider a four-stage game that proceeds as follows. In stage 
one, firms decide their collaborative links. Four conceivable network architectures emerge from 
this stage in the context of an industry consisting of three firms. Under the complete network, all 
firms are connected, whereas under the empty network firms remain as independent competitors. 
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Under a partially connected network, two firms maintain a collaborative agreement while the 
other remains isolated. Finally, under a star network, there is a "hub" firm that is connected 
with two "spoke" firms, which are directly connected with the "hub" and indirectly connected 
with each other. In stage two, firms invest into cost-reduction to improve their production 
efficiency. In stage three, wages are set according to the mode of labour market organisation. 
Finally, in stage four, competition takes place in the product market. 
We first examine the firms' incentives to form collaborative links under centralised wage 
setting. We show that previous findings about decentralised wage setting can be altered when 
wages are set at an industry level. In particular, we find that a partially connected network 
will endogenously emerge as long as the spillover rate is sufficiently high. To understand the 
intuition behind this result, consider a decentralised wage setting system, i.e. firm-level unions 
set firm-specific wages. In this case, a partially connected network implies that the two linked 
firms are more efficient than the isolated firm and thus incur higher wage costs. The higher 
wages tend to diminish the competitive advantage of the linked firms, which makes them willing 
to offer a link to the isolated firm so as to form a complete network. 
Our analysis reveals that the former conclusion can be altered in the presence of an industry-
wide union: the linked firms within a partially connected network incur the same wage costs 
as their rival while enjoying higher efficiency, which serves to strengthen the own competitive 
position when spillovers are sufficiently high. Therefore, the partially connected network en-
dogenously emerges not only as pairwise stable but also strongly stable network. Thus, contrary 
to a decentralised regime that leads to a complete network, the resulting network architecture 
is a partially connected network when the firms face an industry union. We also note that 
a complete network arises when an industry union sets the wage, but it can never be stable 
in the event of deviations by a coalition of firms in this setting. Furthermore, our analysis 
reveals that in the 'intermediate' case of wage setting coordination, the network structure that 
will endogenously emerge is a complete network when the spillover level is not too high. As a 
result, a decrease in the degree of wage setting centralisation can make the decision for R&D 
collaboration more prevalent, which is supported by the aforementioned stylised facts. 
Our analysis extends the extensive literature that has highlighted the links between union-
isation and innovation (e.g. Grout, 1984; Tauman and Weiss, 1987; Ulph and Ulph, 1989, 
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1994, 2001; Calabuig and GonzaJez-Maestre, 2002; Haucap and Wey, 2004). A review of this 
literature is taken up in chapter 3. This literature investigates firms' incentives to undertake 
investments in cost-reduction, but assumes that firms remain independent competitors. In con-
trast, we analyse the incentives for, and the effects of, R&D collaboration in the presence of 
different union structures. 
We also contribute to the literature on R&D collaboration in unionised oligopoly. To the 
best of our knowledge, there is only one paper that has focused on the relation between labour 
unions and R&D networks. Mauleon, Sempere-Monerris and Vannetelbosch (2008) show that 
a move from no unions to firm-level unions leads to networks with a larger number of links, i.e. 
networks that are more symmetric. This suggests that labour market deregulation generates 
a lower level of research collaboration, which is in sharp contrast with the empirical evidence. 
Perhaps their result is due to the fact that a move from firm-level unions to no unions is not in 
line with the stylised facts either. Allowing for the variety of forms that wage setting institutions 
can take (including decentralised wage setting as in Mauleon et aI., 2008), the present chapter 
provides an alternative explanation for the growth in the number of R&D alliances by means of 
the observed labour market deregulation over the recent years. Finally, Mauleon et al. (2008) do 
not compare total investment and employment levels in the context of (stable) R&D networks. 
The final section of chapter 4 undertakes this, with a view to providing new insights into the 
role of wage setting institutions for investment and employment decisions. 
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Chapter 1 
Public Policy towards R&D • In a 
Mixed Market with Spillovers1 
1.1 Introduction 
The theoretical literature on R&D has dealt extensively with the issues of investment in cost-
reducing R&D in the presence of spillovers. In fact, the seminal paper by d' Aspremont and 
Jacquemin (1988) has been stimulating for a number of authors who have extended this original 
model in several ways. However, in this context the presence of public (or state-owned) firms 
and the potential role of public policy in the form of R&D subsidies and privatisation have not 
been addressed. Yet, there is ample evidence of the public sector, broadly defined as state-
owned laboratories, public universities, technological institutes and public enterprises, being a 
key player in innovative industries. In particular, state-owned enterprises have played a major 
role in the development and evolution of national innovation systems by means of their R&D 
investments (see Katz, 2001). 
An example of public firms' importance in terms of R&D investment is observed in the 
health sector, where private and public firms typically coexist. Nowadays, the health sector 
is facing major challenges that call for improved quality and increased efficiency in resource 
IThe present chapter is joint work with Maria Jose Gil·Molto and Joanna Poyago-Theotoky. 
This work has been presented at Alicante, Leicester (Ph.D. conference) as well as at the EARIE 
meeting in 2006 (Amsterdam). We thank seminar participants for their helpful comments and 
useful discussions. 
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utilisation. By means of their R&D activities, hospitals attempt to improve their organisational 
arrangements, existing processes or work practises and even develop new technologies. For 
example, Aanestad et aI., (2003) provide empirical evidence from the Interventional Centre 
established as a medical R&D department in a Norwegian public hospital (Rikshospitalet) in 
order to explore and develop new technologies and procedures. Another example of the key role 
played by public firms in the development of new technologies comes from agriculture, where 
the public sector has been the primary source of research in biotechnology (Oehmke, 2001). 
It is also important to note that the emergence and development of many discoveries in R&D 
intensive industries has been facilitated by public funding as in the case of the biotechnology 
sector (Hart, 1998). This highlights the importance of the role that technology policy in the 
form of R&D subsidisation can play in high-tecll industries. 
Furthermore, there is an ongoing debate about the effects and advisability of privatisation, 
which has consequently generated a great deal of interest among economists concerning mixed 
markets, on the one hand, and the potential welfare effects of privatisation, on the other.2 To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to study efficiency-enhancing (or cost-reducing) 
R&D in the context of a mixed duopoly with spillovers and R&D subsidies. Our aim is to 
shed some light on the effect of R&D subsidies and spillovers on the R&D investments of the 
public and the private firm and the comparative performance of the firms in R&D investment. 
Evidence on the latter issue goes back to the seminal works by Nelson (1959) and Arrow 
(1962) identifying a gap between private and social returns to R&D. 3 We are also interested 
in exploring the interaction between R&D subsidies and spillovers. Finally, we investigate 
the effects of privatisation on the optimal subsidy, industry investment and analyse whether 
privatisation would be welfare-enhancing if subsidies were provided by the regulator. 
In this chapter, a key feature is the failure of the R&D market to generate socially optimal 
levels. An understanding of the relevant forces at work in determining the market outcome 
provides a useful framework within which our model can be analysed. These forces may be 
explained as follows. 
'See e.g., De Fraja and Delbono (1989), Fjell and Pal (1996), Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1997), Mat-
sumura (1998), Pal and White (1998), Matsumura and Kanda (2005) and Fujiwara (2007). 
:l According to this observation, public firms are more likely to address 'social' (welfare maximisation) than 
pure 'firm-specific' (profit maximisation) objectives and in turn to spend more in R&D. 
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Consider initially the case of no spillover; that is, R&D is perfectly appropriable. In the 
course of conducting R&D prior to choosing output firms will tend to overinvest in R&D as a 
means of enhancing their own competitive position at the expense of their rivals. There is thus 
a strategic over-investment effect. In contrast, when there are positive spillovers, the larger the 
spillover the smaller the amount of R&D (Ulph, 1999). This is a strategic underinvestment 
effect. However, these standard results can be altered when a public firm competes against a 
private firm. We show that the level of industry investment is lower than the social optimum 
when there is no spillover. Furthermore, even though the private firm invests less in R&D when 
the spillover rate increases,'l the public firm's higher investment can redress the balance, so that 
industry investment increases with the level of spillovers. Yet, industry investment is below the 
socially optimal level, which can be addressed by an R&D subsidy. 
A private firm, in addition, does not take into account consumer surplus in its objective 
function. This implies another type of market failure, the so-called under-valuation effect (see 
Ulph, 1999). In contrast, the public firm's objective is consistent with welfare maximisation, 
which in turn promotes an increase in the equilibrium level of R&D. This means that the public 
firm may serve as an instrument for alleviating underinvestment. However, there is a second 
and opposing force. Namely, the public firm will introduce another type of market failure -
inefficiency in production - related to the composition of R&D. That is, there is an asymmetry 
in the distribution of post-investment costs: the greater is the asymmetry, the higher is the 
average industry cost, given that marginal cost is increasing (see e.g. Barros, 1995).5 
In the sequel, we postulate that the failure of the R&D market to generate socially optimal 
levels is addressed by a subsidy to R&D output. Public policy has two main objectives. First, 
to remedy the market failure related to the composition of R&D by redistributing production 
from the public to the private firm. This reflects the cost shifting role of the optimal subsidy 
that helps improve the distribution of production costs, thus increasing productive efficiency. 
The second role of the subsidy is to address underinvestment by increasing the total level of 
R&D and hence output. Since the regulator faces several failures, both in the R&D and output 
market with one policy tool at her disposal, this approach naturally translates into a second 
4The private firm's investment is increasing rather than decreasing when spillovers are very large. 
S Notice that the fundamental failures arising in the R&D market coexist with the ones in the output market 
- imperfect competition and inefficient distribution of post-R&D costs. 
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best optimal solution. 
The present chapter contributes to the growing literature on mixed oligopoly.6 One of 
the main themes in this literature is whether privatisation improves social welfare when firms 
are competitors in the product market (e.g. Anderson, de Palma and Thisse, 1997; Matsumura 
and Kanda, 2005; Fujiwara, 2007). Few exceptions include the papers by Delbono and Denicol" 
(1993), Poyago-Theotoky (1998), as well as Ishibashi and Matsumura (2006) that study R&D 
competitionJ Specifically, Delbono and Denicol" (1993) and Poyago-Theotoky (1998) discuss 
the role of a public firm in regulating innovative activity when in the course of the R&D race 
there are no spillovers in the former study, or imitation is easy in the latter. These models, 
allowing firms to choose only their investment level, have been recently extended by Ishibashi 
and Matsumura (2006) to a framework where both the innovation size and investment level are 
endogenous. However, these contributions have not considered the role of subsidies in regulating 
R&D activity. 
Our model involves a homogeneous good Cournot duopoly in which firms undertake cost-
reducing (process) innovation. This draws on and extends d' Aspremont and Jacquemin's 
(1988) seminal contribution by introducing a public firm and subsidies towards R&D into the 
frame of analysis. We show that the optimal R&D subsidy is always positive and increasing 
in the degree of spillovers, both in the private and the mixed market. Moreover, we find that 
private industries should be subsidised less than mixed ones. Our findings also suggest that 
even though the R&D of the public firm may decrease as a result of privatisation, the R&D of 
the private firm may increase or decrease depending on the rate of spillovers and, consequently, 
on the extent of the appropriability problem. Finally, regarding the effects of privatisation on 
social welfare, our analysis reveals that privatisation is likely to be welfare reducing as long as 
the number of private firms is relatively small. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the related literature on 
(J For example, l3arcena-Ruiz and Garz6n (2003) examine the decision for merger in mixed duopoly; 1.'latsumura 
(2003) studies endogenous timing in the presence of a foreign firm; Lu (2006) addresses the same question with 
a larger number of firms both in the domestic and foreign market; and Barcena-Ruiz (2007) endogenises the 
decision about the timing of price selection in a mixed duopoly. For more details refer to the next section. 
7Within a Hotelling-type spatial model , Matsumura and Matsushima (2004) endogenise production costs of 
a mixed duopoly by introducing cost reducing activities. Nett (1994) established as to why public firms opt 
for producing at a higher cost than private firms. Further, Nett showed that welfare in a private duopoly may 
exceed welfare in a mixed one. 
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mixed oligopoly. The model is presented in section 1.3. Sections 1.4 and 1.5 study the cases of 
a mixed and a private duopoly, respectively. A comparison of both cases and the implications 
for policy-making are discussed in Section 1.6. The next sections 1.7 and 1.8 extend the basic 
model in two main directions: first, by considering subsidies to R&D expenditure; second, by 
investigating the case of more than one private firm by means of numerical simulations. Finally, 
section 1.9 concludes and discusses some directions for further research. The derivation of the 
social optimum for the mixed duopoly model is presented in the Appendix. 
1.2 Related literature on mixed oligopoly 
Public firms are present in several industries such as banking and insurance, gasoline distrib-
ution, radio, television, automobile and steel (Anderson, de Palma and Thisse, 1997). Mixed 
oligopoly is an imperfectly competitive form of market in which a welfare-maximising public 
firm (typically there is only one) competes with a multitude of profit-maximising private firms 
(De Fraja and Delbono, 1989; Poyago-Theotoky, 2001; Anderson, de Palma and Thisse, 1997). 
The main issue at stake concerns the welfare effects of privatisation: if the government (or 
regulator) would adopt privatisation programmes, what would be the optimal prescription for 
privatisation? The present section aims at providing an answer to this question by reviewing the 
bulk of the mixed oligopoly literature, concentrating mainly on theoretical studies of this phe-
nomenon. Before proceeding, it is useful to mention briefly some evidence about privatisation, 
and discuss its desirability following the study by Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1997). 
During the last decades, extensive privatisation programmes were undertaken in Africa, 
Asia, Latin America and in the former Soviet bloc countries. For instance, in Britain in the 1980s 
a variety of firms were privatised such as British Telecom, British Gas, the power electricity 
industry, and the water industry (see Anderson et aI., 1997). Since all these firms were natural 
monopolies, this perhaps can be identified as the main economic reason behind privatisation. 
In other cases, for example in Eastern Europe, the primary motivation for privatisation was the 
introduction of competition and the transformation of these economies from central command 
to market economies. Thus the reasons behind privatisation can be quite diverse, depending 
on the specific circumstances and needs of each economy. The privatisation programmes that 
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were implemented led to substantial restructuring in various sectors such as insurance, banking, 
automobiles and aircrafts, among others. 
Several explanations have been advanced for the popularity of privatisation. First is the 
desire to foster competition by reducing the control of the government in the economy. Second 
is the need to raise revenues; and third is the general perception of the public that state-owned 
firms are less efficient than their private counterparts - again see Anderson et al. (1997). The 
latter is a highly controversial issue and several authors have attempted to provide explanations 
concerning the relative performance of public and private firms. 
On the one hand, De Fraja (1993) and Nett (1994), among others, have argued that public 
firms have higher costs and thus are less efficient than private firms. For instance, De Fraja 
(1993) pointed out that in a mixed duopoly the higher costs of the public firm are due to higher 
wages it needs to pay its workers. These higher wages are due to the public firm's maximising 
behaviour rather than the outcome of any enhancing effect of public ownership. Noting that 
a mixed market is more competitive relative to a private one, this in turn means that the size 
of the surplus to be negotiated in a mixed market between the management and the union of 
the private firm is smaller (relative to the surplus of the public firm), thereby leading to higher 
wages in the public firm. 
We now make two additional key remarks: first, the present result has been obtained under 
the assumption that there exist firm-level unions. Indeed, this is in line with recent trends in 
Europe and the US towards decentralised wage setting regimes (see OECD, 2004). Second, 
as De Fraja (1993) has pointed out, a public monopolist will pay a lower wage than a private 
monopolist, unless union utility has a high weight in the welfare function. This is because 
an increase in the wage increases costs and the market price, thus leading to lower consumer 
surplus and profits, although the union rents become higher. It turns out that the latter positive 
effect will dominate the negative effects on profits and consumer surplus as long as the union 
utility is weighted relatively high in the social welfare function. 
Other reasons that have been advanced for explaining the higher operational costs of public 
firms relate to the issues of protection from market discipline and managerial control. More 
precisely, public firms are immune from take-over, bankruptcy and stock market discipline 
(Anderson et aI., 1997; Estrin and Perotin, 1991). Furthermore, public firms are subject to the 
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"whims of politicians" as well as to the fear of politicians that they may not be re-elected. In 
addition, it may not be totally clear who is the principal in a public firm, since the government 
can be considered as the agent of the voters. 
On the other hand, Millward and Parker (1983) found no significant evidence in favour of 
a positive cost differential between public and private firms. Estrin and Perotin (1991) noted 
that, under certain circumstances, public ownership can improve the internal efficiency of a 
corporation. In particular, when market failures are present and private monitoring is weak 
then nationalisation can improve the management of a corporation provided that it adopts 
clear-cut objectives. It is also interesting to cite some empirical evidence on the relative R&D 
performance of state-owned and private enterprises. For example, Poyago-Theotoky (1998) 
mentions empirical evidence in Malerba (1993) suggesting that in Italy from the 1960's through 
to the 1980's two public firms have been among the top investors in R&D. In another study, 
Stembacka and Tombak (1996) bring evidence on the public sector's GDP in Finland in 1995 
which contributed around 59.8% in the total GDP while some public firms outperformed their 
private counterparts in terms of R&D spending. 
Next, we proceed to review the literature on mixed oligopoly starting with the seminal 
contribution by De Fraja and Delbono (1989). The study by De Fraja and Delbono (1989) 
has been influential for a number of subsequent authors who attempted to evaluate the welfare 
effects of privatisation in various contexts: when the regulator uses policy instruments (subsidies 
and/or tariffs); in the presence of foreign (private) firms; when the timing of firms' moves is 
changed (leader/follower roles). De Fraja and Delbono (1989) showed that in the context of 
a mixed oligopoly, where a public firm competes with a multitude of private firms, welfare is 
maximised by nationalising the entire industry. Welfare will be lower when the public firm acts 
as a Stackelberg leader compared to the case of full nationalisation. It should also be noted that 
when the public firm acts as a Stackelberg leader all firms price above marginal cost. This is 
because the public firm, which is less efficient than the private ones (due to increasing marginal 
costs), transfers some part of its production to its more efficient private counterparts; by doing 
so, the public firm increases welfare by reducing total production costs. 
Next, comparing the cases where the public firm acts simultaneously with the private firms 
to maximise welfare (Cournot-Nash conjecture), or alternatively, it is privatised and maximises 
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own profits, De Fraja and Delbono (1989) showed that a welfare-maximising public firm may 
reduce welfare as long as the number of private firms in the industry is sufficiently large. In 
other words, privatisation may be socially beneficial only in industries that are sufficiently 
competitive. The intuition is as follows. Privatisation secures a higher level of productive 
efficiency because firms produce an equal amount of output and thereby operate at equal costs. 
However, privatisation incurs welfare losses because it reduces allocative efficiency. A lower 
level of allocative efficiency reflects the lower output in a private market (relative to a mixed 
market) that leads to higher prices and firm profit. The resulting losses in terms of allocative 
efficiency will be relative small when the market is sufficiently competitive, so that privatisation 
increases the level of social welfare. It should also be noted that neither having a public firm 
to act simultaneously with the private firms nor privatising it is a better option from a social 
viewpoint relative to the cases of full nationalisation or public Stackelberg leadership. 
The last issue to address in this framework concerns the preferences of private actors among 
the different regimes. De Fraja and Delbono (1989) found that it is more preferable that the 
public firm acts as a Stackelberg leader rather than simultaneously with the private firms, as 
in the latter case it leaves little room for private production. 
More recently, White (1996) extended the seminal contribution by De Fraja and Delbono 
(1989) to investigate the role of production subsidies in influencing the privatisation decision. 
In this framework, an optimal production subsidy has a dual effect: first, it redistributes pro-
duction from the less efficient public firm to the more efficient private firms, so that production 
is equalised across firms (cost-shifting effect). The need for redistributing production costs 
sterns from the difference in the nature of the firms' objectives (welfare-maximisation versus 
profit-maximisation). Second, an output subsidy that is set optimally by the regulator can 
increase the level of industry production. The need for higher industry production relates to 
the fact that markets are imperfectly competitive. Thus an optimal production subsidy can 
lead to a first best optimum, since there is only one market (output market) and one policy 
tool at the government's disposal. 
Utilising this dual role of an optimal production subsidy, White (1996) reached two main 
conclusions: first, if a mixed oligopoly receives subsidies but a private one does not, then 
privatisation decreases social welfare. This result should come at no surprise given the way 
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the policy instrument is used by the regulator. Second, if both the mixed and the private 
oligopolies are subsidised, then social welfare and the optimal subsidy remain unchanged as 
a result of privatisation. Moreover, the equilibrium output, profits and consumer surplus are 
identical across the two regimes. 
This result was somewhat surprising since privatisation was shown for first time not to be 
welfare-related provided that the government has access to tools of subsidisation. It was only 
until recently that Poyago-Theotoky (2001) explained intuitively this result and showed that 
privatisation is not welfare-related whether the public firm: (i) moves simultaneously with the 
private firms, (ii) acts as a Stackelberg leader, or (iii) is privatised and acts simultaneously with 
the private firms to maximise profits; so-called "irrelevance" result. The intuition behind this 
stems from the observation that since the government has access to tools of subsidisation it can 
attain the first best. Therefore, the order of the firms' moves or the potential for privatisation is 
irrelevant, since the social optimum is unique. Myles (2002) showed that this result obtains for 
general demand and cost functions and, more recently, Zikos (2007) showed that this result may 
hold even when firms carry out R&D (prior to choosing output) provided that the government 
sets R&D subsidies optimally in addition to output subsidies - the first best can be restored. 
Fjell and Heywood (2004) argued that the irrelevance result obtains under the assumption 
that a public firm acts simultaneously with the private firms in the post-privatisation regime. 
However, it is often the case that a public leader that is privatised becomes a private leader; 
examples being the privatisation of large airline carriers, telecommunications companies and 
postal companies. Thus, if the public firm retains its leadership after privatisation this makes 
the irrelevance result to vanish (Fjell and Heywood, 2004). The intuition is that the subsidy, 
which is assumed identical across firms, increases the leader's output more than the output of 
the followers. This means that the optimal subsidy reinforces the first mover advantage of the 
leading firm and, as a consequence, it cannot restore cost efficiency. In fact, the public leader 
produces an output such that marginal cost exceeds price, but the private firms produce a level 
of output for which price is larger than marginal cost. Thus, a second best allocation can be 
attained, which makes the irrelevance result to vanish. 
Fjell and Heywood (2004) also found that privatisation causes the optimal subsidy to fall. 
The main reason behind this outcome is that the effectiveness of the optimal subsidy in the 
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post-privatisation regime is reduced, as it cannot restore cost efficiency (i.e. the public leader 
produces a larger output and operates at a higher marginal cost than the followers). 
It is worth noting that the "relevance" of privatisation shown by Fjell and Heywood (2004) 
relies heavily on the assumption that firms receive identical subsidies. If one allows instead for 
firm-specific subsidies, it can be shown that the first best optimum can be attained and thus 
the irrelevance result can be restored (see Zikos, 2007). This is because the use of asymmetric 
subsidies implies that, in equilibrium, the leader is subsidised to a lesser extent than the follow-
ers. Thus, the cost redistribution role of the optimal subsidy is regained, which coupled with 
its output expansion role can lead to a first best allocation. 
The studies above have concentrated on the interaction effects underlying the relationship 
between a public firm and several private firms located in the market of a single country. Fjell 
and Pal (1996) were the first to allow for foreign private firms within the same model, so as to 
examine the welfare effects of an open door policy (Le. entry of foreign firms into the domestic 
market), as well as the welfare effects of foreign acquisition of domestic (private) firms. Fjell 
and Pal (1996) found that entry of a foreign private firm into the domestic market can increase 
welfare as long as the number of domestic private firms is relatively small relative to the number 
of foreign firms. We now explain the reason. When a foreign firm enters the domestic market 
it increases total output, and this lowers the price and raises consumer surplus. On the other 
hand, foreign entry implies that some of the profit is captured and transferred away from the 
home country. It turns out the latter negative effect will be relatively small - and will thus be 
dominated by the positive effect of entry - as long as the number of domestic private firms is 
relatively small. It is in that case that the profit loss from entry will be relatively small to allow 
for an increase in social welfare. 
Concerning the effect of foreign acquisition of domestic firms Fjell and Pal (1996) found 
that it is always negative. The intuition is quite simple: the public firm maximises welfare by 
choosing an output level such that the marginal increase in consumer surplus is matched by the 
marginal decrease in producer surplus. The effect of foreign acquisition of a domestic firm is to 
reduce producer surplus. This in turn implies that the public firm can produce a larger amount 
of output. The increase in the public firm's output will shift outwards its reaction curve, which 
in turn will reduce the private firms' output, prompting an inward shift of the private firms' 
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reaction functions. In fact, the marginal increase in the public firm's output will be larger than 
the marginal decrease in the private firms' output. This implies that total output will be higher, 
thereby leading to a lower price and higher consumer surplus. It turns out that the increase in 
consumer surplus is always dominated by the decrease in the producer surplus, implying that 
foreign acquisition of a domestic firm is welfare detrimental. Thus, it is likely that industry 
participants will lobby against the acquisition of domestic firms. 
More recently, Pal and White (1998) extended Fjell and Pal's (1996) contribution to inves-
tigate the interaction effects between strategic trade policies (production subsidies and tariffs) 
and privatisation. We first discuss the effects of an optimal subsidy both before and after pri-
vatisation. Before privatisation, the direct effect of the subsidy is to redistribute production 
from the less efficient public firm to the more efficient private firms in the domestic market. In 
addition, as the optimal subsidy expands the domestic production of private firms, it reduces 
the output of the foreign firms (import-reducing effect). After privatisation, the direct effect of 
the subsidy vanishes, since production is equalised across the firms. However, the need for the 
indirect effect of the subsidy (which is import-reduction) becomes more prominent because pri-
vatisation reduces total output in the domestic market. It turns out that privatisation reduces 
the optimal subsidy because it causes its direct effect to vanish, even though the need for its 
indirect effect grows larger (Pal and White, 1998). 
We now turn to the effects of an optimal tariff. An optimal tariff works in exactly the 
opposite direction of a subsidy: its direct effect is to reduce production of the foreign private 
firms (import-reducing effect). As a result, the output reaction functions of the domestic private 
firms shift outwards, reducing the output of the public firm - a cost-redistribution effect. After 
privatisation, the need for the direct effect of the tariff becomes more prominent, and as in the 
case of an optimal subsidy, the need for cost-shift between the privatised public firm and private 
firms in the domestic market vanishes. It turns out that privatisation causes the optimal tariff 
to rise as the need for its direct effect grows larger after privatisation, while the need for its 
indirect effect vanishes. 
We now take up the issue of the welfare effects of privatisation under optimal production 
subsidies. On the one hand, privatisation decreases consumer surplus as it restricts output and 
increases the price. On the other hand, privatisation reduces gross profits (i.e. profits plus the 
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subsidy), although it increases net profits. It turns out that the positive effect on (net) profits 
dominates the negative effect on consumer surplus, thus leading to an increase in social welfare 
with privatisation8 It is worth mentioning that this result holds even with a small number 
of firms, implying that De Fraja and Delbono's (1989) conclusion that privatisation may raise 
welfare as long as the market is sufficiently competitive, may not be always valid in the context 
of an international oligopoly with domestic production subsidies. 
When the government uses an optimal production tariff, then, on the one hand, privatisation 
reduces consumer surplus, but it increases domestic profits and tariff revenues, on the other. It 
turns out that the negative effect of privatisation on consumer surplus dominates its positive 
effect on producer surplus and tariff revenues only if the number of firms in the domestic market 
is relatively small; otherwise, the result is reversed and privatising the public firm leads to an 
increase in overall welfare in the domestic market. 
The next question naturally arises: under which circumstances should a production subsidy 
be preferred over a tariff, and vice versa? The answer to this question is quite simple: noting 
that the direct effect of the subsidy is to stimulate domestic production, with its indirect effect 
being to restrict foreign production, it follows that a subsidy is preferable over a tariff as long as 
the efficiency of the production technology in the domestic market is not too low. By contrast, 
when the production technology is relatively inefficient, then a production tariff is optimal as it 
can avoid, to some extent, over-stimulating the domestic production (see Pal and White, 1998). 
We next discnss the main results concerning endogenous timing of moves in a mixed market. 
The discussion follows an excellent survey by Barcena-Ruiz (2007). In the same paper Barcena-
Ruiz also discusses the issue of endogenous timing in price setting that arises in a mixed d uopoly 
with differentiated goods. In all cases, the order of the firms' moves is determined by utilising 
the observable delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). According to this game, in the first 
stage, firms announce simultaneously the time period they will take their actions and commit 
to this decision. Note that the assumption of commitment is not restrictive in the sense that 
firms will have no incentives to renege in a later time period (Pal, 1998). At the following stages 
(or time periods) firms take their actions according to their previous announcements. The main 
8 Note, however, that because privatisation reduces both consumer surplus and gross (domestic) profits all 
agents in the market are likely to oppose it (Pal and \Vhite, 1998). 
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objective is to solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this extended form game. 
Starting from the case of a private duopoly as a benchmark, the order of the firms' moves 
depends on the slope of their reaction functions. If the firms' actions are strategic complements 
(the reaction functions are upward sloping), then if one firm prefers to be the leader the other 
firm will want to be a follower. By contrast, if the firms' actions are strategic substitutes, then 
both firms will want to act as leaders. The intuition is that if the leading firm expands its 
quantity, this will lead to a contraction of the follower's quantity. In this case, both firms will 
take their actions simultaneously in the Nash equilibrium of the game. 
By contrast, in a mixed oligopoly with homogeneous goods (quantities are strategic substi-
tutes) Pal (1998) showed that when a public firm maximises welfare and private firms maximise 
profits, firms will take their actions sequentially. The same result obtains in the context of an 
internationally integrated product market with foreign private firms in the spirit of Fjell and 
Pal (1996) - see Matsumura (2003) and Lu (2006). More precisely, in the context of a domestic 
market the public firm can either be a Stackelberg leader or follower, but when foreign firms 
are added into the frame of analysis the public firm will always act as a leader. In fact, in 
the latter case the desirable (from a social welfare viewpoint) and the equilibrium roles of the 
public firm coincide. 
We now explain the endogenous roles of the firms under price (Bertrand) competition fol-
lowing the recent contribution by Ba-rcena-Ruiz (2007). Note first that when the goods are 
homogeneous the price is driven down to marginal cost, and therefore, the question about 
leader and follower roles is not anymore relevant. Turning to case of differentiated goods in a 
private duopoly (as a benchmark), Barcena-Ruiz (2007) shows that when firms act sequentially 
profits and prices are higher than under simultaneous play. This stems from the fact that prices 
are strategic complements, implying that the leader will choose a higher price than the follower 
and both prices will be higher than the simultaneous case. As a result, firms will prefer to 
choose their prices sequentially. By contrast, in a mixed duopoly this is no longer true since 
both firms will want to be the leaders. On the one hand, the private firm wants to be a leader 
as it can increase its price, knowing that the public firm will increase its price too (given that 
prices are strategic complements). By analogous reasoning, the public firm wants to be a leader 
in order to increase competition by lowering its price, anticipating that the private firm will 
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reduce its price too. As a consequence, both firms will choose their prices simultaneously. Note 
that this outcome resembles the aforementioned finding in a private market when firms face 
downward sloping reaction functions. This completes our review of the literature on endogenous 
timing of moves in mixed oligopoly. 
We now turn to the literature dealing with innovation decisions in a mixed market. The 
model developed in chapter 1 is placed within the context of this literature and builds on the 
seminal contribution by d' Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), i.e. R&D is of non-tournament 
nature. Chapter 1 extends the paper by d' Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) by incorporat-
ing a public firm among the market participants, as well as subsidies to MD output. The 
literature mentioned above is scarce. Nett (1994) considered a non-tournament R&D setting 
where firms can implement a new technology that brings their marginal cost down to zero while 
incurring a fixed cost. In the context of a mixed duopoly, she showed that a public firm will opt 
for producing at a higher marginal cost than its private counterpart. Nett (1994) also showed 
that, under certain circumstances, welfare in the private duopoly may be higher than the level 
achieved in the mixed duopoly, which points towards privatising the public firm in some cases 
concerning the cost of adopting the new technology. However, the paper by Nett (1994) ne-
glected appropriability issues of research results and R&D was assumed a deterministic process 
(i.e. there is no uncertainty of the research outcome). 
Delbono and Denicolo (1993) investigated the issue of regulating a private duopoly market 
under the assumption of perfectly protected innovations. When the research output is perfectly 
appropriable, this leads to overinvestment in the private duopoly. Delbono and Denicolo (1993) 
modelled R&D as a patent race and showed that in a mixed duopoly the public firm can help 
alleviate the overinvestment problem by making a lower investment than the private firm, thus 
leading to an increase in social welfare. However, the assumption of perfect appropriability 
in R&D is crucial in the results obtained by Delbono and Denicolo (1993). In fact, Poyago-
Theotoky (1998) pointed out that most of these results can actually be reversed under the more 
plausible assumption of easy imitation. 
More precisely, Poyago-Theotoky (1998) showed that the public firm invests more in MD 
than the private one and that welfare in the mixed duopoly can be higher whenever the size of 
the reward to innovation is small enough. We now explain the reason. When the size of the 
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reward to innovation is relatively large, the private firm can benefit a lot from the efforts of the 
public firm (through easy imitation) by drastically cutting its R&D expenditure. In that case, 
the associated increase in the public firm's R&D does not suffice to balance the decrease in the 
private firm's R&D, so that total R&D decreases. This in turn implies that social welfare in 
the private duopoly will become higher. By contrast, when the size of the reward to innovation 
is relatively small the private firm does not stand to benefit a lot by reducing drastically its 
R&D, so that the associated increase in the public firm's R&D will lead to an increase in overall 
R&D spending. Thus welfare in the mixed duopoly will exceed the level achieved in the private 
duopoly. 
It is also interesting to discuss the main policy implications of this analysis. It is easy to 
see that innovations of a relatively large size should be left to private firms. Moreover, even for 
innovations of a small size a public firm should be used with caution as a policy instrument. 
This is because a public firm remedies the market failure associated with the total level of R&D 
but introduces another type of market failure related to the composition of R&D (Poyago-
Theotoky, 1998). The latter failure of the R&D market stems from the different nature of the 
objectives between the public and private firms. Thus, a public firm may be a useful policy 
instrument, although with certain limitations. 
Finally, we discuss briefly the papers by Matsumura (1998) and Matsumura and Kanda 
(2005). Matsumura (1998) deals with the issue of government share ownership in privatised 
firms. In a mixed duopoly where a privatised firm - assumed to maximise a weighted average 
of welfare and own profits - competes with a pure profit maximising firm, Matsumura (1998) 
shows that the government has incentives not to sell all its shares in the privatised firm. In other 
words, the government will prefer a partially privatised firm (to a fully privatised or nationalised 
firm) in the context of a mixed duopoly market. In contrast, Matsumura and Kanda (2005) 
showed that this result can be reversed in free entry markets. In this case, full nationalisation 
is optimal as it implies marginal cost pricing and thereby removes wasteful entry by private 
firms. 
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1.3 Contribution to the mixed oligopoly literature 
The issue lying behind this chapter is the recognition by policy makers and others that reliance 
on market processes alone leads to potential market failures. These market failures have to do 
with limited appropriability of new innovations, which stems from the public good nature of 
knowledge (Ulph, 1999). In this environment, it is widely accepted that firms will undertake 
smaller investments relative to the socially optimal allocation since the returns to R&D will 
be extremely low. As pointed out by Martin and Scott (2000), authorities can rely on many 
instruments, such as patent protection, competition policy, tax credits and subsidies, to address 
the underinvestment problem. 
Over the last decade there has been considerable interest in the role that public firms might 
play in helping to overcome some of the market failures associated with R&D (see e.g. Delbono 
and Denicolo, 1993; Poyago-Theotoky, 1998; Ishibashi and Matsumura, 2006). Economists have 
argued that public firms operate in the same markets as private firms and thus can be seen as a 
way of avoiding direct regulation and the consequent informational problems (Barros, 1995). In 
relation to this, Poyago-Theotoky (1998) has suggested that a public firm overinvests in R&D 
and so can increase the total level of investment. In the same study, however, one also needs to 
take into account that a public firm introduces inefficiency in production, which fundamentally 
stems from the differences in the firms' objectives - i.e. maximisation of welfare vs profit. This 
clearly suggests that the use of a public firm as policy tool alone does not suffice to overcome 
inefficiencies that are inherent in R&D and innovation. 
Moreover, the design of public policy stems from the recognition that output subsidies are 
typically prohibited in the context of collective agreements such as GATT and WTO. According 
to WTO (2009), a subsidy is defined as '(i) a financial contribution (ii) by a government or 
any public body within the territory of a Member (iii) which confers a benefit.' Given this 
definition, subsidies that distort the allocation of resources by supporting some Members at the 
expense of others' are prohibited.9 In contrast to output subsidies, antitrust laws encourage 
R&D subsidies, which are considered as a crucial ingredient of technology policy (Hart, 1998). 
Economic analyses considering together public firms and output subsidies abound (see e.g. 
!) An exception till the end of 2003 were subsidies on agricultural products under the Agriculture Agreement's 
"peace clause" . 
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White, 1996; Pal and White, 1998; Poyago-Theotoky, 2001; Fjell and Heywood, 2004). However, 
the issue of subsidising innovations in mixed markets has yet to be addressed. Accordingly the 
present chapter is a first step towards filling this gap in the economic literature. In this chapter 
we develop a model in which both the use of a public firm and R&D subsidies can be analysed. 
This not only allows to disentangle the role of each instrument, it also enables us to examine 
the implementation of both policies simultaneously. 
1.4 The model 
We consider a simple market setting consisting of two firms competing in output. We compare 
two market structures: a mixed duopoly (where one of the two firms is public) and a private 
duopoly. A private firm is assumed to be profit-maximiser while the public firm is assumed 
to maximise social welfare. In the case of the mixed duopoly, we denote with subscript 0 the 
public firm and with subscript 1 the private firm. The linear inverse demand function is of the 
standard form P(Q) = a - Q, where Q = qi + qj, i # j, i, j E {O, 1} and Q ~ a. 
Firms invest in R&D to lower their marginal cost following research paths that are perfect 
substitutes, i.e. we consider a non-tournament R&D setting.lO The effective level of R&D, Xi, 
represents the reduction in marginal cost due to R&D, and has two components: the level of 
own R&D output, Xi, and the competitor's R&D output, Xj, influencing firm i via spillovers 
Xi = x;+ (3Xj, i # j, i,j E {O, 1}, (1.1) 
where the extent of information leakage or degree of spillovers among firms is captured by the 
parameter (3, which is assumed to be exogenously given and 0 ~ (3 ~ 1. 
To avoid situations where the private firm is driven out of the market altogether, we as-
sume the existence of diminishing returns to scale by introducing a quadratic term related to 
production in the firms' cost function. Thus, firm i's total cost function depends on its level of 
production, Qi, and the effective level of R&D, Xi, 
Ci(qi,Xi) = (c- Xi)qi +q;, a> c > 0, i E {0,1}, (1.2) 
lOThis means that the research firms undertake leads to the same discovery. 
30 
Our modelling of the cost function reflects the fact that the public firm is ex ante equally 
efficient as the private firm. Noting that marginal costs are increasing, this leads to a higher 
cost for the public firm after production decisions have been made. According to White (2002) 
the ex ante equal efficiency assumption can be qualified in several ways. For instance, as there 
is mixed evidence concerning the relative efficiency of public and private firms the assumption 
of identical and symmetric technologies seems quite reasonable (see also De Fraja and Delbono, 
1989). Moreover, public firms that survive for a substantial time period may be considered at 
least as efficient as their private rivals. If the public firm was more efficient it would serve the 
entire market, and if it was too inefficient this would leave room for government intervention for 
either privatising or shutting down the public firm (White, 2002). As we intend in this chapter 
to examine strategic interactions between firms in mixed duopoly and the welfare effects of 
privatising the public firm, considering monopolistic public firms or private markets would not 
be relevant for our purposes. 
Given Ci(qi, X;), the marginal cost of production can be written as 
DC 
mCi = ~ = (C- Xi) +2qi· 
uqi 
(1.3) 
Notice that the effective level of R&D, Xi, affects only the intercept of the marginal cost 
(Le., it shifts the marginal cost curve downwards) but not its slope. This is the same effect 
that process R&D has on production costs in d' Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and followers, 
where production costs are assumed to be linear. 
R&D is costly with its cost given by r (Xi) = 'Yxl, 'Y > O. This reflects diminishing returns 
to the level of R&D investment (or effort/input) Xi. For tractability, we set 'Y = 1 which ensures 
non-negativity of all variables. Hence, by investing xl in R&D, a firm can lower its costs by 
Xi due to its own research effort and by an additional amount fJXj via unpaid appropriation 
of some part of the rival firm's effort. Further, the government subsidises the R&D output of 
each firm. Each firm receives a subsidy s per unit of R&D output, S(Xi) = SXi. ll As concerns 
It As we will show) our results remain robust to the case that the government subsidises R&D expenditure. 
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private firms they are assumed to maximise own profits 
7ri = P(Q)qi - Ci(qi, Xi) - r(Xi) + S(Xi)' (1.4) 
whereas the public firm is assumed to maximise social welfare defined as the sum of consumer 
surplus (CS) and producer surplus (PS) net of R&D subsidies12 
Q2 
SW = 2 + (7ri + 7rj) - S(Xi + Xj). 
_ ~ '-v---' 
cs PS Subsidy 
(1.5) 
Note that the subsidy has no direct effect on social welfare, and hence on the objective function 
of the public firm, as it cancels out when aggregating 
Q2 1 
SW = 2 + I)(a - qi - qj)qi - Ci(qi, Xi) - xli· 
i=O 
(1.6) 
Even though there is no direct effect of the subsidy on social welfare, the public firm's 
R&D (and output) will be affected by the subsidy indirectly, through its impact on the private 
firm's R&D choice. Therefore, the subsidy has a cost shifting effect that helps improve the 
distribution of production costs between the firms, thereby increasing productive efficiency. In 
addition to the cost-shifting effect, the subsidy remedies the suboptimal level of R&D investment 
by encouraging firms to spend more in R&D. 
In order to study the effects of R&D subsidies on innovation along with the effects of 
privatisation on innovation, welfare and on the optimal subsidy, we consider a multi-stage game 
with observable actions. The time structure of the game unfolds as follows: in stage one, the 
government chooses the level of a subsidy (tax if negative) to R&D in order to maximise social 
welfare. In stage two, firms make simultaneously their R&D decisions and then play a standard 
Cournot game in the third stage. The game is solved by backward induction. 
12 Note that the assumption of welfare maximisation neglects any agency problems that may arise between the 
government and the manager of the public firm. However, this is an initial attempt at studying the welfare effects 
of subsidisation in the context of a mixed duopoly with cost-reducing investments, so the present assumption 
offers a natural building block for the analysis of more general cases. To this end, the mixed oligopoly literature 
has extensively used similar assumptions (e.g. Anderson et al., 1997; De Fraja and Delbono, 1989; White, 2002). 
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1.5 Mixed duopoly 
In this section, we study the equilibrium for a mixed duopoly in which the optimal R&D subsidy 
is provided by the government. 
1.5.1 Output selection stage 
In the last stage of the game, each firm chooses its output to maximise its objective function, 
taking the output of the other firm as given. The first order conditions (foes henceforth) of this 
problem are: 
(a - c) - 3qo - ql + (xo + (3xl) = 0, (1.7) 
(a - c) - 4ql - qo + (Xl + (3xo) = O. (1.8) 
Note that the second order condition (soc henceforth) for the public firm is given by -3 < 0, 
and for the private firm -4 < O. It follows that the foes are necessary as well as sufficient for 
an (interior) optimum. Solving the system of these foes we obtain the Cournot equilibrium 
quantities: 
m( ) _ 3(a - c) + (4 - (3)xo + (4(3 - l)XI 
qo XO,XI - 11 ' (1.9) 
m( ) 2(a - c) + (3(3 - l)xo + (3 - (3)XI 
ql XO,XI = 11 . (1.10) 
Note that 4 - (3 ~ 4(3 -1 (and 3 - (3 ~ 3(3 - 1); this implies that a firm's own R&D contributes 
more to its output rather than to its rival's output (except for (3 = 1). After substituting the 
equilibrium quantities into the social welfare function (1.5) and into the private firm's profit 
function (1.4), we proceed to solve for the R&D stage of our gameYl 
I:lThese computations have been performed with the help of 1:1athematica 4.0. The corresponding expression 
for welfare is 2!2(59(a2 + c2) - 197x~ - 28xoXl - 200xi - 28x~.B + 174xoXl.B - 28xif3 + 42xa.82 - 28xoXI.B2 + 
45x;i3' - 2c(31xo + 28(xI + xoi3) + 3lxli3) + a( -118c+ 62xo + 56(xI + xof3) + 62xli3)); and for profits 1;1 (8(0' + 
c') + 2x5 + 1218xI - 12xoxI - 103x;- 12x5i3 + 40xoxli3 -12x;i3 + 18x5i3' - 12xoxli3' + 2x;i3' + 8c(xo - Xl (3-
i3) - 3xoi3) - 80(2c + Xo - XI (3 - i3) - 3xoi3)). 
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1.5.2 R&D selection stage 
In the second stage, the public firm chooses its R&D output (cost reduction) to maximise 
welfare whereas the private firm decides on its R&D to maximise profit. Given qO' and qI", the 
foes turn out to be, respectively 
(31 + 28;3)(a - c) - [14 - ;3(87 - 14;3)JXl - [197 + 14;3(2 - 3;3)Jxo = 0, (1.11) 
8(3 - ;3)(a - c) - 4(3 - ;3)(1 - 3;3)xo - [206 + 4;3(6 - ;3)JXl + 1218 = 0 (1.12) 
The sac for the public firm is given by -(197 + 14;3(2 - 3;3) < 0; and for the private firm 
-(206 + 4;3(6 - ;3)) < O. The sacs conditions are satisfied and therefore the foes are not only 
necessary but also sufficient for an interior optimum. 
Rearranging the foes yields the following R&D best-response functions: 
r (x ) = (31 + 28;3) (a - c) - [14 - ;3(87 - 14;3)JXl 
o 1 197 + 14;3(2 - 3;3) , (1.13) 
( ) _ 8(3 - ;3)(a - c) - 4(3 - ;3)(1 - 3;3)xo + 1218 rl xo - 206 + 4;3(6 - ;3) . (1.14) 
The associated stability condition for the public firm is given by: 
1(14 - ;3(87 - 14;3)) / (197 + 14;3(2 - 3;3))1 < 1. (1.15) 
The respective condition for the private firm is: 
12(3 - ;3)(1- 3;3)/ (103 + 2;3(6 - ;3))1 < 1. ( 1.16) 
The stability conditions are fulfilled, so the (regular) Nash equilibrium (xo, x1") is locally stable. 
(Local stability reflects the idea that there exists a neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium where 
the system converges to it.) 
It is interesting to note that the slope of ro(xl) and rl (xo) is negative for lower values of 
;3 and positive for higher values of ;3, meaning that R&D is a strategic substitute/complement 
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depending on the extent of informational spillovers. The following Lemma elaborates. 
Lemma 1 In the mixed duopoly, R&D is 
(i) a strategic substitute for both firms if and only if (3 < 0.17 , 
(ii) a strategic substitute for the private firm but a strategic complement for the public firm if 
and only if 0.17 < (3 < 0.33 and 
(iii) a strategic complement for both firms if and only if (3 > 0.33. 
Proof. By differentiating (1.13) we obtain fJrO(Xl)/fJxl ~ (S)O if and only if (3 ~ (S)0.17. 
Next, differentiating (1.14) yields fJrl(XO)/fJxo ~ (S)O if and only if (3 2: (S)0.33. Combining 
these two observations the result follows. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 1 reveals that R&D is initially a strategic substitute and becomes a strategic com-
plement, as spillovers intensify. The intuition underlying this result is determined on the basis 
of the interaction between two opposing effects. When firm i increases its investment in R&D, 
this worsens the competitive position of firm j (business stealing effect). Furthermore, given the 
public good nature of the cost reduction, firm j is capable of improving its own cost efficiency 
via technological spillovers (spillover effect). Not surprisingly, if spillovers are relatively low 
the former effect will dominate the latter, implying that firm j will effectively lose out to its 
rival, i.e. R&D is a strategic substitute. By contrast, a relatively high spillover rate would 
mean that an R&D investment on part of firm i is beneficial for j, i.e. R&D is a strategic 
complement. 14 Furthermore, it is clear that the threshold value of spillovers that determines 
the turning point from strategic substitution to complementarity is lower in the case of the 
public firm.15 This simply stems from the fact that private profit is part of the social welfare 
function. Finally, note that our result is similar to the ones obtained in Delbono and Denicolo 
(1993) and Poyago-Theotoky (1998), in the context of R&D patent races. 
Solving the system of (1.13) and (1.14) we obtain the R&D equilibrium outcomes as a 
14 Amir et aI. (2000) discu.ss a similar result for a private duopoly. 
15Thi:; means that the range in which a marginal increase in a firm's R&D increases the other firm's (marginal) 
payoff is greater from the public firm's viewpoint. This stems from the fact that the public firm takes into account 
the private firm's profit. 
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function of the subsidy s: 
m( ) _ 2[25 + 2~(18 - ~)J(a - c) - s[14 - ~(87 - 14P)J 
Xo s - 2[167 + 2~(25 - ~)(1 - ~)J ' (1.17) 
Xm(s) = 4(9 - ~2)(a - c) + s[197 + 14~(2 - 3~)J. 
I 2[167 + 2~(25 - ~)(1 - ~)J (1.18) 
Subsequently, the equilibrium quantities can be rewritten as: 
m( ) _ 2[53 + ~(31 - 18~)](a - c) + s[-23 + ~(102 + ~ - 14~2)J 
qo s - 2[167 + 2~(25 _ ~)(1 _ ~)J ,(1.19) 
m(s) = 11 [2(3 + ~)(a - c) + s(5 - ~(2 - ~))J. (1.20) 
ql 2[167 + 2~(25 - ~)(1 - ~)J 
Next, we proceed to examine the effect that the R&D subsidy has on innovation (cost 
reduction) and output levels by means of comparative statics. The following two Lemmata 
summarise. 
Lemma 2 (i) The public firm's Rf3D output is decreasing (increasing) in the subsidy rate if 
and only if ~ < 0.17 (~> 0.17). (ii) The private fiNn's Rf3D output is increasing in the 
subsidy rate for all ~ E [0, 1J. (iii) Total Rf3D output, x[!'+x,!" is increasing in the subsidy 
rate, s. 
Proof. Differentiating xo( s) we obtain: 
axo = -14 + ~(87 - 14~) 
as 2H 
where H = 167 + 2~(25 - ~)(1-~) > 0 V~ , ~ E [0, 1J. Given that the denominator is positive, 
it follows that Ii~f 2: (:0:)0 if and only if ~ 2: (:0:)0.17. 
Differentiation of xl (s) yields: 
Finally, 
aXI = 197 + 14~(2 - 3~) 0 'It<. 
as 2H > I-' 
a(xo + xl) = 183 + 115~ - 56~2 0 'It<. 
as 2H > I-' 
36 
Q.E.D. 
The above result is driven by the subsidy-induced movements of the R&D best-response 
functions. In particular, if the spillover is relatively low (/3 < 0.17), an increase in the amount 
of subsidy increases the R&D spending and hence R&D output for the private firm (direct effect 
of the subsidy). Its best-response function shifts out, and as the best-response functions of both 
firms are downward sloping, this leads to a decrease in the R&D for the public firm (indirect 
effect of the subsidy). When the spillover lies within the intermediate range (0.17 < /3 < 0.33), 
the private firm's best-response function shifts outwards too, in response to an increase in the 
subsidy .. This has now a positive rather than a negative impact on the public firm's R&D 
output, due to strategic complementarity (from the public firm's point of view). Finally, if the 
spillover is relatively high (/3 > 0.33), implying that R&D is a strategic complement for both 
firms, an increase in the subsidy will always increase total R&D output. Finally, it is interesting 
to note that when an increase in the subsidy decreases the public firm's R&D output (/3 < 0.17), 
this decrease will be outweighed by the increase in the private firm's R&D, yielding an increase 
in the total level of R&D (Part (iii) of Lemma 2). 
Lemma 3 (i) The output of the public firm is decreasing (increasing) in the subsidy rate if and 
only if /3 < 0.23 (/3 > 0.23). (ii) The output of the private firm is increasing in the subsidy 
rate for all /3 E [0,1]. (iii) Total output, qO'+q'l', is increasing in the subsidy rate, s. 
Proof. For part (i) we have the following: 
oq(j' -23 + /3(102 + /3 - 14/32 ) 
os 2H 
The resulting expression is positive if and only if /3 > 0.23, given that H = 167 + 2/3(25 - /3)( 1 -
/3) > 0 '1/3 , /3 E [0,1]. 
As for part (ii): 
oqi = 11[5 - /3(2 - /3)] > 0 '1/3. 
os 2H 
Finally, 
o(q(j' + qi) = 16 + /3(40 + 6/3 - 7/32 ) 0'1/3. 
oS 2H > 
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Q.E.D. 
The above Lemma states that a threshold value for the spillover exists such that the net 
impact of the subsidy on the public firm's output can be positive or negative. Two effects are 
interacting and determining this result: (a) The subsidy will affect the public firms' output via 
the effect it exerts on cost-reducing R&D. From Lemma 2, the public firm's R&D is decreasing 
(increasing) in s for {3 < (»0.17. (b) The subsidy will impact the public firms' output via 
the output of the private firm. In fact, from Lemma 2, we know that the subsidy effect on 
the private R&D effort is always positive. An increase in the private R&D will affect not only 
the private firm's own output but also, indirectly, the public firm's output, with the latter 
effect being negative. 16 The effect described in (b) will always be negative and will only be 
compensated by the effect described in (a) for {3 > 0.23. With regard to the private firm, the 
result is clear-cut: a higher subsidy will always lead to higher output. The reason is that the 
positive effect of private R&D on the private firm's output dominates the negative effect of the 
public firm's R&D (and hence output) on the private output level. As well, total output is 
everywhere increasing in s, which highlights the positive association between R&D and output 
decisions (see Lemma 2). 
1.5.3 R&D subsidy stage 
In this section, we derive the optimal R&D subsidy for the mixed market. The government 
will choose the value of the subsidy that maximises welfare. Substituting the equilibrium R&D 
output and the equilibrium quantities into the social welfare function17 and differentiating with 
respect to s yields the following foc: 
(197 + 28{3 - 42(32)(2(a - c)(3 + 32{3 + 17{32 - 9(33) - s(162 + 56{3 - 101{32 + 7(34)) = 0 
2(167 + 50{3 - 52{32 + 2(33)2 
(1.21 ) 
16Quantities are strategic substitutes (see (1.7) and (1.8». 
17Using Mathematica 4.0, we obtain social welfare 4(a' + c2 )(7736 + 65501'1- 24951'12 - 17281'13 + 478/'1') -
4cs(591 + 6388/'1 + 4119/'12 - 2641/'13 - 966/'1' + 378/'15) + s2(-31914 - 15568/'1 + 25133/'12 + 5180/'13 - 5621/'1' -
196/'15 + 294/'16) - 4a(2c(7736 + 6550/'1- 2495/'12 -1728/'1' + 478/'1') - s(591 + 6388/'1 + 4119/'1' - 2641/'13 - 966/'1' + 
378/'15)))/4(167 + 50/'1- 52/'12 + 2/'13)2. 
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Note that the soc is given by -(197 + 28(3 - 42(32)(162 + 56(3 - 101(32 + 7(34)/2(167 + 50(3 -
52(32 + 2(33)2 < O. 
Solving the foc with respect to s, we obtain the equilibrium subsidy: 
m 2[3 + (3(32 + 17(3 - 9(32))(a - c) 
s = --'-c1-:::62'!-+""'--:o(3;:C[ 56::---'-=(3-:-:( 1-=-0'--1 _--'-'="7(3'='2"'))e-'- (1.22) 
The next Proposition establishes the properties of the optimal R&D subsidy. 
Proposition 1 In the mixed duopoly, the optimal Rf'jD subsidy is always positive and increas-
ing in the rate of spillovers. 
Proof. From (1.22) we obtain: 
dsm K(a - c) 
d(3 B2 
where (a - c) > 0, K = 2(5016 + 6114(3 - 190(32 - 1092(33 + 237(34 - 238,85 + 63(36) > 0, 
B = 162 + (3[56 - (3(101 - 7(32)) > 0 V(3 , (3 E [0,1). It follows that d;; > O. Next, note that 
sm 1,,=0= 6(~6-;c) > 0, and hence by continuity sm > 0 V(3. Q.E.D. 
According to Proposition 1, the R&D subsidy in the mixed duopoly is always positive. 
The intuition behind this result can be explained as follows. First, as pointed out in the 
Introduction, there are important market failures associated with the composition of R&D as 
well as with the total level of R&D and output. Within our mixed duopoly context there is 
a second and opposing factor, namely, technological spillovers that tend to encourage R&D 
spending. IS That is, in the absence of subsidies, the private firm invests less in R&D when the 
spillover rate increases unless spillovers are very large. In contrast, the public firm increases 
its R&D spending because it realises that a higher spillover generates higher social returns to 
R&D. The increase in the public firm's investment outweighs the corresponding decrease in 
private investment, so that industry investment increases with the level of spillovers. Yet, as 
IBln the absence of R&D subsidies, the equilibrium solutions for the public and the private firm's investment 
ad 'l b . d f (1 17) d (I 18) b tt' 0 h . b rn( 0) 125+2~(18-~)J(a-c) are re' I y 0 tame rom eq. . an . y se 109 S = j t ey are given y Xo s = = 167+2£1(25 .0)(1 fJ) 
d rn( 0) 2(9-~')(a-c) 0 '1 t bl' h h ~ O!!=l. '" O'f d 1 'f (3 '" 0 88 d an Xl S = = 167+2,8(25 (3)(1 (3)' ne can ea.51 y es a IS t at O{3 > ! 8{J:::::;: I an on y I ::::>. an 
D(2:0+:q) > 0 
8~ . 
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industry investment remains suboptimal this in turn calls for a positive subsidy to R&D output, 
as Proposition 1 reports. 19 
The optimal subsidy is increasing in the rate of spillover for two primary reasons. First, 
total R&D output (xo + xl) is increasing in s (recall Lemma 2). Second, a greater spillover 
implies that the results of the R&D will spread across firms more effectively, that is, there 
are higher (social) returns to the subsidy. This in turn explains why the subsidy rate will be 
adjusted upwards following an increase in the rate of spillover. The intuition is in the line with 
the observation reported by Hinloopen (1997) for a private duopoly with linear cost functions. 
Substitution of (1.22) into (1.17) and (1.18) yields the equilibrium R&D levels: 
Xo 
Xl = 
[24 + 7(3(5 + (3(1 - (3))](a - c) 
162 + (3[56 - (3(101 - 7(32)] , 
[21 + (3(38 + 7(3(1 - (3))](a - c) 
162 + (3[56 - (3(101 - 7(32)] 
(1.23) 
(1.24) 
Note that the R&D investments of both the private and the public firm increase with the 
degree of spillovers. As a result, spillovers stimulate industry investment. That is, 
dx= 
_0_ 
d(3 
dXI 
d(3 = 
(a - c)(4326 + 7116(3 + 525(32 - 1456(33 - 28(34 - 98(35 + 49(36) 
[162 + (3(56 - (3(101 - 7(32))]2 
(a - c) (4980 + 6510(3 + 828(32 - 1372(33 - 91(34 - 98(35 + 49(36) 
[162 + (3(56 - (3(101 - 7(32))]2 
d(xo + xl) 0 
d(3 >. 
From (1.22), (1.19) and (1.20) we obtain the equilibrium output levels: 
m 3[17 + 5(3(2 - (3)](a - c) 
Qo = 162 + (3[56 - (3(101 - 7(32)] , 
m [21 + (3(38 + 7(3(1- (3))](a - c) 
ql = 162 + (3[56 - (3(101 - 7(32)] 
(1.25) 
(1.26) 
(1.27) 
(1.28) 
(1.29) 
19 It can be shown tha.t the R&D investment of the public firm is higher than the socially optimal investment 
(derived from a public duopoly due to diminishing returns in production), if (3 < 0.21. Moreover, the private 
firm carries out a lower investment than the socially optimal level. Industry investment is always below the level 
achieved in the first-best (see the Appendix), 
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Entering (1.22), (1.23), (1.24), (1.28) and (1.29) into (1.4), we obtain equilibrium profits: 
[2169 + {:J(3126 + 907{:J + 110{:J2 - 174{:J3 - 266{:J4 + 77{:J5))(a - C)2 7rO = [162 + {:J(56 - {:J(101 - 7{:J2))J2 
m [1863 + {:J(2880 + 966{:J + 114{:J2 - 169{:J3 - 266{:J4 + 77{:J5))(a - cj2 
71"\ = [162 + {:J(56 - {:J(101 - 7{:J2))J2 
(1.30) 
(1.31) 
Substitutions reveal the remainder equilibrium values for consumers surplus and social welfare 
as follows: 
csm = 2[42 + 13{:J(2 - {:J)]2(a - c)2 
[162 + {:J(56 - {:J(101 - 7{:J2))J2' 
SWm = [45 + 14{:J(2 - {:J))(a - cj2 . 
162 + {:J[56 - (:J(101 - 7{:J2)] 
(1.32) 
(1.33) 
In the Appendix, we show that the private firm underinvests relative to the social optimum. 
In contrast, the public firm overinvests when spillovers are sufficiently small while underinvesting 
in all other cases.20 The increase in the public firm's investment above the level achieved at the 
social optimum does not compensate for the corresponding decrease in the private investment. 
Consequently, industry investment is suboptimal, which reflects the second best nature of our 
equilibrium solution. 
1.6 Private duopoly 
We now consider the case that the public firm is privatised and maximises profits instead of 
welfare. Therefore, in the final stage of the game, both firms choose their output levels to 
maximise profits. Solving for the foes of this maximisation problem yields: 
(1.34) 
Note that the soc is given by -4 < O. 
Rearranging the foes, we obtain the following best response functions in quantities: 
(1.35) 
20 The critical threshold is given by {3 ~ 0.29. 
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Solving the system of equations in (1.35), we obtain equilibrium quantities: 
Y(. .) _ 3(a - c) + (4 - iJ)x;+ (4iJ - l)xj . -'-. .. {O I} 
lJ.i Xi) XJ - 15 ' Z f J, '1,,) E J • (1.36) 
By substituting the expression above into the profit functions, we can express profits in terms 
of R&D investments Xi, Xj and the subsidy 8. 21 In stage two, firms choose their R&D levels to 
maximise profits. The focs are thus given by: 
12(4 - iJ)(a - c) - 2[193 + 2iJ(8 - iJ)]Xi - 4(4 - iJ)(l - 4iJ)xj + 2258 = 0 (1.37) 
The associated soe for firm i is -2[193 + 2iJ(8 - iJ)] < O. Solving the foe of each firm i with 
respect to Xi, i E {O, I}, we obtain the following R&D best-response functions: 
rf( .) _ 12(4 - iJ)(a - c) - 4(4 - iJ)(l - 4,8)xj + 2258 . -'- . .. { } 
i xJ - 2[193 + 2,8(8 _ iJ)] , , T J, " J E 0,1 . ( 1.38) 
Note also that the stability condition is given by 
14(4 - iJ)(l - 4iJ)/2[193 + 2iJ(8 - iJ)]1 < 1, (1.39) 
so the (regular) Nash equilibrium (xl;, xl) is locally stable. Similarly to d' Aspremont and 
Jacquemin (1988) when the degree of spillovers is either low or high enough, the R&D decisions 
are either strategic substitutes (iJ < {J) or complements (iJ > fJ). By straightforward calculation 
we obtain that this threshold value is fJ = 0.25, where fJ is defined as the value of iJ that solves 
the equation -4(4 - iJ)(l - 4iJ) = o. 
Solving the system of the R&D best-response functions, we find the equilibrium R&D levels: 
p 4(4-iJ)(a-c) +758 . 
xi(s)= 2[67-2iJ(3-iJ)] , 'E{O,l}. (1.40) 
Similarly to the effect of the subsidy on private R&D in the mixed duopoly, note that the 
level of R&D is also positively related to the subsidy rate in the private duopoly. Substituting 
21The corresponding expression for the profit of firm i is 2;5 (18(a2 + c2 ) + 225sXi - 193xt - 16xixj + 2x;-
16x; (3 +68xiXj(3 -16x; (3+ 2x; (32 -16xiXj(32 +32x; (32 + 12c(xj -Xi( 4 - (3) -4xj(3) -12a(3c+xj -Xi (4 - (3) -4xj(3». 
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xl' in equation (1.36), we can express equilibrium output as function of the subsidy 8: 
--1'(8) = 15 [2(a - c) + 8(1 + (3)1 
'1i 2[67 _ 2{3(3 _ (3)1 ' i E {O, 1}. (1.41) 
In this case too, the quantities produced depend positively on the amount of subsidy, with 
this effect being the outcome of the positive R&D-output association. Substituting the equilib-
rium R&D levels and equilibrium quantities into the social welfare function22 and performing 
the maximisation with respect to 8, we obtain the following foc: 
300(a - c)(l + 11;3) - 4508(22 - 6{3 - 3(32) 
2[67 - 2f3(3 - (3)]2 = 0 (1.42) 
The soc of this maximisation problem is given by -225(22 - 6{3 - 3f32)J[67 - 2{3(3 - (3)j2 < O. 
From the foc the equilibrium subsidy turns out to be: 
p _ 2(1 + l1(3)(a - c) 
8 - 3[22 - 3{3(2 + (3)I' (1.43) 
Analogously to sm, it is easy to see that 8 P is also positive and increasing in f3. Differentiation 
of 8P with respect to (3 yields: 
a8P = 2(a - c) (248 + 6f3 + 33(32) > O. 
a{3 3[22 - 3{3(2 + (3)]2 (1.44) 
Substituting equation (1.43) into (1.40) and (1.41) yields the equilibrium solutions for R&D 
and output as follows: 
P 3(1 + (3)(a - c) 
x· = 
, 22-3{3(2+{3)' (1.45) 
5(a - c) q; = 22 _ 3{3(2 + (3)' i E {O, 1}. (1.46) 
22With the help of Mathematica 4.0, we obtain that welfare is given by 2(67 2J(3 ~)rl (-300c(s+ 118,6) + (a2 + 
c')(2444 + 128iJ - 16iJ') - 2258'(22 - 6iJ - 3iJ') + 4a(75(8 + 118iJ) - 2c(611 + 32/3 - 4iJ'))). 
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Substitution of (1.43), (1.45) and (1.46) into (1.4) reveals each firm's profit: 
p _ [43 + (3(6 + 13(3))(a - cf 
"i - [22 - 3(3(2 + (3))2 . (1.47) 
Finally, substitutions in the expression for social welfare (1.5) and the expression for consumer 
surplus, (1/2)Q2, reveal the following: 
p _ 50(a - c)2 
CS - [22 - 3(3(2 + (3)]2' (1.48) 
SWP _ 6(a - c)2 
- 22 - 3(3(2 + (3) (1.49) 
The derivation of the equilibrium solutions for the private market completes our analysis in 
the present section. In what follows, we compare the equilibrium outcomes of the two market 
arrangements. This simple comparative static analysis serves the purpose of capturing the 
(long-run) effects of privatisation. 
1. 7 Comparing the two market structures 
In this section, we compare the optimal subsidy rate, R&D output and quantity produced 
across the two market structure configurations and provide some tentative policy guidelines 
with respect to privatising the public firm. We do this in a series of Propositions. 
Proposition 2 The optimal R&D subsidy in the mixed duopoly is higher than in the private 
duopoly, srn> sp. 
Proof. From (1.22) and (1.43) it follows that: 
m p _ 2(36 + 220(3 + 4(32 - 77(33 + 2(34 + 4(35)(a - C) \.J(3 
s - S - 3EB > 0 v , 
since E = 22 - 3(3(2 + (3) > 0 and B = 162 + (3[56 - (3(101 - 7(32)) > 0, V(3, (3 E [0,1). Q.E.D. 
The Proposition above shows that the government should provide a larger subsidy to the 
mixed market than the fully private market, ceteris paribus. One might expect the R&D 
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subsidy in the private market would exceed the subsidy in the mixed market, since, as it will be 
elaborated, a comparison of social welfare levels reveal SWm > SWP• However, the intuition 
underlying our initially surprising finding is clear once one observes that the social returns to 
the subsidy are higher in the mixed duopoly. As expected, a mixed duopoly will produce a 
greater R&D output and thereby induce higher social returns to the subsidy. 
According to a second interpretation, there is an inter-play between two effects. The first 
is the under-valuation effect, which leads to a suboptimal investment level. The second effect 
is the cost asymmetry in the mixed market, as we already discussed. This effect vanishes in 
the move from the mixed to the private duo poly, since both firms produce the same amount 
of output and hence operate at equal costs. It turns out that the combined force of the cost 
asymmetry and under-valuation effect in a mixed duopoly dominate the under-valuation effect 
in a private duopoly, causing the subsidy rate to fall with privatisation. 
Our main findings regarding the comparison between R&D levels, outputs and profits across 
market configurations are summarised below. 
Proposition 3 (i) Total RI'3D output and total quantity produced are always higher in the 
mixed duopoly than in the private duopoly; xlJ+x1> 2x; and qlJ+ql> 2q;' (ii) Total profit in 
the private duopoly exceeds total profit in the mixed duopoly if and only if (3 < 0.g4; 7r1)'+7r1< 27r1'. 
Proof. Total R&D, quantities and profits are given below: 
m m [45 + (3(73 + 14(3(1 - (3)](a - c) 
Xo + XI = B 
m m 2[42 + 13(3(2 - (3)](a - c) 
qo + ql = B 
m m [4032 + (3(6006 + 1873(3 + 22482 - 343(33 - 532(34 + 154(35)](a - C)2 
7ro + 7r 1 = B2 
Private duopoly (symmetric firms): 
2x!' = 6(1 + (3)(a - c) 
• E 
2..P = lO(a - c) 
~i E 
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p 2[43 + (3(6 + 13(3)](a - c)2 
211"i = E2 ' 
where B = 162 + (3[56 - (3(101 - 7(32)] > 0, E = 22 - 3(3(2 + (3) > 0, '1(3 , (3 E [0,1]. 
We calculate: 
In (i), 
m m .. v ~(a - c) 
Xo +X1 -2X; = EB . 
Since B > 0, E > 0 '1(3 and ~ = 18 + 28(3 + 5(32 - 5(33 > 0 '1(3, it follows that Xo + X'{' > 2x; 
'1(3. 
Next, 
m m J' 2p(a-c) 
qo + ql - 2~i = EB . 
The result then follows from the fact that p = 114+40(3-63(32+4(34 > 0 '1(3, i.e. qo+q'{' > 2qf. 
In (ii), 
m m P_ v(a-c)2 
11"0 + 11"1 - 211"i - (EB)2 . 
The expression will be positive whenever v > 0, where v = -305496 - 32856;3 + 578372(32 + 
38664(33 - 319754(34 + 10102;35 + 60835(36 - 3332(37 - 4473;38 + 168;39 + 112;310. For (3 = 0, 
v = -305496 < 0, while for (3 = 1, v = 22342 > O. Further dv/d(3 S 0 whenever (3 S 0.028. 
Hence, the function v is strictly increasing on (0.028,1). This implies that there exists a 
critical value of the spillover parameter (3, {3, defined as {3 = {;3 I v = O} with (3 E (0.028,1). 
-
Straightforward calculation yields ;3 = 0.94. Thus, if;3 < 0.94, 211"; > 11"0 + 11"'{' and if (3 2: 0.94, 
the reverse holds. Q.E.D. 
This proposition provides an insight into the welfare effects of privatisation. The following 
remarks may be useful in understanding the result. When socially optimal subsidies to R&D 
are provided by the government, both in the mixed and in the private duopoly, the following 
hold: 
(a) The public firm in the mixed duopoly generates more cost reduction (invests more in 
R&D) than a firm in the private duopoly: 
m _v _ (42 - 28;3 + 7(32 + 2;33) (a - c) 0 "(3 
Xo "'-0 - EB > v. (1.50) 
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(b) The private firm does more R&D in the private duopoly than in the mixed duopoly if 
and only if f3 < 0.44. We have that: 
m _P _ (-24 + 56f3 - 2f32 - 7(33)(a - c) 
XI "'"I - EB . (1.51) 
Let A = -24 + 56f3 - 2f32 - 7f33. Note further that A 1{J=0= -24, A I{J=I= 23 and g~ = 
56 - 4f3 - 21f32 > O. It follows that there is a critical value of f3 that solves the equation A = O. 
With the help of Mathematica 4.0 we obtain that the solution to this equation is f3 '" 0.44. 
Indeed, x't < x'; if and only if f3 < 0.44; x'{' > xf if and only if f3 > 0.44; and x'{' = x~ if and 
only if f3 '" 0.44. 
(c) The public firm produces more in a mixed duopoly than a firm in a private duopoly: 
m _ Y _ 2(156 + 37f3 - 79(32 + 5(34) (a - c) 0 "f3 
qo '10 - EB > v. (1.52) 
(d) A private firm produces more in a private duopoly than in a mixed duopoly: 
rn _ -1' _ 2(-42 + 3f3 + 16(32 - (34)(a - c) "f3 
ql '11 - EB < 0 v . (1.53) 
(e) The profits of a firm in a private d uopoly are higher than those of a public firm in a 
mixed duopoly if and only if f3 < 0.65: 
(1.54) 
where F = -78696 + 2712f3 + 227748f32 + 19852f33 - 151922(34 + 5948f35 + 30320f36 - 1774f37 -
2259f38 + 84f39 + 56f31O Note that the sign of the difference depends only on f3. Further, 
F 1{J=0= -78696 and F I{J=I = 52069. Given that F is strictly increasing in {3, i.e. ~~ = 2(1356+ 
227748f3 + 29778f32 - 303844{33 + 14870f34 + 90960f35 - 6209f36 - 9036f37 + 378f38 + 280f39 > 0, 
it follows that there exists a critical value of f3, ~, defined as iJ == {f3 I F = O}. With the help 
of Mathematica 4.0 we can solve the equation F = 0 with respect to {3 to obtain that iJ '" 0.65. 
Hence, 7r0' < 7rb if and only if {3 < 0.65; 7r0' > 7rb if and only if {3 > 0.65; and 7r0' = 7rb if and 
only if f3 '" 0.65. 
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(f) The profits of a private firm are higher in a private duopoly than in a mixed duopoly: 
(1.55) 
where L = -226800 - 35568,8 + 350624,82 + 18812,83 - 167832,84 +4154,85 + 30515,86 -1558,87 -
2214,88 + 84,89 + 56,810 < 0 V,8. 
Regarding social welfare, the following result obtains: 
Proposition 4 Under a government policy of providing optimal subsidies to Rf3D, social wel-
fare is higher in the mixed duopoly than in the private duopoly. 
Proof. From the equilibrium solutions for social welfare we obtain: 
swm _ SWp = (18 + lO,8 ~;:2)(a - c)2 > 0 V,8, 
as E = 22 - 3,8(2 +,8) > 0, B = 162 + ,8[56 - ,8(101 - 7,82)1 > 0 and 18 + lO,8 - 5,82 > 0, V,8. 
Privatisation triggers two opposing forces in our model and the relative strength of these 
forces determines whether it can be desirable. First, as explained above, privatisation reduces 
the level of aggregate output, which tends to reduce consumer surplus. Second, it increases 
the level of (gross) industry profit unless the spillover rate is very high.23 The loss consumers 
suffer from privatisation (relative to a mixed duopoly) outweighs the corresponding increase 
in industry profit. Consequently, social welfare becomes lower in the event of privatisation, 
as Proposition 4 reports. This result is reminiscent of De Fraja and Delbono (1989) in the 
context of mixed oligopolies without R&D competition and absent subsidisation suggesting 
that privatisation increases welfare only if the number of competitors is sufficiently large. In 
this case, the gains in terms of productive efficiency outweigh the losses in terms of allocative 
efficiency. 
In sum, combining Propositions 1, 2 and 4 yields some interesting insights into a class of 
policy relevant questions. First, the level of the optimal subsidy should be adjusted according 
23Because gross industry profits are, in most cases, higher in the private duopoly and because subsidy costs 
decline with privatisation, net industry profits are always higher in the private duopoly than in the mixed duopoly. 
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to the degree of spillovers, namely firms should be subsidised more heavily at a higher rate 
of spillover. Second, the private market should be subsidised to a lesser extent relative to 
the mixed one. Finally, privatisation cannot be recommended given that the mixed market 
attains a higher level of social welfare. This argument offers some support to the view against 
the widespread adoption of privatisation programmes. It should be stressed that these policy 
implications have been derived within a rather limited context and care should be taken with 
generalising them to markets with many firms both private and public.24 However, even within 
this limited context, it is clear that the conventional presumption about the desirability and 
efficiency of privatisation can be overturned when specific features, like R&D and appropriability 
issues, are added into the frame of analysis. 
1.8 Subsidising R&D expenditure 
The analysis to this point has assumed that the government (or regulator) subsidises R&D 
output. Here we discuss what would happen if the subsidy is instead directed towards R&D 
expenditure. To examine this, it is important to take into account that the mapping between 
R&D expenditure and cost reduction exhibits strictly ciecrea.,ing returns to scale (see Amir, 
2000). In what follows we show that the R&D subsidy will be the same then. This observation 
has important implications. It suggests that policy makers should not subsidise R&D expen-
diture given the decreasing returns assumption. Rather, they should subsidise the level of cost 
reductions since both policies deliver the same level of social welfare [see eq. (1.33) and (1. 74)J. 
We note that the present result holds independently of whether a public firm is present, that 
is, it obtains both in the mixed and the private market. 
Thus each firm receives a subsidy that is given by: 
S(Xi) = (1- s)x;, - 00::; s < 1. (1.56) 
We will show that our main results remain robust to the form of the R&D subsidy. 
24 The implications of the number of private firms on our results are explored in a subsequent part of this 
chapter by means of numerical simulations. 
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1.8.1 Mixed duopoly 
In the last stage, firms choose an output level to maximise their objectives. The equilibrium 
solutions of this stage game, qo, qi, are given by (1.9) and (1.10). In the preceding stage, 
firms choose their R&D levels. Taking the foc for the public firm and solving with respect to Xo 
results in the R&D reaction function (1.13) 25 From the private firm's maximisation problem, 
we obtain the following foc: 
2(3 - ,8)[2(a - c) - xo(1- 3,8)]- (103 + 12,8 - 2,82 - 121s)Xl = o. (1.57) 
The associated soc is given by -(103 + 12,8 - 2,82 - 1218); the latter is negative if and only if 
8 < [(103+ 12,8-2,82)/121]. Note that the equilibrium level of the subsidy satisfies this condition 
as we demonstrate in the sequel. Rearranging leads to the R&D best-response function: 
r (x ) = 2(3 - ,8)[2(a - c) - xo(1 - 3,8)] 
1 ° 103 + 12,8 - 2,82 - 1218 (1.58) 
Solving the system of (1.13) and (1.58) we obtain the following equilibrium R&D levels: 
(a - c)[25 + 36,8 - 2,82 - 8(31 + 28,8)] 
xo(s) = 167 + 50,8 - 52,82 + 2f33 - s(197 + 28,8 - 42,82)' (1.59) 
2(a - c)(9 - ,82) 
x (s) - ----,---,i---,':i---'----'------:-----:o:-
1 - 167 + 50,8 - 52,82 + 2f33 - s(197 + 28,8 - 42,82) . (1.60) 
We now make the following remarks on the slope of firms' reaction functions and on the 
effects of the subsidy on the equilibrium R&D levels. The first thing to note is that the slope 
of the private firm's reaction function depends on the term multiplying xo, -2(3 - ,8)(1 - 3,8). 
This term is positive if and only if,8 > 0.33, namely R&D is a strategic complement, which is 
the exact range of,8 values obtained within our main analytical framework. Indeed, noting that 
the public firm's reaction function remains unaltered, it follows that Lemma 1 is independent 
of the form of subsidy specification. Second, the effect of the subsidy on the private firm's 
R&D output is always positive, but it can be either positive or negative from the public firm's 
25This is because the subsidy exerts no direct influence on welfare, i.e. its direct effect is zero. On the other 
hand, there is a (positive) direct effect of the subsidy on private R&D, shifting the private firm's R&D reaction 
function outwards, and in turn expanding private R&D spending. 
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viewpoint. The latter effect is positive if and only if /3 > 0.17, and so Lemma 2 is verified. The 
computations below establish these results: 
OXo(s) _ 2(a-c)(-126+783/3-112/32-87/33+ 14/34) 
as - [167 + 50/3 - 52/32 + 2/33 - s(197 + 28(3 - 42/32)]2 . (1.61) 
The sign of this derivative is positive if and only if I" == -126 + 783/3 -112/32 - 87/33 + 14/34 > O. 
Using Mathematica 4.0 we obtain that I" > 0 if and only if /3 > 0.17. Next, we differentiate 
(1.60) with respect to s: 
2(a - c)(9 - /32)(197 + 28/3 - 42/32) 
2 '3 2 > 0, [167 + 50/3 - 52/3 + 2/3' - s(197 + 28/3 - 42/3 )]2 (1.62) 
Substitution of (1.59), (1.60) into (1.9) and (1.10) yields the equilibrium output levels: 
(s) _ (a - c)[53 + 31/3 - 18/32 - s(65 + 15/3 - 14/32)1 
qo - 167 + 50/3 - 52/32 + 2/33 - s(197 + 28/3 - 42/32)' (1.63) 
l1(a - c)(1 - s)(3 + /3) 
ql(S) = 167 + 50/3 - 52/32 + 2/33 - s(197 + 28/3 - 42/32)' (1.64) 
The effect of s on qo and ql can be addressed by examining the derivative with respect to s, 
We have the following: 
oqo(s) 2(a - e)( -207 + 918/3 + 32/32 - 228/33 - /34 + 14/35) 
as [167 + 50/3 - 52/32 + 2/33 - s(197 + 28/3 - 42/32)]2 . (1.65) 
Straightforward computations tell us that this derivative is positive if and only if /3 > 0,23. 
oql(S) 22(a - e)(45 - 18/3 + 4/32 + 2/33 - /34 ) 
as = [167 + 50/3 - 52/32 + 2/33 - s(197 + 28/3 _ 42/32)]2 > O. (1.66) 
From (1.65) and (1.66) it is immediate that the content of Lemma 3 remains unaltered when 
the subsidy is directed towards R&D expenditure rather than the R&D output. 
Substituting (1.59), (1.60), (1.63) and (1.64) into the welfare function and differentiating 
with respect to s we obtain the equilibrium subsidy as follows: 
rn. 3 + 32/3 + 17/32 - 9/33 
S -
- 21 + 38/3 + 7/32 - 7/33' 
(1.67) 
51 
The relevant soc for this maximisation problem reads as 8(a - c)2r(w - sZ)/N < 0, where r = 
1773+252(3 -575(32 -28(33 +42(34, W = -867+5884(3+5190(32 -2585(33 -1130(34 +378(35 + 7(36, 
Z = 4137 + 8074(3 + 1561(32 - 2779(33 - 490(34 + 294(35 and N = [167 + 50(3 - 52(32 + 2(33 -
s(197 + 28(3 - 42(32)]4. This soc is in turn satisfied if and only if s > (w / Z). Simple computation 
establishes that the latter requirement is indeed satisfied by srn.: 
srn. _ W _ 1458 + 504(3 - 1071(32 - 56(33 + 164(34 - 7(36 > 0 
Z - (197 + 28(3 - 42(32)(21 + 38(3 + 7(32 - 7(33) . (1.68) 
Next we show that the soc at stage two of the game, s < [(103 + 12(3 - 2(32)/121]·= 6, is satisfied 
too. Taking the difference of the term on the right hand side of the latter inequality and srn. 
we obtain: 
6 _ srn. = 2(3 - (3]2(100 + 38(3 - 7(32 + 7(33) > 0 
121(21 + 38(3 + 7(32 - 7(33) , (1.69) 
and thus the soc at the R&D setting stage of the game is fulfilled by srn •. 
Substitution of (1.67) into (1.59), (1.60), (1.63) and (1.64) reveal the equilibrium solutions 
for R&D and output. Interestingly, these substitutions yield the same expressions derived within 
our basic model, equations (1.23), (1.24), (1.28) and (1.29). By the same token, consumer 
surplus is given by equation (1.32). Substitutions reveal the firms' profit: 
(a - c)2D 
EG2 (1.70) 
where D = 44253 + 129402(3 + 88839(32 - 36117(33 - 36041(34 + 9488(35 + 2863(36 - 1967(37 + 
686(38 - 98(39; E = 21 + 38(3 + 7(32 - 7(33; G = 162 + 56(3 - 101(32 + 7(34. 
(1.71) 
Comparing these expressions with ITa and ITl we obtain that when the subsidy is paid on each 
unit of R&D output then firms make a higher profit. That is, 
m m. (a-c]2H 
ITo - ITo = EG2 > 0, (1.72) 
because H = 1296 + 18666(3 + 64179(32 + 79592(33 + 21034(34 - 27265(35 - 13342(36 + 4249(37 + 
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1715{38 - 441{39 > o. And, 
(1. 73) 
since J = 63 + 786{3 + 1594{32 + 660{33 - 447{34 - 182{35 + 63{36 > O. Substituting into the 
expression of social welfare we obtain: 
swm * = (a - cj2(45 + 28{3 - 14(32) 
G (1.74) 
Again, this is the same expression as in the context of our basic model. Note also that consumers 
surplus is the same under both specifications but per firm (gross) profits are lower when the 
subsidy is paid on R&D expenditures. It follows that the subsidy costs must he smaller in the 
latter case so as to arrive at equation (1.74). To put it differently, consumer surplus and net 
profits, i.e. profits without R&D subsidy, are equal under both specifications, which implies that 
the values of welfare will be equal too. Moreover, one can easily show that the same equilibrium 
welfare levels obtain in the private duopoly under both subsidy specifications. Therefore, our 
main result regarding the decision to privatise the public firm is robust to the form of the R&D 
subsidy. 
1.9 More than one private firm 
The analysis to this point has assumed two firms. An analysis for an (n + I)-firm oligopoly 
turns out to be not analytically tractable and so to assess the effects of competition beyond the 
duopoly model we use numerical simulations. 
There is a large body of literature on mixed oligopolies analysing the welfare effects of 
privatisation when output is subsidised by the policy makers. More precisely, the literature 
shows that at best total surplus remains unaltered after privatisation (White, 1996; Poyago-
Theotoky, 2001), and at worst privatisation decreases the level of welfare. The latter arises 
when the public firm remains a leader in the post-privatisation regime (Fjell and Heywood, 
2004). However, these contributions have been confined to the analysis of output production 
and, consequently, output subsidies only. 
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n=2 n=3 n=4 n=5 n=6 
(3 m p m p m p m p m p 
0 0.2778 0.2727 0.3247 0.3231 0.3558 0.3555 0.3778 0.3782 0.3941 0.3947 
0.2 0.2958 0.2901 0.3623 0.3603 0.4131 0.4128 0.4547 0.4553 0.4908 0.4918 
0.4 0.3204 0.3138 0.4285 0.4258 0.5402 0.5398 0.6688 0.670 0.8305 0.8333 
0.6 0.3544 0.3464 0.5553 0.5509 0.9081 0.9070 1.8683 1.8781 
0.8 0.403 0.3927 0.8615 0.8509 5.8407 5.7971 
1 0.4758 0.4615 2.4146 2.3333 
Table 1.1: Social welfare in the mixed (m) and private (p) oligopolies (given a - c = 1) 
In Table 1.1, we report numerical results for social welfare both before and after privatisa-
tion 26 Inspection of these Tables reveals that privatisation increases total surplus as long as 
the number of private firms is sufficiently large, namely, when there are at least four private 
firms in the market (Le. n 2: 5). The intuition behind this result reflects two factors. First, 
it is well known that privatisation improves productive efficiency. The reason is that in the 
move from a mixed to a private oligopoly, the inefficiency in the distribution of production 
costs vanishes because firms produce the same amount of output and so operate at equal costs. 
Second, privatisation worsens allocative efficiency because it constrains the level of industry 
output and thus leads to higher prices and firm profit. It turns out that when the number of 
private firms is sufficiently large, there is more vigorous competition that tends to reduce the 
firms' profit margin. Consequently, because of the increase in the intensity of competition that 
implies lower oligopoly rents, the gains in terms of productive efficiency will outweigh the losses 
in terms of allocative efficiency when the number of private firms is relatively large (at least 
four in this setting). This result contrasts with White (1996) who found that subsidising both 
the mixed and the private oligopolies does not alter welfare. However, it complies with the 
established conclusion by De Fraja and Delbono (1989) obtained in the absence of public poli-
cies and/or spending on R&D according to which privatisation improves welfare for a relatively 
large number of pri vate firms. 
2GThe values that are not reported violate the second order condition for welfare maximisation at the subsidy 
selection stage of the game. 
54 
1.10 Conclusion 
Governments have undertaken extensive privatisation programs all over the world, in Europe, 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America and in the former Soviet block countries. Despite the popularity 
of privatisation, economists have argued in favour of public firms as instruments in addressing 
potential failures associated with R&D and innovation in private markets. Inherent in this line of 
reasoning is the need to implement R&D subsidies when public firms are present. In this chapter 
we have explored the use of these two policy instruments - public firms and R&D subsidies -
within the same analytical framework. We have also investigated the consequences of privatising 
the public- firm. An analysis of these issues generates a number of original conclusions. 
The first observation is that optimal R&D subsidies should be higher as the spillover rate 
increases. Existing theoretical work by Hinloopen (1997) has derived this result within the 
context of a private market. Thus, one contribution of the present chapter is to demonstrate 
that the need to subsidise at a higher rate generic research than applied research is of more 
general applicability. Second, we have shown that the optimal R&D-stimulating subsidy should 
be higher in a mixed market than in a private market. This result, new to the literature, reflects 
higher social returns to the subsidy in the mixed market and needs to be considered seriously by 
governments. Moreover, the provision of R&D subsidies should be directed towards innovation 
output rather than R&D expenditure. In this way, public authorities can still reach the same 
level of social welfare. Finally, a remarkable finding is that there are circumstances in which 
the public firm should be privatised. This arises when the market is sufficiently competitive, 
which is in line with the seminal work by De Fraja and Delbono (1989) without consideration 
of issues associated with R&D and innovation. We thus confirm that this policy can be applied 
to hi tech sectors and can also be seen as additional evidence in support of privatisation under 
some circumstances. 
Further research is certainly welcome to better understand the conditions under which the 
pursuit of privatisation may be desirable from a social viewpoint. In this perspective, the present 
model may be interpreted as a building block for the analysis of more general cases and could 
therefore support several extensions. A first issue would be to accommodate principal-agent 
considerations between the public authority and the management of the public firm in order to 
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see how this more realistic scenario might influence the incentives to privatise the public firm. 27 
As a second extension, it would be worthwhile to evaluate the welfare effects of privatisation 
allowing for more general demand and cost functions. 
1.11 Appendix 
1.11.1 Social optimum 
We begin our analysis by deriving the social optimum for our duopoly model. More specifically, 
this is defined as a public duopoly: due to diminishing returns to R&D the social planner will 
use two firms, instead of only one.28 The timing of the associated two-stage game is as follows: 
in stage one, the public firms choose their R&D levels, and then compete in quantities in stage. 
two. Thus firms aim at maximising social welfare: 
1 SW = _Q2 + 71". + 71". 2 t J' (ALl) 
where 71"; = P(Q)q; -C;(q;, X;) - r(x;). The definition for 7I"j is analogous. Since both firms have 
the same objective we are looking for a symmetric equilibrium, and so we can set q; = qj = q 
and X; = Xj = x. Substitution in (ALl) yields: 
SW = 2[(a - c)q - 2q2 + x(q(l + (3) - x)]. (Al.2) 
Taking the foe with respect to q we obtain: 
2[(a - c) - 4q + (1 + (3)x] = o. (Al.3) 
The soc is given by -4 < 0, so the foe is necessary as well as sufficient for an interior optimum. 
Solving the foc with respect to q we obtain the equilibrium output of each public firm: 
q= 
[a - c + (1 + (3)x] 
4 
(A1.4) 
27There is a large body of literature on administration issues concerning public firms; see Barros (1995) and 
Levy (1987), for instance. 
28 Alternatively, the first-best obtains when the regulator subsidises both R&D and output in a mixed duopoly. 
56 
Substitution of (A1.4) into (A1.2) and differentiation with respect to x yields the foc as 
follows: 
1 
"2[(a - c)(l + (3) - x(7 - 2f3 - (32)] = o. (A1.5) 
The associated soc is given by -(7 - 2f3 - (32) < O. Solving (A1.5) gives us the optimal R&D 
in equilibrium: 
xop _ (a - c)(l + (3) 
- 7 - 2f3 - f32 ' 
where the superscript oap' refers to the social optimum. 
Substitution of (A1.6) into (A1.4) yields the optimal output level: 
op_ 2(a-c) 
q - 7 - 2f3 - f32 . 
(A1.6) 
(A1.7) 
Substitutions of (A1.6) and (A1.7) into (A1.2) and the expression for profits tfi reveal the 
rest of the equilibrium solutions: 
7fOP _ (a - c)2(l - (3)(3 + (3) 
- (7 - 2f3 - (32)2 ' 
CSOP = 8(a - c)2 
(7 - 2f3 - (32)2' 
SWop= 2(a-c)22. 
7 - 2f3 - f3 
(A1.S) 
(A1.9) 
(A1.10) 
Letting s = 0 in (1.17) and (1.18) gives us the equilibrium investment of the public and the 
private firm in the absence of R&D subsidies: 
xo(s ) _ [25 + 2f3(18 - (3)](a - c) o - 167 + 2f3(25 - (3)(1 - (3)' 
2(9 - (32)(a - c) 
0) = 167 + 2f3(25 - (3)(1 - (3) 
(AI. 11) 
(A1.12) 
We next turn to compare the firms' investment with the socially optimal level. From (A1.6) 
and (A1.lI) we obtain: 
OP m (-S + 15f3 + 109f32 - 18(33)(a - c) 
x - Xo (s = 0) = (7 _ 2f3 _ (32)[167 + 2f3(25 - (3)(1 - (3)]. (A1.13) 
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The sign of the difference depends on the term cp = -8 + 15,8 + 109,82 - 18,B3. Note that 
cp 1f3=0= -8, cp 1f3=I= 98 and 8cp/8,B = 15 + 218,B - 54,B2 > O. This implies that there exists a 
critical value of ,B, ~, defined as ~ == {,8 1 cp = O}. The critical value for ~ is given by ~ "" 0.21. 
Hence, xo(s = 0) > xop if and only if,8 < 0.21; xo(s = 0) < xOP if and only if ,8 > 0.21; and 
x~'(s = 0) = xOP if and only if,8 "" 0.21. 
From (A1.6) and (A1.12) we obtain: 
xop _ xm S = 0 = (41 + 253,8 + 30,82 - 54,B3)(a - c) 
1 ( ) (7 - 2,B - ,B2) [167 + 2,8(25 - ,8) (1 - ,8) I > O. (A1.14) 
As for industry investment we have the following comparison: 
2x"P _ xm(s = 0) _ xm(s = 0) = (33 + 268,8 + 139,82 - 72,83)(a - c) > O. 
o 1 (7 - 2,B - ,B2)[167 + 2,B(25 - ,B)(1 - ,8)1 (A1.15) 
Next, we compare the firms' investment with the social optimum when R&D is subsidised. 
From (1.23) and (A1.6) we have that: 
xm _ x"P _ 3(a - c)(2 - 7,8 + ,83) 
o - (7 - 2,B - ,B2)[162 + ,8(56 - ,B(101 - 7,B2))1' (A1.16) 
Let!J = 2-7,B+,83. Note further that!J 1/3=0= 2,!J 1/3=1= -4 and 8!J/8,8 = -7+3,82 < o. This 
implies that there exists a critical value of ,B, {J, defined as {J == {,B 1 Xo = XOP}. The critical 
value for {J is given by {J "" 0.29. Hence, if ,B < {J we have that Xo > xOP; if (3 > {J, Xo < x op; 
and if ,B = {J, Xo = xop. 
From (1.24) and (A1.6) we obtain: 
(A1.17) 
As for total R&D, from (1.23), (1.24) and (A1.6) we get: 
Xo + Xl - 2x"P = 3(a - c)(3 - ,B)(1 + ,B)2 0 (7 - 2,B - ,B2)[162 + ,B(56 - ,B(101 - 7,B2))1 < . (A1.18) 
As is to be expected, total output is lower than the socially optimal level. Using (1.28), 
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(1.29) and (A1.7) we obtain: 
qQ' + ql - 2qap = 2(a - c)(30 + 14{3 - 17{32 + {34) 2 < O. (7 - 2{3 - {32)[162 + {3(56 {3(101 7{3 ))1 (A1.19) 
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Chapter 2 
R&D Collaboration Networks in 
Mixed Oligopolyl 
2.1 Introduction 
Inter-firm R&D partnerships are known for having played a crucial role in generating technol-
ogy advances and expanding the stock of available technological capabilities. The importance 
of R&D partnerships was reflected in the growth in partnering activity of the high-tech phar-
maceutical and biotechnology industry (Hagedoorn, 2002; Roijakkers and Hagedoorn, 2006).2 
R&D collaboration can take different forms: in hi-tech sectors typically firms cooperate ei-
ther through equity modes, such as research joint ventures (or RJVs) and minority holdings, 
or non-equity modes, such as joint R&D agreements, R&D contracts and research consortia 
(Roijakkers and Hagedoorn, 2006). In the case of non-equity modes the relation between the 
research partners exhibits a relatively high degree of flexibility, enabling participation across 
various technological fields. This type of cooperation that is relatively loose in its form is 
I This chapter has been presented at the GREQAM summer school on Knowledge, Science and 
Innovation (Aix-en.Provence, October 2007) and at the 13th Coalition Theory Network Workshop 
on Integration and Cooperation in So cia-Economic and Environmental Networks and Coalitions 
(Venice, January 2008). I wish to thank the discussant of the paper David Frachisse and David 
Encaoua, Andrea Galeotti, Christian Ghiglino and Pascal Billand. 
2 For instance, during the period 1990-1994, around 300 companies established new research partnerships and 
during the second half of the 19908, the number grew even larger to around 600 firms (Roijakkers and Hagedoorn, 
2006). 
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what we call an R&D network. Note that greater flexibility is particularly important in a fast 
evolving business environment that makes it difficult for firms to follow the latest technological 
advances because of high costs of doing R&D and short technology cycles. Section 2.2 describes 
the aforementioned organisational modes and discusses their relative merits. 
A substantial literature has particularly focused on RJVs suggesting that R&D cooperation 
induces higher investments as long as the extent of knowledge spillovers is sufficiently large a 
A crucial assumption is that firms coordinate their R&D efforts to maximise joint profits and 
then benefit from collaboration via spillovers. Our approach, however, that focuses on R&D 
networks is different in several important ways. First, we assume that firms choose their R&D 
efforts non-cooperatively and subsequently communicate the results of their efforts through 
spillovers. This resembles an RJV competition type of model in the terminology of Kamien, 
Muller and Zang (1992). It reflects that it is not possible to write complete contracts on 
investment decisions (Banal-Estanol et aI., 2008). This is a natural assumption because the 
firms' investment decisions cannot be easily observed and verified. Second, when a new link 
is formed firms benefit not only from their direct partners, but also, to a lesser extent, from 
the partners of their partners. Here, the underlying assumption is that informational spillovers 
diminish in the distance between a pair of research partners. In a similar spirit, Piga and 
Poyago-Theotoky (2005) endogenise R&D spillovers within the context of a Hotelling-like model 
of product differentiation. In particular, they consider a three-stage game where firms choose 
locations, R&D and price. In this setting, when firms locate closer to each other, they can 
benefit from a higher spillover 4 Finally, in contrast to most of the literature on RJVs, our 
model allows the structure of the network to be endogenously determined, considering both 
deviations by one or more firms within a three-firm setting. 
An important aspect of the innovation process is that it involves both private and public 
firms. Mixed oligopoly is a common form of market in Europe and Japan following the intro-
duction of competition into traditional state monopolies (White, 2002). To cite a few examples, 
Norway's current portfolio includes a variety of R&D projects aimed at the development of fuel 
:IContributions to this literature include d' Aspremont and Jacquemin {1988L Suzumura (1992)1 Poyago-
Theotoky (1995), Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992) and Amir (2000), among others. 
4The equilibrium locations of the firms are driven by the interplay between two forces: the closer firms locate 
to each other the greater the R&D spillovers are, but the more intense the price competition they face. 
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cells and related hydrogen technologies. These projects are organised as research consortia of 
R&D intensive firms, with participation of state-owned firms such as Statoii. The development 
of fuel cells and hydrogen technologies is related to energy-oriented R&D projects within the 
EU and is also highly subsidised (5th and 6th Framework Programs)S Another example is the 
European Council for Automotive R&D that was launched in 1994. It is principally a research 
partnership between car manufacturing companies, governments, universities and research in-
stitutes for the purpose of developing and sharing knowledge on environmentally clean and 
efficient energy technologies (Sperling, 2001). 
Motivated by the recent trends in R&D partnering activity, we develop a model of endoge-
nous network formation to study firms' incentives for bilateral collaborations. Our aim is to 
investigate the role of a public firm in influencing the structure of the network, and the poten-
tial implications of a public firm's presence for the relationship between equilibrium industry 
structure and performance, two key issue of the literature on R&D networks. The most natural 
way of studying which network architectures will endogenously emerge is to adopt Jackson and 
Wolinsky's (1996) concept of pairwise stability. It requires that a network is pairwise stable if 
no firm has an incentive to delete one of its existing links and no pair of firms want to establish 
a new link. Note that this condition is quite weak and thus should be seen only as a necessary 
condition for stability. Pairwise stability allows for deviations by a pair of firms. However, it 
could be the case that a group of firms can improve their competitive position by deleting or 
adding several links, which is not a possible deviation in the context of pairwise stable networks. 
To this end, Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) introduced the concept of strong stability: 
we say that a network is strongly stable if it survives all possible deviations by a coalition of 
firms. These definitions have been adapted to allow for a public firm as a member of a network. 
In particular, we are primarily interested in the following questions: 
(i) What are the incentives of competing firms that pursue efficiency-enhancing innovations 
to create networks for the purpose of developing and sharing new knowledge? What is the 
architecture of the networks that will endogenously emerge? 
5The public organisation Enova was established in 2002 with main aim to subsidise environmentally clean 
energy technologies. In addition, the Research Council of Norway is responsible for directing public funds towards 
R&D, which form part of the budgets of the ~:linistry of Petroleum and Energy. Public funding to R&D for fuel 
cells and hydrogen technologies was in 2001 approximately US$ 18 millions (God0 et al., 2003). 
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(ii) How does the presence of a state-owned company affect the network structure; and, are 
individual incentives to form networks adequate from a social welfare point of view? 
To answer these questions, we consider a mixed oligopoly with a public and two private firms. 
As noted by Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001), Song and Vannetelbosch (2007), Mauleon 
et al. (2008), among others, the study of networks with an arbitrary number of firms is not 
analytically tractable. To this end, we place our analysis within a three-firm setting, the smallest 
number possible allowing firms to have a not necessarily equal number of partners." In stage 
one, prior to competing in the product market, firms create collaborative ties. The purpose of 
collaborative agreements is the sharing of know-how concerning a cost-reducing technology. Six 
conceivable network structures arise from this stage. Under the complete network all firms are 
connected, whereas under the empty network there are no collaborative ties. A star network 
entails that there is a "hub" firm, either public or private, that maintains a direct link with 
two "spoke" firms, whereas the latter are indirectly connected via the "hub". Finally, under 
a partial network there is only a pair of firms with a collaborative link. In stage two, the 
government (or regulator) commits to a level of R&D subsidy to maximise overall welfare. 
Note that the use of R&D subsidies is motivated by the aforementioned empirical examples and 
the presence of several market failures that generate suboptimal investment levels. Section 2.3 
discusses these market failures in some detail. In stage three, firms choose a non-cooperative 
level of R&D effort. In stage four, firms compete in the market of a homogeneous good by 
setting quantities. We note that the novelty of this game - the introduction of a public firm 
and the endogeneity of R&D subsidies - make the task of obtaining closed-form solutions quite 
complicated, particularly so in the case of asymmetric networks (partial and star networks). 
Following Song and Vannetelbosch (2007), we have restricted our attention to specific values 
of the spillover parameter. As we will see, our results concerning the stability and efficiency 
properties of R&D networks appear to be clear-cut, which eliminates the potential for emergence 
of any irregularities. 
The study by Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) and the literature it has stimulated on 
GGoyal and r..loraga-Gonzalez (2001) have also analysed the n-firm case assuming that each firm is connected 
with the same number of partners as all others. This eliminates potential competitive advantages that would 
arise in a setting allowing for unequal connections. Furthermore, it would be a restrictive assumption in our 
setting, given the presence of a public firm. 
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R&D networks analyse the incentives for inter-firm collaboration and the structure of the net-
works that will emerge endogenously. 7 Since this study, it has been widely accepted that a 
conflict between individual incentives to form links and social welfare is likely to occur. Goyal 
and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) suggested that a conflict is likely to arise when public spillovers 
are not too small. More recently, Song and Vannetelbosch (2007) investigated the possibility 
of reconciling private incentives for collaboration with the collective ones by means of an R&D 
subsidisation policy. Considering a model with three firms located in different countries and 
selling a (homogeneous) good within an internationally integrated product market, they showed 
that the likelihood of such a conflict is considerably reduced but still arises in the cases of very 
small or quite large spillovers. In addition, governments should be allowed to subsidise R&D 
when spillovers are not very small. 
The principal differences with our approach are the following. First, we examine the poten-
tial role of a public firm as a policy instrument within a network of R&D collaboration. This is 
a useful addition to the relevant literature since previous studies have entirely concentrated on 
partnerships between firms of private ownership. Second, we are interested to study networks 
involving the transmission of both tacit and codified knowledge. Note that the aforementioned 
studies focus on the framework of codified knowledge only. In this case, spillovers from direct 
collaborations are fully absorbed. Furthermore, indirectly connected and unconnected firms 
are treated alike, since both enjoy the same incoming spillover. By contrast, we assume that 
research knowledge may not be fully appropriated and that spillovers depend on the distance 
between research partners.8 In addition, there is no spillover outflow from a given network. 
This framework has been proposed in a recent study by Mauleon, Sempere-Monerris and Van-
netelbosch (2008).9 As remains to be seen, the presence of a public firm in fact influences the 
pattern of network formation independently of the mode of knowledge transmission, and this 
7 Goyal and Joshi (2003) studied networks of collaboration in oligopoly with private firms where costs decline 
linearly in the number of each firm's partners and the formation of a new collaboration tie incurs a fixed cost. 
8 For example, each pair of the firms i and j and j and k may have a collaborative tie, without the same being 
necessarily true for the pair i and k. We will say that firms i (j) and j (k) are directly connected and firms i and 
k are connected indirectly (see Mauleon et al., 2008). The distinction between direct and indirect collaborations 
influences the process of knowledge transmission and, in turn , affects the potential for inter-partner learning. 
9 In the context of unionised labour markets, the present paper investigates the relationship between union 
bargaining power and R.&D network architecture, and finds that the complete network is uniquely pairwise stable 
and strongly stable in the presence of monopoly unions. 
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shapes the market structure and industry performance. 
We find that the complete network is the unique pairwise stable networklO This reflects 
that in the empty, partial and star networks firms that are not connected have an incentive 
to establish a new link. This is in contrast with a purely private market where the partially 
connected network remains stable for small spillovers and no subsidies to R&D (Goyal and 
Moraga-Gonzalez, 2001). When R&D is subsidised, the partially connected network is stable 
for intermediate spillovers (Song and Vannetelbosch, 2007). Moreover, the complete network 
among private firms is always pairwise stable, although it is never stable if coalitional deviations 
are allowed. Under certain circumstances, this makes the partially connected network the unique 
strongly stable network. 
Contrary to that we find that the complete network is the unique strongly stable network. 
Intuitively, the public firm typically produces more than a private firm. This provides the private 
firms with an incentive to limit the competitive strength of the public firm by forming new links 
and thereby increase their profit. The resulting network architecture is a complete network that 
remains both pairwise stable and strongly stable. Thus, our result can be interpreted in the 
following natural way: the stability of the complete network is merely due to the public firm's 
maximising behaviour, which leaves a small residual demand to the private firms, rather than 
the outcome of any enhancing effect of public ownership on the private firms' incentives to 
collaborate. 11 
Next, we examine networks from an efficiency standpoint. We say that a network is efficient 
if it generates at least as high a level of welfare as any other network. Our analysis reveals 
that the complete network is the unique efficient network. This result carries an important 
message: it suggests that the presence of a public firm' among the industry participants can 
reconcile individual incentives to form networks with the collective ones. Thus a public firm 
may potentially be used as a policy instrument in regulating innovative activity. If, however, a 
network is formed among private firms only, this may lead to a conflict between stability and 
social welfare, even though such a conflict is considerably reduced when the government can 
subsidise R&D. 
10 As we will see, this result is independent of the spillover rate or the mode of knowledge transmission. 
II A similar argument was employed by De Fraja (1993) to explain why public firms appear to pay higher wages 
than their private rivals. 
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No subsidies conflict if spillovers sufficiently large 
R&D subsidies conflict if spillovers small or quite large 
R&O subsidies and state-owned firm no conflict· 
Table 2.1 : Potential conflict between stable and efficient networks (* new result) 
The literature on R&D incentives in the context of a mixed oligopoly is relatively scarce. Del-
bono and Denicolo (1993) examined the role of a public firm in regulating innovative activity in 
a mixed duopoly with perfectly protected innovations. They showed that a welfare-maximising 
firm can alleviate the overinvestment problem in the private duopoly. More recently, Poyago-
Theotoky (1998) investigated the case of easy imitation in R&D, showing that most of the 
results of Delbono and Denicolo (1993) can actually be reversed.J2 Our approach is richer in 
the sense that the strategic effects for R&D are mediated through a network of R&D collabo-
ration in which the structure of the network and the place firms occupy in it play an important 
role. This, in turn, may give us a more comprehensive view of how research incentives are 
shaped in the present context. l :l 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the literature on R&D networks 
and explains the relationship beLween RJVs and R&D networks. Section 2.3 presents the 
model. The next section 2.4 that is divided into several subsections contains our results on the 
stability and efficiency properties of R&D networks. Section 2.5 discusses possible extensions, 
and finally, section 2.6 concludes. The equilibrium solutions of the different networks as well as 
(most) proofs of the Propositions are presented in the Appendix (section 2.7). 
2.2 Related literature 
The use of R&D alliances within the context of networks is a phenomenon that has mushroomed 
over the last two decades as result of the growing technological needs within a rapidly evolving 
business environment. The overall proliferation of R&D partnering activity exhibited a clear 
12 Nett (1994) considered the case of a mixed duopoly with cost-reducing innovation, and showed that the 
public firm may opt for producing at a higher cost than its private counterpart. lv!oreover, in some instances, 
welfare can be higher in the private duopoly relative to the mixed one. 
13 Powell, Koput and Smith-Ooerr (1996) have mentioned that the "locus of innovation1> is not anymore a firm 
as a single entity. It is rather the network of collaboration where the firm belongs. 
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cyclical pattern with peaks in 1986 and 1996 (Hagedoorn and van Kranenburg, 2003). In 
particular, in the hi-tech pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry around 65 partnerships 
were established in 1986, whereas in 1996 the number of newly found cooperative agreements 
increased significantly to 170. However, in later years, and especially after the year 2000, the 
number of research partnerships started to decline (Deroian et aI., 2007).14 Among the relevant 
explanations of this phenomenon are the reduction in the number of patents, the increase in the 
number of mergers and acquisitions, as well as the increase in market concentration. Thus, fairly 
dense networks with a large number of firms being engaged in a multitude of R&D agreements 
are steadily giving place to much smaller network structures. Typically, in this environment the 
pairs of partners are tightly connected. Furthermore, some firms may have a dominant position 
in the network which exemplifies their role as "bridging firms" (or "hubs") in the sense that 
they bring together firms that otherwise would not be connected. Note that these findings need 
to be confirmed by additional empirical studies, given that Deroian et al. (2007) are the first 
to report a decline in the number of research alliances in recent years. 
2.2.1 Research Joint Ventures and R&D networks 
An important dimension of R&D partnering activity concerns the organisational form of re-
search alliances. Traditionally, inter-firm cooperation in hi-tech industries has taken the form 
of equity-based alliances such as RJVs or minority holdings. Concerning RJVs in particular, 
there is a large body of empirical and theoretical literature offering comparisons between the 
scenarios of a grand coalition and the case in which firms remain as independent competitors 
(d' Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Katz, 1986; Suzumura, 1992; Poyago-Theotoky, 1995; 
Kamien, Muller and Zang, 1992; Amir, 2000). It has been widely accepted that R&D coop-
eration promotes R&D spending as long as the extent of technological spillovers is sufficiently 
large. 
Roijakkers and Hagedoorn (2006) provide the following definition of a RJV: "In a RJV, two 
or more separate parent companies agree to conduct long-term, shared R&D within a distinct 
organisational entity or 'company' that is characterised by common equity ownership." The 
broad theoretical literature on cooperative R&D distinguishes between the following modes: (i) 
l-!Similar patterns have been observed in the telecommunications industry. 
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R&D cartels, (ii) RJV competition, and (iii) RJV cartelisation. This taxonomy was proposed 
by Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992). Specifically, when firms are organised in R&D cartels, 
they coordinate their R&D efforts to maximise joint profits. In this situation, the results of the 
firms' joint efforts cannot be fully appropriated, since the process of knowledge transmission 
entails imperfect spillovers. In contrast, under a RJV competition type of model firms choose 
a non-cooperative level of R&D effort and the results of their independent research efforts are 
fully shared between them. As concerns RJV cartelisation, this can be described as a situation 
in which partners choose a cooperative level of research effort and, in turn, they are in position 
to fully appropriate the returns to R&D. In all cases, firms remain competitors in the product 
market. 
Kamien et al. (1992) found that R&D cartelisation may perform better in terms of unit cost 
reduction, profits and consumer surplus relative to R&D competition; the same is also true in 
the comparison between RJV cartelisation and RJV competition. This result can be explained 
by the interaction of two effects. First is the so-called "competitive advantage" externality: 
when firms carry out R&D investments they reduce their rivals' costs too, which decreases 
the marginal returns from own cost reduction - thus dampening the incentives to invest in 
R&D. Second is the so-called "combined profits" externality: when firms invest cooperatively 
in R&D, they internalise the positive effect of their investments on the profits of partner firms; 
this externality is indeed not taken into account when firms engage in R&D competition. It 
turns out that the overall effect is positive as long as spillovers are sufficiently large, so that R&D 
cartelisation outperforms R&D competition, and RJV cartelisation is more desirable than RJV 
competition. In addition, RJV cartelisation is superior to the aforementioned regimes (which 
also holds, in most cases, under Bertrand competition). 
There is broad agreement that the main reasons behind the formation of cooperative R&D 
agreements are: (i) to internalise spillovers and increase R&D efforts; (ii) to pool firms' R&D 
resources in order to reduce transaction costs and avoid wasteful duplication (Benfratello and 
Sembenelli, 2002). Note also that the terms "R&D cooperation" in the spirit of d' Aspremont 
and Jacquemin (1988) has been employed to describe an "R&D cartel" according to the taxon-
omy proposed by Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992), or a "RJV" according to Poyago-Theotoky 
(1995) and Salant and Shaffer (1998). Thus all these terms can be considered equivalent, with 
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most popular in the literature being that of a RJV. 
With the exception of RJV competition, which entails non-cooperative selection of R&D 
efforts by the research partners, all other forms of R&D cooperation (R&D cartels, RJV carteli-
sation) are equity-based modes of partnering activity given that firms coordinate their R&D 
efforts to maximise the sum of overall profits. In the real world, equity based modes of coop-
eration are intended to eliminate the opportunistic behaviour of firms in their choice of R&D 
efforts, which would otherwise arise under non-cooperative selection of R&D efforts, e.g. in the 
context of RJV competition. 
On the other hand, non-equity forms of cooperation are relatively loose contractual agree-
ments, including research contracts and joint R&D agreements. 15 These flexible forms of co-
operation are widely used in the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry and will be referred 
to as R&D networks. Note that according to Roijakkers and Hagedoorn (2006), contractual 
modes of partnering activity in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry have exhibited 
a steady increase during the 1980s and 1990s (with an exception being the year 1982), reaching 
to account for more than 90% of the total number of alliances during the 1990s. In addition, 
the overall rise in non-equity modes of partnering activity was reflected at the increase in joint 
R&D agreements over research contracts. This large rise in joint R&D agreements is mainly 
explained by the increasing independence of the initially small start-up biotechnology compa-
nies, on the one hand, and by the decreasing importance of outsourcing practices (contracting 
out), on the other. 
More generally, the increase in the number of non-equity alliances (as measured by network 
density) can be explained as follows. First, the introduction of new space-shrinking technolo-
gies has facilitated cross-border communication, so that firms can more easily exploit competi-
tive advantages that may arise in different locations. Second, the increasing harmonisation of 
regulations as a result of economic integration and liberalisation (Narula and Dysters, 2004) 
has substantially reduced transaction costs - examples being the EU, Nafta, WTO etc. In 
both cases above, the reduction in transaction costs can explain the increase in the number of 
alliances not only domestically but also internationally. However, this is only a partial expla-
H'Typically, research contracts refer to the situation in which a larger firm contracts out to a smaller one the 
development of a new technology. Joint R&D agreements are another type of cooperation in which firms pool 
together their R&D funds and benefit from sharing technological know-how. 
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nation of a growing phenomenon, since it can be argued that the decline in transaction costs 
should also have similar (positive) effects for more traditional collaboration structures. Thus, 
we can ask the question of what has actually driven the unprecedented growth in the number 
of quasi-hierarchical collaboration structures over full internalisation strategies. 
Recent research has revealed that non-equity forms of alliances have become increasingly 
popular over equity types of collaboration as they allow for greater flexibility, which enables 
firms to stay current with the latest technological developments. This means that equity forms 
of alliances are more costly to establish and, in addition, require more time to dissolve (Narula 
and Hagedoorn, 1998). However, in a rapidly evolving business world new technologies have 
typically short cycles. Products become obsolete faster than was previously the case, and this 
sometimes occurs before a patent is granted altogether. Thus, being flexible is essential for 
firms wishing to remain competitive and expand their technological expertise in different areas. 
Another related reason why establishing non-equity forms of alliances is preferable pertains 
to the observation that rapid change has rendered technologies increasingly interdependent. For 
instance, in the automobile sector the production procedure requires interdisciplinary expertise 
in sometimes diverse areas, such as telecommunications technology, semiconductor development 
and new materials technology, among other things (see Narula and Hagedoorn, 1999). Thus, 
by participating in various joint R&D agreements firms can gain access to new technological 
know-how, with a view to reinforcing the development of in-house innovations. In this respect, 
firms can complement their internal resources and core competencies with external ones, which 
is vital for their survival in the long-run. 
Moreover, firms may decide to engage in (flexible) R&D collaborations in order to learn 
about their rivals' technologies and gain access to a broad range of competencies. This means 
that firms do not necessarily trust their partners; rather, collaborating through a large number 
of flexible alliances enables them to stay current with the most recent technological advances. 
Moreover, the observation that non-equity forms of alliances enable firms to concentrate on 
their core competencies while developing knowledge jointly in non-core areas exemplifies their 
increasing popularity over the last decades. As argued by Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr 
(1996), the locus of innovation is not anymore a firm as a single entity. It is rather the network 
of collaboration where the firm is embedded. The proliferation in the number of non-equity 
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forms of cooperation - allowing for greater overall flexibility - motivates the study of endogenous 
formation of strategic R&D alliance networks. 
Next, we briefly discuss characteristics of alliances that have a profound effect on their 
performance. Most of the empirical literature on strategy and partner selection has focused on 
the importance of cooperation for the firms' innovative performance. However, we often observe 
that some alliances achieve better outcomes than others. Also, it is common phenomenon that a 
large number of collaborative agreements are terminated prematurely. These arguments suggest 
that there must be some factors contributing more to firms' innovative performance than others. 
Sampson (2007) has identified two key factors that underlie differences in performance 
between alliances. First, firms can benefit more from alliances characterised by a moderate 
degree of diversity concerning partners' technological capabilities. This suggests that some 
diversity is beneficial as it promotes greater creativity, novel solutions, and thus increases the 
opportunities for inter-partner learning. 16 It also indicates that effective learning takes place 
between firms with some capabilities in common. This in turn means that when diversity is 
too large firms may find it difficult to make effective use of each other skills and resources. 
Precisely, Sampson (2007) found that alliances consisting of partners with moderate diversity 
contribute 13 times more to the firms' innovation relative to alliances with minimal diversity 
and 3 times more relative to alliances characterised by a high degree of diversity. 
Second, for high levels of diversity between partners' technological capabilities, it appears 
that firms can benefit more through equity joint ventures than bilateral contracts. A key 
difference between the two types of cooperation is that in the former a distinct organisational 
entity - a firm in its own right - is formed; in the case of bilateral contracts, though, the parent 
companies pool their funds together, but do not form a new legal entity. For high levels of 
diversity between partners the superior performance of more hierarchical structures stems from 
the fact that they can attain better information flow through formal (joint) management of 
the new entity, exclusive assignment of employees and development of routines that promote 
efficiency objectives (see Sampson, 2007). Finally, firms' prior experience from collaborative 
activity is decisive for the benefits that they can attain within the context of their current 
16 In a similar spirit, I3aum, Calabrese and Silverman (2000) showed that biotechnology companies with a large 
number of partners are typically more successful relative to firms engaging in alliances with the same partner. 
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alliances (see e.g. Sampson, 2007; Anand and Khanna, 2000). 
2.2.2 Literature review on R&D networks 
We now proceed to discuss the main (recent) contributions on R&D networks. Goyal and 
Moraga-GonzaJez (2001) were the first to develop a formal model studying the incentives of 
firms to set up bilateral relationships and the structures of collaboration that will endogenously 
emerge. More precisely, they studied a three-stage game where in stage one firms decide their 
collaborative links in order to exchange knowledge on a cost reducing technology, then in stage 
two firms choose their R&D efforts, and finally, they compete in quantities. Goyal and Moraga-
Gonzalez (2001) considered the case where firms either compete in the market of a homogeneous 
good or in independent markets. Here we will concentrate on the results arising in the case of 
homogeneous goods, which is the most interesting market configuration (due to the presence 
of strategic effects in the decisions of firms to collaborate). We will also compare the results 
of Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez with the related paper by Deroian and Gannon (2006). In 
this paper the same game structure is adopted, although R&D is directed towards enhancing 
product design or quality (product R&D) rather than reducing firms' costs. 
We first discuss the relationship between R&D effort and the number of collaborations of 
a typical firm. Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) concentrated on symmetric networks where 
each firm has the same number of partners. Moreover, spillovers from (direct) collaborations are 
fully appropriated and there are no spillovers outside of a network. Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez 
(2001) found that R&D effort is decreasing in the number collaborations. This is because an 
increase in the number of links reduces not only a firm's own costs but also the costs of its 
partners. In turn, the latter negative effect tends to dampen the benefits from being a lower 
cost firm. Note that a similar result was obtained by Deroian and Gannon (2006) in the context 
of product R&D. 
Next, we discuss the relationship between the level of· cost-reduction and the number of 
partners (or links). Here a non-monotonic relationship arises: cost reduction is initially in-
creasing with the number of partners of a typical firm, and then it becomes decreasing. This 
is explained by the interplay of two effects: (i) adding a link to a given network reduces the 
costs of all partner firms; and (ii) R&D effort becomes smaller with the number of links, as 
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mentioned above. It appears that, in sparse networks, the savings in R&D effort to attain a 
given cost reduction - described in (i) - outweigh the losses in terms of the firms' level of effort, 
so that costs are initially decreasing. In dense networks the result is reversed, and so costs 
become eventually increasing. Similar conclusions arise in the context of networks where R&D 
is of quality-enhancing type (see Deroian and Gannon, 2006). 
We now turn to discuss the incentives of firms to form collaborative links. Goyal and 
Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) showed that the complete network is pairwise stable and also that the 
empty network can . never be stable. However, an analysis for an arbitrary number of firms 
turns out to be very complicated. To this end, Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) showed that 
the complete network is the unique pairwise stable network in an oligopoly consisting of four 
firms. The main difficulty arising in a more general context is that the addition of a link in a 
given network may have varying effects, both direct and indirect ones, depending on where it is 
located. To the best of my knowledge, the literature up to date has not made any substantial 
progress in dealing with this issue in a more systematic way. Furthermore, in the context of 
quality-improving alliances, Deroian and Gannon (2006) obtained that stable structures can 
neither be complete nor empty networks. Put differently, intermediate levels of collaboration 
maximise profits. 
It is also interesting to look at the incentives for collaboration in two related papers. Bloch 
(1995) proposed a model of coalition formation in which firms may have incentives to join a 
coalition in order to benefit from cost-reductions of the existing members. These benefits are 
proportional to the size of the coalition. Furthermore, it is assumed that the formation of coali-
tions arises through a process of sequential bargaining. In short, firm i announces the coalition 
it wants to be a member of; then the prospective members respond to this announcement. If 
the proposal is accepted the next firm makes its own proposal. Otherwise, the first firm to 
object makes a counteroffer. Bloch (1995) showed that this process yields two coalitions of 
asymmetric size. The largest coalition covers in fact approximately 2/3 of the market, but not 
larger than that, so as to enjoy the benefits of being the dominant group in the market. 
Goyal and Joshi (2003) investigated the same issue from the point of view of network 
formation. They proposed a two-stage game where in stage one firms choose their links to benefit 
from synergies (proportional to the size of the network) that reduce their costs and in stage two 
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compete in quantities. Goyal and Joshi (2003) showed that under moderate competition (i.e. 
all firms make positive profits but lower cost firms make higher profits) and negligible costs 
of link formation, the complete network is stable. This result is in sharp contrast with Bloch 
(1995). Before explaining the reason, we discuss the principal differences between the network 
and the coalition approach, following Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) and Goyal and Joshi 
(2003). 
First, a coalition is a partition of the set of firms into distinct subgroups. An immediate 
implication is exclusivity of membership, that is, a firm can be a member of only one coalition. 
By contrast, the network approach allows for relationships which are bilateral. For example, 
suppose that firm 1 is linked with firm 2 and firm 2 is also linked with firm 3 while firms 1 
and 3 are not connected. This situation would be ruled out in a coalition environment because 
firms 1, 2, 3 cannot be treated as one coalition. Also, thinking of firms 1, 2 and 2, 3 in terms 
of two distinct coalitions would violate the exclusivity of membership of coalitions. Thus, the 
theory of networks allows us to formalise relationships which would otherwise be excluded 
within a coalition environment. Furthermore, within a network environment firms can initiate 
new partnerships without the need of consent from their existing partners. This means that a 
new link will be formed provided that it is in the interests of two agents to do so. 
We are now in position to explain the reason behind the difference between Bloch (1995), 
and Goyal and Joshi (2003). In the model proposed by Bloch a firm entering a coalition benefits' 
proportionately to the size of the coalition but contributes only a small reduction to the costs of 
the existing members. It follows that the larger the size of the coalition, the smaller will be the 
incentives of existing members to allow a new member to enter. This implies that two coalitions 
will be formed with the largest covering around 2/3 of the market. By contrast, in Goyal and 
Joshi (2003) the firms' contributions are mutual and symmetric, so that a firm entering a new 
collaboration can only benefit from the lower cost of its (direct) partner, i.e. relationships are 
bilateral and the benefits from indirect links are excluded. This means that firms with a larger 
number of links can retain their competitive advantage, and thus for negligible costs of link 
formation it is optimal for them to acquire new partners. 
We briefly mention that for large costs of link formation and increasing returns from collab-
oration, Goyal and Joshi (2003) find that the ensuing trade-off implies the stability of dominant 
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groups. Thus, the assumption behind the costs of forming links is decisive for the equilibrium 
outcome, even in the case of increasing returns from forming links. 
Next, we compare individual incentives for collaboration with the incentives from the point 
of view of the entire industry and/or society. Here there is an emerging consensus regarding 
the fact that individual incentives for collaboration exceed the collective ones. In general, 
intermediate levels of collaboration are efficient. This means that total profits and social welfare 
are non-monotone in the number of collaborations. Intuitively, in sparse networks the savings in 
R&D effort by forming an additional partnership outweigh the losses resulting from a decrease 
in R&D effort, so that total profits and welfare are initially increasing. In dense networks, the 
relationship is reversed, and so profits and welfare become eventually decreasing. 
This tension between individual incentives for collaboration and collective ones explains 
why a large number of partnerships may be unstable (Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez, 2001). 
The intuition is that firms which belong to a given network would collectively be better off 
by not forming too may links. However, a pair of firms may gain a competitive advantage by 
deciding to establish an additional collaboration. Thus, in general, the number of alliances that 
will be formed is larger than the level dictated by (total) profit maximisation and/or welfare 
maximisation. Note that Goyal and Joshi (2003) do not compare stable and efficient networks 
in the case of moderate competition and Bloch (1995) shows that the largest coalition (covering 
around 2/3 of the market) is inefficient. 
The next paper to discuss is Goyal, Konovalov and Moraga-Gonzalez (2008) which contains 
a study of hybrid forms of collaboration. In this model firms choose the following actions: 
first, they decide how much to invest in in-house R&D concerning their core competencies, and 
second, how much to spend in joint R&D projects on non-core activities. This framework differs 
from the previous ones in that firms take two (joint) actions, rather than only one. The main 
results of the paper can be outlined as follows. 
The first result investigates the relationship between in-house and joint R&D projects. The 
authors find that R&D projects are complementary independently of the presence of spillovers 
across projects. Notice that this result arises only through the product market interaction of 
attaining lower costs and it can be explained by the interplay of two effects: (i) when a firm 
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invests in a joint project, this lowers own costs, increases output and the positive effects on these 
quantities make more valuable higher investments in in-house R&D; (ii) a higher investment in 
joint R&D reduces the costs of partner firms too, which lowers the benefits from making this 
investment. It turns out that in standard models of oligopoly with price or quantity competition 
the positive effect (i) always dominates the negative effect (ii), so that investments in in-house 
and joint R&D projects are complementary. Note also that when firms compete in independent 
market the second negative effect vanishes. 
The second result pertains to the relationship between equilibrium investments and the 
number of partners of a typical firm (number of joint projects). In relation to this the authors 
find that an increase in the number of joint projects increases not only the investments in 
in-house R&D but also the investments in joint R&D projects. An immediate implication 
is that better connected firms will have more significant contribution as members of an R&D 
network relative to less connected partners and will also allocate a larger amount of resources in 
strengthening their own core competencies. However, unequal contributions within the context 
of joint R&D projects may raise concerns about exploitation and free-riding. Thus, the paper 
by Goyal et al. (2008) can be seen as a first attempt in explaining these issues which lie at the 
core of economic analysis concerning cooperative R&D agreements. 
The next result concerns the relationship between individual and collective incentives for 
collaboration. Goyal et al. (2008) find that in large industries firms have excessive incentives 
to form alliances. This stems from the fact that an additional joint project increases own cost 
efficiency, but this comes at the expense of reducing aggregate profits. A similar tension between 
individual incentives for forming links and collective ones was identified by earlier studies where 
firms are assumed to take a single action. 
Comparing Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) with Goyal et al. (2008) one can see that 
the main results are nonetheless substantially different. In the former study it is shown that 
R&D effort is decreasing in the number of alliances and total profits are non-monotone (first 
increasing and then decreasing), whereas in the latter study R&D effort increases with the 
number of joint projects and total profits are decreasing. 
The studies by Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001), Goyal and Joshi (2003), Deroian and 
Cannon (2006), Goyal et al. (2008) contemplate regular networks, namely networks where 
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each firm has the same number of collaboration ties. This assumption is made for the purpose 
of tractability. However, it has been argued that firms often form alliances in order to gain 
competitive advantage over their rivals (Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez, 2001). This makes rel-
evant the study of asymmetric networks where firms do not have a necessarily equal number 
of connections. However, the study of asymmetric networks for general n turns out to be very 
complicated, and so attention is restricted to the case of a three-firm oligopoly (see Goyal and 
Moraga-Gonzalez, 2001; Mauleon et aI., 2008). In what follows we discuss the papers by Goyal 
and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001), Song and Vannetelbosch (2007), and Mauleon, Sempere-Monerris 
and Vannetelbosch (2008), which take up this issue. The latter paper is the first to consider a 
unionised labour market and in that sense it cannot be directly compared with the other two 
papers where firms are assumed to be non-unionised. Note also that Song and Vannetelbosch 
(2007) extend Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) by allowing for R&D subsidies in the context 
of an internationally integrated product market with three firms located in different countries. 
The main issue at stake in both studies is a conflict between individual incentives to collaborate 
and the collective ones. 
More precisely, Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) show that when spillovers are small 
enough the partially connected network is at the same time (pairwise) stable and efficient. For 
a larger range of spillovers the partial network is efficient, although it may not be stable. Thus 
a conflict between stable and efficient networks may arise if and only if spillovers are not too 
small. However, the likelihood of such a conflict is considerably reduced when R&D is subsidised 
(Song and Vannetelbosch, 2007). In the latter case, a conflict may only arise if spillovers are 
small or quite large. It follows that R&D subsidisation policies are beneficial in reconciling, 
to some extent, individual and collective incentives for collaboration. In particular, Song and 
Vannetelbosch (2007) show that this is true as long as spillovers are not too small. By contrast, 
in the present chapter we show that the use of a public firm as a policy instrument may resolve 
the potential conflict between stable and efficient networks in this setting. 
We now comment on two technical aspects of these results. First, Goyal and Moraga-
Gonzalez (2001) investigate only pairwise stable networks (for a formal definition and explana-
tions see section 2.4.3). In this case, the complete network is always stable and the partially 
connected network is stable only for small spillovers. Song and Vannetelbosch (2007), allowing 
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in addition for coalitional deviations, show that the complete network can never be stable; 
meanwhile the partially connected network remains stable for small spillovers. Intuitively, a 
coalition of two firms under a complete network has incentives to delete its links with the third 
firm in order to form a partially connected network; this explains why the complete network is 
no longer stable when more than a single pair of firms can deviate and reorganise their links. 
Consequently, the partially connected network endogenously emerges as the unique strongly 
stable network when spillovers are sufficiently small. 
Our second remark concerns the definition of efficient networks. Here there are different 
definitions of efficiency. Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) use social welfare as a measure 
of efficiency. Song and Vannetelbosch (2007) employ three alternative definitions. First, the 
notion of Pareto efficiency: a network is Pareto efficient if it is not Pareto dominated by any 
other network (see also Mauleon et aI., 2008 and chapter 4 - section 4.2). Second, the notion of 
strong efficiency: a network is strongly efficient if it yields the highest sum of individual payoffs. 
In the context of an internationally integrated product market one can consider as a measure 
of strong efficiency the sum of the individual countries' welfare, or alternatively, global welfare 
which encompasses the consumer surplus of the fourth (importing) county. These alternative 
measures of efficiency yield very similar predictions regarding the conflict between stable and 
efficient networks. 
The last paper to discuss is Mauleon et al. (2008) which is also related to chapter 4 of the 
thesis. The authors investigate the effects of labour unions organised at the firm-level on the 
incentives of firms to collaborate in R&D. Chapter 4 extends the present paper by allowing for 
different degrees of wage setting centralisation. In the sequel, we discuss briefly the paper by 
Mauleon et al. (2008) as chapter 4 compares in detail its results with our findings. 
The central finding of the paper by Mauleon et al. (2008) is that an increase in the union's 
bargaining power leads to the formation of stable networks which are characterised by a larger 
number of links - or equivalently, are more symmetric. An increase in the union's strength 
is conceptualised in terms of the comparison between two extreme market configurations: the 
case of no unions and the case of firm-level unions. In fact, there is no actual bargaining in the 
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model, and indeed the process of wage determination follows the monopoly-union model. 17 
More precisely, the case of no unions (used as a benchmark) is the model by Goyal and 
Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) where the complete network is pairwise stable but never strongly 
stable, meanwhile the partially connected network is both pairwise and strongly stable as long 
as spillovers are large enough. Thus in the case of no unions the structure of collaborations 
is relatively asymmetric. The intuition behind the stability of the partially connected network 
stems from the large asymmetries in the market implying that the linked firms are in a better 
(competitive) position than the isolated one, so that they have no incentives to offer a link to 
the latter in order to form a star network. 
Note that in the model proposed by Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) the partially con-
nected network is stable for small spillovers but in the model of Mauleon et al. (2008) it remains 
stable for relatively large spillovers. The reason behind this difference is the specification of 
spillovers. Mauleon et al. (2008) assume that spillovers between partner firms are not fully 
absorbed, and in addition, spillovers diminish in the distance of the relationship. This provides 
a clear distinction between directly and indirectly connected firms, with the latter type of firms 
receiving smaller spillovers. However, Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) do not make such 
a distinction, since directly connected as well as unconnected firms receive the same (public) 
spillover. Finally, Mauleon et al. (2008) assume that there is no spillover outflow from a given 
network, which is in contrast with Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001). Thus in the latter 
case the role of the network becomes less prominent. However, it should be noted that both 
approaches should be considered as equivalent in the sense that the results on the stability prop-
erties of different networks go through in both cases and only the respective range of spillovers 
values - being high or low in the case of the partial network - may change (the result on the 
stability of the complete network remains unaltered). 
Having said that the structure of stable collaborations is relatively asymmetric in the case 
of no unions, we now turn to discuss what happens when firms are unionised at the firm-level. 
In this case, it appears that the complete network is the unique pairwise stable and strongly 
stable network. The intuition is that in a partially connected network (that remains stable in 
the absence of unions) the linked firms, which are more efficient than the isolated one, pay higher 
17 See chapters 3 and 4 for a definition of the monopoly-union model. 
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wages. This implies that the relative cost advantage of the linked firm is partially dissipated, 
which, in turn, generates incentives to offer a link to the isolated firm - thus forming a star 
network. Similarly, in a star network the hub firm is in a better competitive position than the 
two spokes. Thus the spokes will have incentives to establish a new collaboration link, so as 
to diminish the competitive advantage of the hub. This, in turn, destabilises the star network, 
giving rise to the complete network. It follows that unionisation at the firm-level is decisive 
for the structure of collaborations in a manner that networks with a larger number of links are 
likely to arise in equilibrium. 
A promising direction for future research is to generalise this model allowing for an arbitrary 
number of firms. In doing so, one needs to relax the assumption that spillovers depend on 
the distance between collaborating firms, as this would make the analysis very complicated. 
Instead, one could adopt the framework proposed by Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) where 
a network consists of a firm's direct partners; meanwhile indirectly connected and unconnected 
firms are treated alike (with both receiving the same public spillover). Note that, as mentioned 
above, both models are equivalent. Moreover, to keep the analysis tractable one has to restrict 
attention to regular networks, where each firm has the same number of partners. This is an 
issue to be taken up in future research. 
In sum, it does appear that the literature has made substantial progress in analysing the 
incentives of firms to form R&D collaborations since the seminal contribution by Goyal and 
Moraga-Gonzalez (2001). However, there are issues that require further investigation. These 
involve the development of models that take explicit account of the process of knowledge trans-
mission by building on existing concepts in the industrial organisation literature, such as ab-
sorptive capacity. Another promising research direction is to consider partner selection in terms 
of an explicitly modelled search and matching and/or signalling procedure. These are issues to 
wait for future research. 
2.3 The model 
We consider a model of endogenous network formation. Firms create collaboration links to 
transfer knowledge on a new technology which lowers their costs and thus enhances their pro-
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ductive efficiency. We study firms' incentives for R&D collaboration, paying particular attention 
to the form that strategic alliances can take, and then compare stable with efficient networks. 
We proceed first to develop the necessary terminology and definitions. 
Networks of collaboration. Let N = {O, 1, 2} be the set of firms. The set comprises a 
public firm (indexed by i = 0) and 2 identical private firms. The inverse demand function of 
the homogeneous good produced by the firms is P(Q) = a - Q, where Q :s: a and Q = EiEN qi. 
We will say that any two members of N, i and j, are linked under the network 9 if {i,j} E g. 
For simplicity, we write ij to represent the link {i,j}, so that ij E 9 implies that firms i and j 
maintain a collaboration link under network g. Define a collaboration network as a collection 
of such pairwise links {(ij)i,jEN}. In any network g, nodes represent the firms and each link 
represents an R&D partnership. Firms can add or sever links from a given network provided 
that it is in their interests to do SO.18 We have that 9 + ij is the network resulting from 9 if 
firms i and j form a new link between them. Similarly, 9 - ij is the network resulting from the 
deletion of the link between i and jl9 Let Ni(g) be the set of links of firm i in network 9 and 
G be the set of all possible networks. 
In the rest of the chapter, we concentrate on asymmet1ic networks. The advantage of this 
choice of a set up is that it allows firms to maintain a not necessarily equal number of connec-
tions. This is particularly relevant due to the asymmetry resulting from the presence of a public 
firm among the industry participants. Hence, we have the following network architectures: (i) 
the complete network, gC, in which the level of collaborative activity is maximal, i.e. all firms 
are connected to each other; (ii) the star network, in which one firm ("hub") is connected with 
two others ("spokes"), but the latter remain disconnected. Note that there are two cases to 
be distinguished here: either the public firm can be a hub or any of the private firms. We call 
the former public-hub star network, g'O, and the latter private-hub star network, gS. (iii) Next, 
we have the partially connected network, in which any two firms are connected while the third 
firm is isolated. Under the partially connected network either two private firms can maintain 
18The optimality of forming links or severing links from an existing network is conceptualised in terms of profit 
for the private firms, whereas in terms of welfare (consumers surplus plus aggregate profits) for the public firm 
(the formal definitions are presented below). 
l!lHere the links are assumed to be nondirectional: that is ij = ji. 
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a link or the public firm can be linked with one private firm. We call the former public partial 
network, gPO, and the latter private partial network, gP. (iv) Finally, we have the empty network 
(ge), in which the level of collaborative activity is minimal, i.e. there are no collaboration links. 
With two private firms and one public firm eight network architectures are possible; however, 
only six of them yield qualitatively different results. These network architectures are presented 
in Figure 2.1. 
CD ® 
<D 
r V 
Privat&-hub Star NIIIwofk PubllI>hub Star Network 
® 
@ 
Private Partial Network Pul;lIlI;: Partlal Network 
Figure 2.1: Six possible network architectures 
R&D efforts and spillovers. Given a network g, each firm carries out R&D to reduce its 
marginal cost. R&D effort is costly with cost represented by the quadratic function r(ei) = ,er, 
, > 0; this reflects diminishing returns to the level of R&D effort ei. For simplicity, we set 
, = 1 which ensures non-negativity of all variables. 
The effective level of R&D is the total reduction in a firm's marginal cost and has two com-
ponents: the own research effort ei and the effort profile of firm i's research partners {ej, ed, 
i of j of k. We assume that the extent of information leakage or degree of spillovers benefit col-
laborating firms at an exogenously given rate {3, {3 E (0, 1J. The rate of knowledge transmission, 
the spillover rate, depends on the distance among collaborating firms. The distance between 
two firms i and j in a network g is defined as the number of links in the shortest path between 
them. We denote by t( ij) the number of links in the shortest path between i and j, and we set 
t( ij) = 00 to denote the absence of a path between them. Therefore, spillovers that result from 
direct collaborations are always larger than those obtained from indirect ones, since t( ij) = 1 
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in the case of a direct relationship. Hence, given a network 9 and a collection of R&D efforts 
{ei(g)}iEN, knowledge augments in the following fashion 
(2.1) 
The process of knowledge transmission is central to our analysis and so we discuss the ideas 
underlying it. It follows Mauleon et al. (2008) and suggests that every collaborative agreement 
benefits from partial spillovers while there is no spillover outflow to non-collaborators. Goyal 
and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) focus instead on spillovers outside a given network. In particular, 
their formulation differs from ours in the following key respects 20 
First, spillovers from direct collaborations are not fully absorbed. The assumption of partial 
spillovers reflects that knowledge comprises know-how that is firm-specific and thus cannot be 
easily absorbed and/or utilised by the research partners. This is also motivated by the growing 
complexity of new technologies and the implementation of distinctive processes within each 
firm. For example, if Sony and Philips decide to establish an agreement to reduce their costs 
for a DVD technology, they first need to set up common standards. This means that firms have 
to forgo short-term profit objectives anticipating to enhance their product-market positioning in 
the long-run.21 However, in most cases, collaboration agreements are driven by both objectives 
at the same time, which justifies our focus on partial within-the-network spillovers (see Narula 
and Hagedoorn, 1999). A related observation behind our assumption reflects the idea that 
firms need to build their absorptive capacity in order to benefit from technological spillovers 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). Because building absorptive capacity is costly, firms are able to 
incorporate only part of their partners' knowledge into their innovation process. In contrast, 
Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez assume that collaborating firms can fully benefit from each other's 
R&D efforts (i.e. there are perfect spillovers). 
Second, empirical evidence suggests that the extent of knowledge transmission depends on 
the distance between collaborating firmsP As a way of capturing this empirical observation, 
20The same approach, as in Goyal and 1:Ioraga-Gonzalez (2001), is adopted by Song and Vannetelbosch (2007). 
21 Establishing common standards requires that firms incur an investment cost, which can be recovered in the 
long-run. 
22The empirical literature to date is a bit less clear on this issue. For example, existing findings suggest that the 
probability of collaboration between private firms and universities depends negatively on their physical distance 
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we postulate that spillovers depend on the distance between collaborating firms and, in partic-
ular, they diminish with increasing distance between a pair research partners. Close in spirit 
to our approach, Piga and Poyago-Theotoky (2005) develop a Hotelling spatial model of prod-
uct differentiation to investigate firms' location decisions when R&D investment is directed 
towards enhancing product quality. In this paper, location decisions and thus, the distance -
in a literal sense - between firms, have a bearing on the degree of knowledge dissemination. 
Finally, contrary to Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez, the present chapter makes a clear distinction 
between directly and indirectly connected firms, although these authors treat both types of 
firms identically, assuming the same incoming (public) spillover. 
Next, we turn to compare the approach adopted in the present chapter with the literature 
on endogenous spillovers in the context of cooperative R&D agreements (i.e. RJVs). This 
literature, treating spillovers as a strategic decision that the research partners have to make, is 
scare - a notable exception being Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) .2:1 In this paper, when firms enter 
a RJV (and so make all their innovation decisions cooperatively) this does not automatically 
imply that they will share information fully and coordinate their research design to maximise 
their potential for receiving spillovers.24 In making these decisions, firms will have to consider a 
variety of factors, such as the nature of product market competition and the degree of technical 
substitutability / complementarity, to mention a few. Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) develop a 
model that incorporates these ideas and show that maximal information-sharing is not always 
an equilibrium outcome. Reason being that the RJV may not fully share information, namely, 
to prevent firms from becoming too aggressive competitors in the product market. 
In relation to this, we note that the present chapter treats spillovers as an exogenously 
given capacity of a firm to absorb information from its research partners, in the spirit of d' 
Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). This approach also takes the view that research outcomes 
(see ego lvlansfield and Lee, 1996; Anselin et al., 1997). Cast in this light, knowledge externalities between private 
firms and universities are to a large extent geographically clustered (e.g. Silicon Valley in California or Waterloo 
region in Ontario). 
23Kamien and Zang (2000) also relax the assumption made in virtually all the literature that spillovers are 
exogenous (like "manna from heaven"). In this paper, firms need to invest in R&D in order to realise a positive 
spillover. Thus an interplay arises between building absorptive capacity (i.e. the ability to assimilate information) 
and disclosing own information. The paper shows that firms will choose basic approaches (Le. maximal spillovers 
and absorptive capacity) when choosing their R&D budgets cooperatively, whereas they will opt for firm-specific 
approaches under non-cooperative selection of R&O budgets. 
24 Assuming complementary research paths, Katz (1986) shows that a RJV will fully share information. 
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are pure complements, thus abstracting from issues of research design coordination.25 In the 
present chapter our focus is essentially on understanding how a public firm might influence the 
stability properties of R&D networks as well as the relationship between stable and efficient 
networks. There is important further work to be done on the role of spillovers - a major 
component of collaborative alliances - on innovative performance within the context of R&D 
collaboration networks. 
Payoffs. A network of collaboration is a collection of pairwise links in which the level of 
R&D effort and the extent of knowledge transmission depends on the place where firms locate 
in a given network. The cost of firm i in network 9 when firm i produces output qi, and firm 
i's effective R&D output is Ei, is given by26 
Ci(qi, Ei, g) = (c - Ei(g))qi(g) + q;(g), i E N, a> c> o. (2.2) 
Our specification of the cost function reflects the fact that all firms are ex ante equally 
efficient. If the public firm was more efficient it would serve the entire market; and if it was 
too inefficient this would leave room for potential privatisationP We have further introduced 
a quadratic term in the firms' cost function to avoid situations where private firms are driven 
out of the market altogether. Because our primary purpose is to study strategic interactions 
between a public and two private firms, this assumption is a natural way to do so by allowing 
for cost differences between the firms in equilibrium. This means that the public firm will incur 
2(, Amir (2000) provides a detailed comparison of the cl' Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) model with the model 
developed by Kamien, Ivluller and Zung (1992). cl' Aspremont and .Jacquemin take the view that spillovers are on 
R&D outputs us well as that the autonomous and the spillover cost reduction are perfectly additive. In contrast, 
Kamien, rvlulIer and Zang assume that spillovers are on R&D expenditure and that effective R&D consists of 
the autonomous R&D expenditure plus the expenditure via spillovers. It is shown that the model by Kamiell, 
~.'luller and Zang is fully valid whereas the model by d' A~premont and Jacquemin is of que~tionable validity for 
large spillover values (although it may still be valid for certain types of industries, e.g. research parks). 
2GNote that the marginal cost of production is given by et(g) = ~ = (c - Ei) + 2qi. Therefore, the impact q, 
of effective R&D on the margin is to induce a downward shift in each firm's cost curve, without affecting its 
slope. This specification, in a simple way, maintains the ~pirit of earlier contributions (e.g. d' Aspremont and 
Jacquemin, 1988; Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez, 2001; Song and Vannetelbosch, 2007j ~:Iauleon! Sempere-tvlonerris 
and Vannetelbosch, 2008). 
27White (2002) pointed out that this assumption can be qualified in several ways. For instance, there is mixed 
evidence on the relative efficiency of public and private firms, so that assuming that the public firm is (ex ante) as 
efficient as the private firms would seem quite reasonable. Furthermore, public firms that survive for a significant 
time period may fall within the same category of being relatively efficient. (These arguments follow precisely our 
di~cussion in chapter 1.) 
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a higher marginal cost, given that it seeks to maximise total surplus. 
We postulate that the government subsidises R&D effort. Specifically, given a network 9 
each firm receives a subsidy (tax if negative) s per unit of R&D effort, S(ei(g)) = sei28 ,29 As 
concerns private firms, they are assumed to maximise own profit 
"i(g) = [a - qi(g) - qj(g) - qk(g)]qi(g) - Gi(g) - e;(g) + S(g), (2.3) 
whereas the public firm maximises welfare defined as the sum of consumer surplus and producer 
profits net of R&D subsidies 
Q2() 2 
W(g) = --!- + L "i(g) - s[ei(g) + ej(g) + ek(g)]. 
i=O 
(2.4) 
The form of the public firm's objective function, placing equal weight on consumer and 
producer surplus, accords with utilitarianism or doctrines aimed at promoting fairness among 
consumers and producers. This is consistent with the purpose of this work which is to compare 
individual incentives to form strategic alliances with the collective ones. In other words, we 
intend to examine the circumstances under which the presence of a public firm reconciles private 
and social incentives for collaboration, which is clearly a normative question. We thus restrict 
attention to an equally-weighted form of welfare function. Furthermore, we note that the 
assumption of welfare maximisation neglects any agency problems between the government and 
the public firm. However, this is an initial attempt to study R&D networks with a public 
firm, and in order to focus on the competitive interactions between public and private firms, 
maintaining this assumption provides a building block for the analysis of more general cases. 
We note that the literature On mixed oligopoly has extensively used similar assumptions (see, 
for instance, Anderson et ai., 1997; De Fraja and Delbono, 1989; Pal and White, 1998; White, 
2002; Fjell and Heywood, 2004). 
28 It can be shown that the results are robust to the case of subsidising R&D expenditure. 
29ft is worth noting that in the absence of an R&D subsidisation policy the public firm is likely to be loss-
making, depending on the degree of spillovers. In this chapter 1 we have allowed for R&D subsidies for two 
main rea8ons: first, to capture existing empirical evidence, and second, to facilitate comparison with Song and 
Vannetelbosch (2007) who analysed the case of a purely private market with R&D subsidies. The fact that the 
public firm might incur a loss for some values of the spillover parameter seems to provide a rationale as to why 
public firms are subsidised in the real world. 
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Note further that subsidisation of R&D efforts implies no direct effect on welfare, because 
the subsidy constitutes simply a transfer payment. However, there is an indirect and stmtegic 
effect that is channelled to the public firm's R&D (and output) via the response of the private 
firms to any change in the rate of subsidy. In that sense, an R&D subsidy serves, at least 
partially, the same purpose as an output subsidy (White, 1996; Fjell and Heywood, 2004). 
Thus, rearranging the expression for social welfare we obtain 
Q2(g) ~ 2 
W(g) = -2- + L)(a - qi(g) - qj(g) - qk(g))qi(g) - Ci(g) - ei (g)l· (2.5) 
i=O 
The timing of moves. We construct a four-stage game: in stage one, firms choose 
simultaneously and independently their collaborative links. For tractability, it is assumed that 
the formation of links incurs no additional costs to the parties involved (e.g. Coyal and Moraga-
Conzalez, 2001). In stage two, the government chooses a level of an R&D subsidy to maximise 
social welfare. Firms then choose their individual R&D efforts in the third stage, and finally, 
they compete in quantities. To solve this multi-stage game, we first obtain the equilibrium of 
stages two to four by backward induction. Finally, we solve stage one, the network formation 
stage, by applying the notion of pairwise stability. 
The timing of moves reflects that a long-run decision, such as the formation of collaborative 
links, may have considerable effects on shorter-run decisions, such as the specific level of an 
R&D subsidy, R&D effort and output.30 This implies that when the firms decide which links 
to establish, it is natural to anticipate how this may influence the R&D subsidy they will re-
ceive, their R&D decisions and hence, their product-market positioning. The present timing is 
motivated by the fact that R&D collaborations are strategic decisions with longer-run charac-
teristics than the choice of the level of an R&D subsidy. Indeed, while R&D collaborations last 
for an average of at least three years, with the collaboration on an initial project followed by 
the establishment of alliances along different research lines, the regulator may adjust the level 
of an R&D subsidy more frequently in order to promote the ongoing or encourage new R&D 
projects (see Schilling and Phelps, 2005; Song and Vannetelbosch, 2007).31 Also, the timing 
:10 In section 2.5.1, we discuss the case in which the R.&D subsidy is chosen at the initial stage of the game. 
31 Employing the same timing of moves, Song and Vannetelbosch (2007) highlight empirical evidence in Hage-
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above which is standard in the R&D network literature allows us to capture the commitment 
value of collaboration (see e.g. Narula and Hagedoorn, 1999).32 
The theoretical framework proposed here combines new elements, namely firms of different 
ownership (private and state-owned) with the provision of R&D subsidies. Thus, the seminal 
contribution of Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) is enriched in three dimensions: (i) a public 
firm maximising its contribution to social surplus; (ii) an R&D policy instrument serving the 
purpose of balancing the inefficient distribution of production costs among the public and private 
firms, as well as stimulating overall spending on R&D; (iii) the mode of knowledge transmission, . 
since we consider networks of both tacit and codified knowledge. Although these considerations 
generate important interaction effects underlying the relationship between stable and efficient 
networks, they also complicate considerably the task of obtaining closed form solutions, and 
in particular concerning the cases of asymmetric network architectures, namely the star and 
partial networks. As a result, we restrict attention to R&D networks that will endogenously 
emerge for given values of spillovers (as in Song and Vannetelbosch, 2007). 
We consider the following four cases: (i) weak spillovers, (3 = 1; medium spillovers, (3 = !; 
strong spillovers, (3 = ~; and perfect spillovers, (3 = 1. The main reason behind this selection of 
spillover values is the fact that the different network architectures become more important for 
relatively high spillovers (prompting us to neglect the case of very small or no spillovers). As 
will be seen, the results on the stability and efficiency properties of R&D networks are clear-cut, 
which in turn leaves no room for the occurrence of potential irregularities. 
2.4 Network formation 
In this section, we investigate the firms' incentives to form bilateral collaborations with a 
view to exchanging information on a cost-reducing technology. We proceed first to derive the 
equilibrium of the different networks. 
doorn et al. (2001) according to which 1I3rvl and Apple maintained 12 collaborative projects on core and non-core 
areas of expertise during the period 1991-96. 
32For an R&D project to be successful, firms ask their partners for strong commitment. 
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2.4.1 The public-hub star network 
Attempting to shed some light on the subtle issues concerning strategic interactions within a 
given network, we present here the analysis of the public-hub star network, g'o. In the appendix, 
we present the equilibrium solutions for the other network architectures. Under the public-hub 
star network, the public firm (hub) maintains a direct link with each private firm (spoke); the 
private firms, in turn, are directly connected with the public firm and indirectly connected with 
each other. The relevant cost structures under g"O are thus given by 
co(gSO) = c - eo - (3(ei + ej) + 2qo; and (2.6) 
<;;(g'O) = c - ei - {3(eo - (1/2)ej) + 2qi, i i= j, i,j E {l, 2}. (2.7) 
Firm i's marginal cost is the difference between its effective R&D output and its initial per 
unit cost (c) plus the last term to the right of the equality in eq. (2.6) and (2.7) that stems 
from differentiation of a quadratic (output) term. The public firm's effective R&D depends on 
its own effort and on the efforts of its private partners that reduce firm 0 costs at a rate (3, just 
as eq. (2.7) reflects a private firm's effective cost reduction. Note that a private firm benefits 
from the public firm's effort at a rate {3, and from the effort of the other firm at a rate (3/2, 
given the distance of two links between the private firms in this setting. 
The ensuing expressions for profits are as follows 
11'i(g80 ) = (a-qo-qi-qj)qi-[c-ei-{3(eo-(1/2)ej)]qi-q;-e;(g)+sei, i i= j,i,j E {1,2}. (2.9) 
Social welfare consists of the sum of public and private profits net of R&D subsidies (s(eo + 
e1 + e2)) plus consumer surplus ((1/2)(qo + ql + (]2]2). 
Maximising the expressions for welfare and profits with respect to the output levels, we 
obtain the following focs, respectively 
(a- c) - 3qo -qi -qj +co + (3(ei +ej) = 0, (2.10) 
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(a - c) - 4qi - qo - qj + ei + (3(eO + (1/2)ej) = O. (2.11) 
Note that the soc for the hub is -3 < 0, and for the spokes -4 < 0, which guarantee that the 
foes are necessary as well as sufficient for an interior optimum. Solving the system of the foes, 
we obtain the equilibrium of this stage game 
( ..) _ 6(a - c) + (10 - 4(3)eo + (9(3 - 2)(ei + ej) qo eo)e1,e) - 26 ' (2.12) 
( ) 12(a - c) + (18(3 - 6)eo + (22 - 8(3)ei + (5(3 - 4)ej qi eo, ei, ej = 78 . (2.13) 
Before proceeding to the R&D selection stage, we substitute the public-private output levels 
(2.12), (2.13) in welfare and profits.:!:l 
In stage three, each firm selects a level of R&D effort to maximise its objective for a given 
subsidy, anticipating perfectly the effects of its choice at the output selection stage. This yields 
the following foes 
(a - c) (35 + 64(3) + Cl (ei + ej) - (271 + 64(3 - 96(32)eo = 0, (2.14) 
24(a - ;;)(11 - 4(3) + C2eo + C3ej - 2(1279 + 176(3 - 32(32)ei + 15218 = 0, (2.15) 
where Cl = -16 + 107(3 - 8(32, C2 = -132 + 444(3 - 144(32 and C3 = -88 + 142(3 - 40(32 
The soc for the public firm is given by -(271 + 64(3 - 96(32) < 0, and for a private firm by 
-2(1279 + 176(3 - 32(32) < 0; indeed both conditions are fulfilled for all (3, (3 E (0,11. The foes 
can be rewritten to obtain the R&D reaction functions 
r (e. e.) = (a - c)(35 + 64(3) + C1(ei + ej) 
o " J 271 + 64(3 _ 96(32 ' (2.16) 
,..(e e.) = 24(a - c)(l1 - 4(3) + C2 eO + C3ej + 15218 
• 0, J 2(1279 + 176(3 _ 32(32) , (2.17) 
33The resulting expression for welfare is given by 601S4 (1782(a2 + c?) - 4878ea - 576eo(ei + ej) - 4976(e~ + e;)-
488e,ej -1152e~/3 + 3852eo(e, +ej)/3 - 820e;/3 + 1064e,ej/3 - 820e;/3 + 1728e~/3 - 288eo(e, + ej)/32 + 1195(e; + 
ej )/32 + 1714e;ej/32 - 36(a(99c - (e, + ej)(32 + 51/3) - eo(35 + 64/3)) + c«e, + ej )(32 + 51/3) + eo(35 + 64/3)))), and 
for the profit of firm i given by - 30~2 (144(a2 + (2 ) +36ea +3042sei - 264eoei - 2558e~ +48eoej -176eiej + 16e;-
216e~/3 +888eoe,/3 - 352e; /3 - 204eoej/3 + 284e,ej/3 -40e;/3 +324e~/32 - 288eoe,/32 +64e; /32 + 180eoej/32 -80e,ej/32 + 
25e;/32 + 24c(2e,( -11 + 4/3) + ej(4 - 5/3) + eo(6 - 18/3)) - 24a(12c + 2e,( -11 + 4/3) + ej (4 - 5/3) + eo(6 - 18/3))). 
These computations have been performed with the help of Mathematica 4.0. 
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We now make the following remarks on the externalities generated in the present network: 
the R&D effort is a strategic substitute for sufficiently low spillover values, and turns to a 
strategic complement when the spillover exceeds a certain threshold. Importantly, the turning 
point from strategic substitution to strategic complementarity is lower from the public firm's 
viewpoint. Note that the associated spillover value from the public firm's viewpoint is the 
solution to the equation Cl = 0; it can be computed as f3 ~ 0.15. Similarly, the R&D effort 
is a strategic substitute from a private firm's perspective (in relation to the public firm) if 
and only if f3 < 0.33; however, the R&D effort with respect to the other private firm is a 
strategic substitute if and only if f3 < O.S. Note that latter critical values are the solutions to 
the equations C2 = 0, C3 = 0, respectively. Thus, it is more likely that R&D is a strategic 
complement from the viewpoint of the "hub" - public firm. The following Table summarises. 
Strategic interaction Spillover range: R&D substitute (complement) 
Hub -> Spoke f3 < (»0.15 
Spoke -> Hub f3 < (> )0.33 
Spoke;=! Spoke f3 < (> )O.S 
Table 2.2: Summary of the results for stage 3 Il&D efforts 
Solving the system of the R&D reaction functions and applying symmetry for the firms at 
the spokes, i.e. ei = ej = e, we obtain 
e (s) = (a - (;)(S3 + 233f3 - 12f32) - 3(16 - 107f3 + Sf32)S 
o 703 + 265f3 _ 344f32 + 16f33 ' (2.1S) 
() 4(a - (;)(33 - f3 - 4f32) + 3(271 + 64f3 - 96f32)s 
e s = 2(703 + 265f3 _ 344f32 + 16f33) (2.19) 
Note the effect of the subsidy on the R&D effort of a private firm is positive, whereas 
the subsidy can exert either a positive or a negative influence on the public firm's effort; the 
associated effect is positive if and only if f3 > 0.15. Note that the critical threshold f3 ~ 0.15 
is the solution to the equation 16 - 107f3 + Sf32 = O. The intuition behind this pattern can 
be gained by referring to the subsidy induced movements of the R&D best response fUnctions, 
given by (2.16) and (2.17).34 When the spillover rate is relatively low (f3 < 0.15), an increase 
:J.l See also chapter 1 for a discussion along these lines. 
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in the level of subsidy increases the R&D effort of each private firm. This induces an outward 
shift of the private firms' best response functions (see eq. 2.17), implying a reduction in the 
public firm's R&D effort because the best response functions are downward sloping. When the 
spillover rate lies within the intermediate range (0.15 < (3 < 0.33), an increase in the level 
of subsidy increases the private firms' R&D effort too, which has now a positive rather than 
a negative impact on the public firm's effort, since R&D is a strategic complement from the 
public firm's perspective. Finally, when the spillover rate is relatively high ((3 > 0.33), meaning 
that R&D efforts are strategic complements, a higher subsidy will always increase the firms' 
R&D efforts. 
Substituting (2.18) and (2.19) in (2.12) and (2.13) we obtain the stage-two equilibrium out-
puts which can be analysed with respect to the subsidy in a similar manner.35 Entering the 
resulting expressions for R&D efforts and outputs in the social welfare function and differenti-
ating with respect to 8 leads to the foc 
2(a - c)(6 + 145(3 + 109(32 - 60(33) - 3(231 + 88(3 - 240(32 - 16(33 + 32(34)8 = O. (2.20) 
The associated soc requires that -(231 + 88(3 - 240(32 - 16(33 + 32(34) < 0; this holds for all (3, 
guaranteeing a unique maximum of the social welfare with respect to the R&D subsidy. Solving 
the foc with respect to 8, we obtain the equilibrium subsidy 
8 so = 2(a - c)(6 + 145(3 + 109(32 - 60(33) 
(g) 3(231 + 88(3 - 240(32 - 16(33 + 32(34) . (2.21) 
Note that the optimal subsidy is always positive and increasing in the degree of spillovers. A 
higher spiIJover rate implies more effective communication between the partners within a given 
network, which increases the returns to the R&D subsidy (Hinloopen, 1997). Indeed, we have 
that 
8s(gSO) 
8(3 
2(a-c)C4 >0 V 
3(231 + 88(3 - 240(32 - 16(33 + 32(34)2 (3, 
where C4 = 32967 + 53238(3 + 3100(32 - 6688(33 + 2224(34 - 6976(35 + 1920(36 > O. 
(2.22) 
Substitutions yield the equilibrium solutions for the public-hub star network, which are 
35Chapter 1 contains an extensive analysis of the mixed duopoly case. 
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presented in Table 2.3 below. 
Hub firm (public) Spoke firms (private) 
h( '0) _ (0-c)(27+72/3+22/32_24/33) 
eo 9 - 231+88/3 240/32 16/33+32/34 ( '0) _ (0-c)(24+55/3+20/32_16/33) e 9 - 231+88/3-240/3'-16/33+32/34 
h( "0) _ (0-c)(60+52/3-23/32) 
Qo 9 - 231+88/3-240/32 16/33+32/34 ( SO) _ 13(0-c)(6+4/3-3/3') q 9 - 2(231+88/3 240/32 16/33+32/34) 
h( 80) _ (0-c)2tq 
71'0 9 - 3(231+88/3 240/32 16/33+32/34)2 ( SO) _ (0-c)2L>2 71' 9 - 6(231+88/3 240/32 16/33+32/34)2 
W( 80) _ (0-c)2(75+56/3-34/32) 
9 - 231+88(3-240(32-16(33+32(34 eS( SO) _ 2(0-c)2(69+52/3-31/32)2 9 - (231+88(3-240/3'-16/33+32(34)2 
Table 2.3: Equilibrium solutions for the public-hub star network 
Note that the superscript h refers to the hub firm, and the expressions for 6 1 and 62 
are given by 6 1 = 8937 + 15750{3 + 7746{32 + 5756{33 - 301{34 - 4704{35 + 1152{36 > 0 and 
6 2 = 15372 + 23736/3 + 8794{32 + 8676iJ3 - 1037{34 - 7936{35 + 2304{36 > O. 
Then one can easily obtain per firm effective R&D as follows 
Eo(gSO) 
Ei(g'O) 
and total effective R&D 
= eo + {3(ei + ej) 
= 
(a - c)(27 + 120{3 + 132{32 + 16{33 - 32{34) 
231 + 88{3 - 240{32 - 16{33 + 32{34 
{3 
ei + {3eo + '2ej 
(a - c) (48 + 188{3 + 239{32 + 32{33 - 64{34) 
.231 + 88{3 - 240{32 - 16{33 + 32{34 
E( SO) = (a - c)(75 + 308/3 + 371{32 + 48{33 - 96{34) 
9 231 + 88{3 - 240{32 - 16{33 + 32{34 
(2.23) 
(2.24) 
(2.25) 
To study the aggregate performance of the different networks we consider a variety of mea-
sures, namely social welfare, consumer surplus and aggregate profits. Taking the sum of indi-
vidual profits, lI(g'O) = 71'3(g'0) + 271'(g80 ), we obtain 
(2.26) 
where 6 3 = 24309 + 39486{3 + 16540{32 + 14432{33 - 1338{34 - 12640{35 + 3456/36 > O. 
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2.4.2 ~I) efforts 
In this section, we address the following question: What is the impact of forming links on 
the firms' R&D effort? Would an increase in the number of strategic alliances increase own 
R&D effort, or would it reduce the effort due to the potential for free-riding? The answer to 
these questions has two main angles: first, we investigate what happens when a firm, either 
public or private, establishes own collaboration ties. Second, we deal with the effects of other 
firms forming collaboration ties on a firm's own research effort. Our notational convention is 
as follows. The superscript I refers to a linked firm in a partially connected network and the 
superscript h denotes the "hub" in a star network. The superscripts e, Po, p, so, s, c stand 
for the empty, public partial, private partial, public-hub star, private-hub star and complete 
networks. Claim 1 reports how changes in collaboration links affect the firms' R&D effort. 
Claim 1 The public firm's R&D effort increases in the following cases: 
(i) with the number of own links, i.e. eo(ge) < e&(gPO) < ea(g'O); 
(ii) with the degree of R&D spillovers; 
(iii) when private firms establish links, i.e. e&(gPO) < eo(g8), ea(gSO) < eo(gC). 
The exception to the cases above is the private-partial network, gP, in which the public finn's 
R&D effort decreases with the spillover, ae~W) < 0, and with the addition of a link among the 
private firms in an empty network, eo(ge) > eo(gP). 
(iv) Each private firm's R&D effort increases with the number of own links, with the degree 
of R&D spillovers, as well as when the other private firm establishes collaboration links with 
the public firm. 
Proof. (i), (ii) Follow directly from Table 2.4; (iii) follows from Figure 2.3 and Table 2.4; 
the results that ae~~P) < 0 and eo(ge) > eo(gP) also follow from Table 2.4. (iv) From Figure 
2.4 and Table 2.5 we can establish the following comparisons: e(ge) < el (gPO) < eh(gS) and 
e(ge) < el(gP) < eh(g8). These results show that a private firm's effort increases with the 
addition of own links. From Table 2.5 it is also easy to see that a private firm's effort increases 
with the degree of spillovers. To establish the last part (iv) we refer to Figure 2.5 and Table 
2.5. We see that e(ge) < e(gPo), el(gP) < e(g8) and el(gPo) < e(g80 ), which completes the proof 
of Claim 1. • 
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Result (i) states that when the public firm forms an additional link, it finds particularly 
appealing to increase its R&D effort. This highlights the combined effect underlying direct and 
indirect spillovers that imply higher marginal returns from collaboration. Specifically, in the 
move from the empty to the public partial network, the public firm can benefit from direct 
spillovers. By moving then to the public-hub star network the public firm can appropriate 
technological know-how not only through direct but also indirect links (see Figure 2.2 and 
Table 2.4). Intuitively, the efficiency effect of adding a link is to increase the public firm's 
output by reducing own production costs. A higher output makes further increases in R&D 
effort more worthwhile because the potential gains from higher efficiency will spread across 
more units of output. However, this is not the end of the story: the public firm's contribution 
to R&D investment is reinforced by a private firm's higher R&D effort. In particular, a private 
firm realises that by increasing its own R&D effort it can enhance the public firm's payoff 
because the public firm takes into account private profit. The public firm benefits from greater 
private effort and thereby increases its own R&D effort. By result (ii), these effects are even 
more pronounced when the spillover rate within a given network increases because of the greater 
potential for inter-firm communication and learning. 
CD ® ® 
CD 
Empty NetwQr1(. Public Partial Networ1<; 
/ 
v 
Public-hub Star Netwol'1l. 
Figure 2.2: Network architectures when the public firm adds own links 
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case (i) 
CD ® CI>----® 
CD @ 
Empty Network Pnvate Partial Netwon<. 
case (ii) 
I ® r 
Public Partial Network Private-nub Star Natworil 
case (iji) 
V V 
Pub~c.hub Star Network Complete Network 
Figure 2.3: Network architectures from the public firm's viewpoint when private firms add own links 
Result (iii) is closely related to (i) and states that the public firm's investment increases when 
private firms establish own links. This reflects the fact that accessing other firms' investments 
provides the public firm with an incentive to increase its own R&D effort because of the resulting 
higher efficiency that increases public output (as in cases (ii) and (iii) of Figure 2.3). In contrast, 
the private firms' move from the empty to the private partial network reduces the public firm's 
market share and thereby reduces its R&D effort by leading to a lower level of the public firm's 
output (as in case (i) of Figure 2.3). The positive effect for the public firm of getting access 
to private investments and the negative effect of remaining isolated become more prominent as 
the spill over rate increases. 
eo(gC) e3(g80 ) eo(g8) eb(gPo) eo(gP) eo(g") 
(3-l 
-4 .194 .193 .172 .154 .108 .117 
(3=! .326 .305 .260 .200 .094 .117 
(3_3 
-4 .630 .503 .417 .259 .071 .117 
(3=1 2.415 1.021 .836 .345 .027 .117 
Table 2.4: Public firm's R&D effort (given a - c = 1) 
Result (iv) states that a private firm exerts a stronger R&D effort when it links with other 
firms (see Figure 2.4 and Table 2.5). A private firm increases its effort for two primary reasons. 
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First, a private firm spends more in R&D when it partners the public firm. As explained above, 
an increase in a private firm's R&D effort endows the public firm with an incentive to increase 
its ~wn effort. Because the public firm's contribution to R&D is larger, a private firm will 
find it profitable to exert a higher R&D effort. Second, a private firm carries out more R&D 
when it moves from the empty to the private partial network. This reflects the fact that the 
public firm is an aggressive competitor: a higher investment on the part of the private firms 
reduces own costs and thereby increases output and profits. Again, by result (iv), these effects 
are more important when the degree of spillovers is higher. Furthermore, these findings are 
in sharp contrast to earlier studies looking at R&D collaboration among private firms, finding 
that an increase in the level of collaborative activity or in the degree of spillovers lead to a 
reduction in the firms' R&D effort because of the associated incentive for free-riding (see Goyal 
and Moraga-Gonzalez, 2001). 
CD CD 
CD 
Empty Network 
@ 
Pub~c Partial Netwotk Private Partial Network 
"- / 
r 
Private-hub Star Network 
Figure 2.4: Network architectures when private firm 1 adds own links 
Result (iv) also states that a private firm puts in a higher R&D effort when the other firms 
establish new links. Perhaps the most surprising result is case (i) in Figure 2.5: a private firm 
invests less under an empty network rather than under a public partial network where it remains 
isolated. One might suspect that the isolated firm would invest less in the latter case because 
it becomes marginalised in the product market. However, as result (iv) in Claim 1 states, this 
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is not the case in the presence of a public firm. Intuitively, the public firm takes into account 
the private firms' profits, so that it balances the underlying market forces and eliminates the 
potential for large disparities between the linked firms under a public partial network and the 
isolated one. This pattern contrasts to the case that all firms are private where the isolated firm 
tends to be pushed out of the market when spillovers between the linked firms are sufficiently 
large (see e.g. Mauleon et aI., 200S).3G 
gC g.'lO gS gPo gP ge 
e e e eh e el el e 
(3 - 1 
-4 .IS4 .163 .172 .172 .121 .122 .144 .104 
(3=! .31S .253 .271 .272 .142 .146 .200 .104 
(3=~ .624 .422 .450 .451 .166 .IS0 .2S3 .104 
(3=1 2.415 .S74 .902 .90S .199 .229 .432 .104 
Table 2.5: Private firms' R&D effort (given a - c = 1) 
case (i) 
CD ® I CD -CD 
Empty Network Public Partial Network 
case(ii) 
@ r 
Private Partial Network Private-hub Star Network 
case (iii) 
v 
Public Partial Netwotll Public-hub Star Network 
Figure 2.5: Network architectures from the private firm 1 '8 viewpoint when the other firms add links 
Our next result concerns effective R&D effort that takes into account the specific network 
architecture and the place firms occupy in the network. We find that effective R&D exhibits a 
3GGoyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) report a similar result when the outgoing spillovers from a partially 
connected network are relatively small. 
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similar behaviour with individual R&D (see Tables 2.6 and 2.7). 
Eo (gC) E8(g'O) EO(g8) Eb(gPO) Eo (gP) Eo (ge) 
{3-1 
-4 .286 .275 .236 .185 .108 .117 
{3=~ .643 .558 .461 .273 .094 .117 
{3_3 
-4 1.566 1.136 .924 .394 .071 .117 
{3=1 7.244 2.768 2.195 .574 .027 .117 
Table 2.6: Public firm's effective R&D effort (given a - c = 1) 
gC g'O g' gPo gP ge 
E E E Eh E El El E 
{3_1 
-4" .279 .231 .237 .258 .121 .161 .179 .104 
{3=~ .639 .469 .472 .537 .142 .246 .298 .104 
{3-;!. 
-4 1.565 .957 .943 1.100 .166 .374 .495 .104 
{3=1 7.243 2.332 2.227 2.646 .199 .574 .865 .104 
Table 2.7: Private firms! effective R&D effort (given a - c = 1) 
2.4.3 Stability and efficiency 
Pairwise stability 
R&D alliances are conceptualised in terms of pairwise links which are embedded in a more 
general context of bilateral relations - a network. Therefore, to address the issue of network 
formation, one can use the definition of pairwise stability to examine which network architec-
tures will endogenously emerge. The following definition is due to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) 
and refers to the firms' incentives to altering the structure of a network by creating or severing 
bilateral links. This definition is quite weak and should therefore be seen only as a necessary 
condition for stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez, 2001). 
Definition 1 A network 9 is pairwise stable if the following conditions are satisfied: 
(i) If firms i, j E N are private 
(a) for all ij E g, 1l";(g) 2: 1l";(g - ij) and 1l"j(g) 2: 1l"j(g - ij), and 
(b) for all ij ~ g, if 1l";(g) < 1l";(g + ij), then 1l"j(g) > 1l"j(g + ij). 
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(ii) If firm i is public and firm j is private 
(a) for all ij E g, W(g) ~ W(g - ij) and 7rj(g) ~ 7rj(g - ij), and 
(b) for all ij ~ g, if W(g) < W(g + ij), then 7rj(g) > 7rj(g + ij) (and vice versa). 
The definition of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) is adapted to allow for a public firm as a 
member of a network. In the absence of a public firm, definition 1 reduces to conditions i(a) 
and i(b) that have been used in related papers by Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001), Song and 
Vanettelbosch (2007), Mauleon et al. (2008), among others. Definition 1 says that a network 
is pairwise stable if it survives all possible deviations at a bilateral level, that is, if no firms 
have an incentive to delete one of their links, and no pair of firms want to form a new link (see 
Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Mauleon et aI., 2008).37 Thus, joint consent is required in order 
to establish a bilateral relationship, i.e. a link cannot be enforced; and a link can be simply 
deleted unilaterally. We apply this definition to study pairwise stable networks. 
Claim 2 In the presence of a public firm, the unique pairwise stable collaboration network is 
the complete network. 
The stability properties of the different research networks can be analysed by referring to 
Tables 2.8 and 2.9. It appears that in the empty, partial and star networks firms that are not 
connected have an incentive to establish a new collaboration tie. Interestingly, in the private 
partial network, in which there is a collaborative agreement between the private firms whereas 
the public firm is isolated, it turns out that each private firm has an incentive to set up a new 
link with the public firm in order to become the "hub" in the ensuing private-hub star network 
gS. 
This is in contrast with the outcome of a purely private market. In this case, when R&D 
is not subsidised the partial network remains stable for small spillovers (Goyal and Moraga-
Gonzalez, 2001). When R&D subsidies are available, though, the partially connected network 
37 As in Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001), Song and Vannetelbosch (2007), Mauleon et al. (2008), the 
concepts of stability in this chapter (and chapter 4) do not allow for transfers between firms. Even in the absence 
of transfers, in the present chapter the complete network emerges in equilibrium. Perhaps a model with transfers 
between firms would be worthwhile to investigate in the context of larger network architectures, where firms with 
a large number of links might have an incentive to sponsor firms with fewer links to connect to each other. See 
Goyal and Joshi (2003), for example, for a model with transfers between firms. 
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becomes stable for intermediate spillovers (Song and Vannetelbosch, 2007). The intuition be-
hind these results stems from the large disparities between the linked firms and the isolated one 
in a partially connected network, which make (in extreme cases) the isolated firm to exit the 
market. By contrast, Claim 2 indicates that when a public firm is isolated, then each linked firm 
has an incentive to establish a new link with it. The reason is that the public firm invests more 
than a private firm in R&D, so that setting up a new connecting link with it enables a private 
firm to increase its payoff through direct spillovers both from the public firm and its current 
partner. This, in turn, destabilises the private partial network gP, leading to the private-hub 
star network. 
By analogous reasoning, in the private-hub star network, the private firm at one of the spokes 
has an incentive to establish a new link with the public firm; this gives rise to the complete 
network given that the public firm always benefits from having an additional collaboration.3s 
Next, consider the public-hub star network g80. In this case, the private firms have an 
incentive to link to each other in order to limit the public firm's competitive strength. This, 
in turn, destabilises the public-hub star network, giving rise to the complete network. Note 
that these results are consistent with the case in which all firms are private, since the complete 
network remains always pairwise stable. 
gC g80 gB gPO gP gC 
rr rr rr rrh rr rrl rrl rr 
f3=! .075 .065 .067 .073 .047 .056 .062 .048 
f3=~ .158 .109 .116 .136 .046 .070 .088 .048 
f3=~ .518 .244 .260 .326 .045 .094 .146 .048 
f3=1 7.16 .922 .938 1.24 .046 .140 .294 .048 
Table 2.8: Private firms' profit (given a - c = 1) 
Our final observation concerns the role of spillovers in the stability of the complete net-
work. Note that the relevant network architectures become more prominent when spillovers 
38 It is important to note that when the complete network is pairwise stable this does not apriori mean that 
the complete network is strongly stable too. This is because the notion of pairwise stability considers deviations 
by a pair of firms (Le. one link only can be deleted at a time) whereas strong stability allows for deviations 
by a coalition of firms (two or three links can be deleted simultaneously). Indeed, Song and Vannetelbosch 
(2007) show that in the presence of three private firms the complete network, with or without subsidies, is always 
pairwise stable whereas it is never strongly stable. 
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are relatively large. By contrast, in the limiting case that spillovers tend to zero, the network 
architectures become very similar. Consequently, when spillovers become smaller, this leads to 
a decrease of the (potential) losses from deleting a link from the complete network. 
W(gC) W(gSO) W(gS) W(gPo) W(gP) W(ge) 
J3=t .375 .365 .364 .339 .338 .325 
J3=~ .480 .440 .436 .358 .359 .325 
J3_3 
-4 .751 .592 .582 .386 .394 .325 
J3=1 2.41 1.02 .982 .429 .459 .325 
Table 2.9: Welfare level. (given a - c = 1) 
Strong stability 
We proceed to perform an additional check for stability by resorting to the notion of strong 
stability due to Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005). This notion of stability refers to 
the incentives of a coalition of firms to redistribute their collaboration links, and so it allows 
for situations which are not accounted for under pairwise stability. In that sense the current 
definition constitutes a powerful refinement of pairwise stability as it allows for more than a 
single pair of firms to deviate and reorganise their links. This is particularly useful because it 
could be the case that a group of firms are better off by deleting or adding several links, which 
is not being taken into account when studying pairwise stable networks (see Jackson and van 
den Nouweland, 2005; Song and Vannetelbosch, 2007; Mauleon et aI., 2008). Indeed, we will 
say that a network 9 is strongly stable when it survives all possible changes in the number of 
its links by any coalition of agents. Let us first explain what is meant by 'reorganisation' of 
links in network 9 by a coalition of agents S. 
Definition 2 A network g' E G is obtainable from 9 E G via deviations by S if 
(i) ij E 9' and ij ~ 9 implies ij cS, and 
(ii) ij E 9 and ij ~ 9' implies ij n S i- 0. 
This definition reflects two main ideas (see Jackson and van den Nouweland, 2005). First, 
a link is formed between members of a coalition S (condition (i)). Second, if a link is deleted, 
it must be the case that at least one of the firms who deleted their link be in S (condition 
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(ii)). Besides, consent of two firms is required for a link to be formed (Le. a link cannot be 
enforced), but a link can be simply severed unilaterally. The latter requirements apply to the 
definition of pairwise stability as well. Thus pairwise stability can be seen as a special case of 
strong stability when S is a pair of firms. 
Next, building on definition 2, we present our notion of strong stability in the presence of a 
public firm. When the public firm is absent, this definition reduces to condition (i) that is due 
to Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005). The latter has also been used in subsequent studies 
(e.g. Song and Vannetelbosch, 2007; Mauleon et al., 2008). 
Definition 3 A network 9 is strongly stable if the following conditions hold: 
(i) If firms i and j are private 
for any S C N, g' that is obtainable from 9 via deviations by S, and i E S such that 
7ri(g') > 7ri(g), there exists j E S such that 7rj(g') < 7rj(g). 
(ii) If firm i is public and firm j is private 
for any S eN, 9' that is obtainable from 9 via deviations by S, and i E S such that 
W(g') > W(g), there exists j E S such that 7rj(g') < 7rj(g) (and vice versa). 
Definition 3 reflects the following ideas. Consider a network g' that derives from network 9 
via deviations by a coalition of players S. We say that 9 is strongly stable if in the move from 
9 to g' firm i strictly gains then it must be the case that at least one firm strictly loses, so that 
the latter would have an incentive to block the deviation from 9 to g' (see Jackson and van 
den Nouweland, 2005; Song and Vannetelbosch, 2007). Because the notion of strong stability 
considers deviations by a coalition of firms, it also presumes some sort of coordination between 
them. In this respect, it is a more suitable notion for smaller network architectures and thus 
can be used to study networks in mixed oligopoly (Mauleon et ai., 2008). Applying definition 
3, we can state the following result. 
Claim 3 The unique strongly stable collaboration network is the complete network. 
Since the notion of strong stability constitutes a refinement of pairwise stability, the only 
candidate for a strongly stable network is the complete network. Here, the following three cases 
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emerge: (i) the coalition of the two private firms deleting their links with the public firm, thus 
forming the private partial network, gP; (ii) the coalition of the public firm and one private 
firm severing their link with the other private firm to form the public partial network, gPo; and 
the coalition of all firms deleting their connecting links to establish the empty network, ge. It 
turns out none of these deviations is beneficial for the coalition of agents attempting to alter 
the structure of the complete network. 
Intuitively, in the presence of a public firm, the asymmetries in the partially connected 
networks are considerably reduced, as explained above (in relation to the discussion of Claim 
2). This makes vulnerable both the private partial and public partial network because firms 
have incentives to form additional links. Interestingly, the incentives of the private firms to set 
up additional links stem from the adverse consequences of the public firm's behaviour on their 
market share and profit. The same reasoning applies to the empty network in which the level 
of partnering activity is minimal. Thus, the presence of a public firm increases the degree of 
partnering intensity, so that the complete network emerges as the unique pairwise stable as well 
as strongly stable network. In large part, this is due to the maximising behaviour of public firm 
that suppresses the private firms' profits, rather than the outcome of any enhancing effect of 
public ownership on the private firms' incentives to collaborate. 
This result sharply contrasts with the outcome in a purely private market. In this case, 
when the government does not subsidise R&D, the partially connected network is the unique 
strongly stable network if and only if spillovers are sufficiently small (Song and Vannetelbsoch, 
2007).39 When subsidies to R&D are available, the partially connected network remains stable 
(against deviations by a coalition of agents) if and only if spillovers obtain intermediate values 
(Song and Vannetelbsoch, 2007). Contrary to this, we have shown that in a mixed market the 
partially connected network is no longer pairwise stable, and so it cannot be strongly stable 
too. Instead, firms have incentives to link to each other, so that the complete network arises in 
equilibrium. 
39Goyal and ~:loraga-Gonza.lez (2001) characterised pairwise stable networks both for the three-firm case and 
for symmetric networks with an arbitrary number of firms, although a complete characterisation in the latter 
case turns out to be not entirely feasible. 
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We turn to compare the level of R&D investment that firms carry out with the socially 
optimum level of investment. The interest behind this comparison stems from the fact that when 
firms choose their R&D efforts prior to the output stage of the game,40 they may overinvest 
in R&D so as to gain at the expense of their rivals (see Ulph, 1999). Therefore, the following 
question naturally arises: Under which circumstances is there strategic over-investment within 
the complete network, the unique stable network in our setting? 
In line with the existing literature on R&D networks, we assume that there are no costs 
of link formation, and thus, the complete network together with the socially optimal R&D 
efforts (given fully internalised spillovers) and the competitive output levels corresponds to 
the first-best optimum (Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez, 2001).41 However, even in the complete 
network an R&D subsidy is essential for three main reasons. First, there is under-investment 
due to imperfect competition. Second, a private firm does not take into account consumer 
surplus in its objective, and thus, carries out a lower level of R&D relative the social optimum; 
this is what Ulph (1999) and Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) call undervaluation effect. Third, 
the public firm's objective, being consistent with welfare maximisation, takes into account 
consumer surplus. The public firm's behaviour, however, introduces another type of market 
failure - inefficiency in production - which is related to the composition of R&D. A further 
source of market failure exists due to the fact that firms do not fully share the outcomes of their 
research. Consequently, the role of an R&D subsidy is two-fold: to increase the level of total 
R&D and to redistribute production from the (less efficient) public firm to its (more efficient) 
private counterparts42 
Turning to R&D policy, it is clear that with one instrument and two targets to control 
(R&D and .output levels) the government cannot attain the first-best optimum. This implies 
that strategic behaviour does not bring about over-investment in this setting. Can the same 
40 In other words, R&D is conducted for strategic reasons. 
HThe .social optimum can be attained in two alternative ways. Given the presence of two targets to control, 
R&D and output, the government needs to implement two instruments, an R&D and an output subsidy. Al-
ternatively, the first-best optimum can be attained with three public firms (noting the presence of diminishing 
returns to scale). 
420ur assumption of decreasing returns to scale plays an apparent role here. Considering the cases of constant 
or increasing returns implies that welfare is maximised with a single public firm. Thus the assumption of 
increasing marginal costs is necessary in order to focus on the important issues of strategic interaction and R&D 
collaboration incentives among public and private firms. 
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be true when the government has both an R&D and an output subsidy at its disposal? In this 
case, the output subsidy will be set so as to bridge the gap between price and marginal cost. 
However, as shown by Leahy and Neary (1997) and Zikos (2007), when two policy instruments 
are available, R&D should be taxed if spillovers are relatively small. The intuition is quite 
simple: When firms behave non-cooperatively and the government provides only an output 
subsidy,43 then the private firms over-invest in R&D as they attempt to gain at the expense of 
the public firm, provided that the latter is an aggressive competitor. This in turn, justifies a 
tax on R&D when spillovers are relatively small and firms' actions are strategic substitutes44 
In this case, the government can still attain the first-best optimum since it has two instruments 
to control two targets, R&D and output (see Leahy and Neary, 1997). Thus, strategic over-
investment is a likely outcome in the context of the complete network when output subsidies 
alone are available and spillovers are relatively small. 
Aggregate performance 
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the different network structures in terms of 
consumer surplus, total profits and effective R&D. As concerns consumer surplus, we obtain 
that it increases with the level of collaborative activity as well as with the degree of technological 
spillovers, so that it attains its maximum under the complete network (see Table 2.1O). The 
only exception to this pattern is the public partial network gPO which lowers consumer welfare 
relative to the private partial network gP when spillovers are large, (3 E (~, 1). We now explain 
the reason. Note that in the public partial network gPO the public firm takes into account not 
only the profits of its partner but also the profits of the isolated firm. This in turn implies that 
when spillovers are large the two firms which are connected under the private partial network 
gP are more aggressive competitors than the two partners - public and private - under the 
public partial network gPo. Therefore, the two private firms together exert a higher R&D effort, 
which outweighs the relatively low R&D effort of the isolated public firm - and thus the private 
partial network expands total output and increases consumer surplus. 
4:1 In our setting, while firms collaborate in R&D they choose a non-cooperative level of R&D effort. 
-14 As shown in the appendix, R&D effort is a strategic substitute when spillovers are sufficiently small. 
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CS(gC) CS(g80 ) CS(g8) CS(gPO) CS(gP) CS(9') 
f3_1 
-4 .238 .227 .224 .195 .191 .178 
f3=! .390 .329 .320 .219 .213 .178 
f3=~ .954 .600 .568 .254 .250 .178 
f3=1 9.85 1.795 1.610 .312 .329 .178 
Table 2.10: Consumer surplus (given a - c = 1) 
Next, we compare total profits. We obtain that profits increase both with respect to the 
number of collaborative alliances and with the spillover parameter, which again implies that they 
are maximised under the complete network (see Table 2.11). Interestingly, the private partial 
and private-hub star networks (gP, g8) dominate respectively the public partial and public-hub 
star ones (gPO,g80 ). Together with our findings for consumer surplus, these results suggest that 
the aggregate performance of different networks in terms· of profit does not always tend to go 
hand-in-hand with their performance in terms of consumer surplus. Thus, it is important to 
evaluate the different networks by resorting to a measure of overall efficiency from the point 
of view of the society at large, namely societal welfare. This analysis is taken up in the next 
section. 
II(gC) II(g8O) II(g8) II(gPo) II(gP) II(ge) 
f3_1 
-4" .234 .209 .217 .166 .181 .152 
f3=! .490 .357 .381 .190 .234 .152 
f3=~ 1.591 .811 .865 .230 .341 .152 
f3=1 21.89 3.112 3.170 .305 .613 .152 
Table 2.11: Total profits (given a - c = 1) 
Similarly, total effective R&D increases both with the number of links and the degree of 
spillovers, so that it is maximised under the complete network. Interestingly, the private partial 
network gP generates greater overall reduction in marginal costs relative to the public partial 
network gPo. However, comparison of the public-hub star network g80 and private-hub star 
network g8 reveals that the former always outperforms the latter. Thus, the presence of a 
public firm in the role of a "hub" leads to greater reduction in costs and improvements in 
market performance. 
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E(gC) E(g"o) E(g') E(gPo) E(gP) E(ge) 
(3_1 
-4 .845 .738 .731 .467 .468 .325 
(3=! 1.922 1.497 1.469 .661 .691 .325 
(3-;! 
-4 4.697 3.051 2.967 .935 1.061 .325 
(3=1 21.73 7.432 7.068 1.348 1.757 .325 
Table 2.12: Total effective n&D (given a - c = 1) 
Efficiency 
We now study social welfare under the different networks. We say that a network 9 E G is 
efficient if W(g) ~ W(g') for all g' c G. Our first result concerns welfare under the partial 
networks (see Table 2.9). When spillovers are small ((3 = t), the public partial network gPO 
increases overall welfare relative to the private partial network gP. Therefore, for small values 
of the spillover parameter the increase in consumer surplus under the public partial network 
gPO outweighs the decrease in total profits and thereby increases societal welfare. The outcome 
is reversed for medium, large and perfect spillover values.'15 
The next result pertains to the relationship between social welfare and the level of inter-firm 
partnering activity (number of links), on the one hand, and the extent of technological know-
how transmission, on the other (see Table 2.9). In all cases, the level of collaborative activity 
and the degree of spillovers have a positive impact on total surplus, as Claim 4 reports. 
Claim 4 The complete network is the unique efficient network. In addition, social welfare 
increases with the degree of spillovers, and with the number of collaborative links, namely the 
complete network (gC) dominates the star networks (g"O, g8), the star networks dominate the 
partial networks (gPO, gP), and the partial networks dominate the empty network (ge). 
Proof. Follows immediately from the results in Table 2.9 .• 
Taken together with our findings on the stability properties of the different networks, the 
present result carries an important message: it suggests that the presence of a public firm can 
reconcile individual incentives to form R&D networks with the collective ones. In contrast, a 
4SConsumer surplus and total profits are both lower under~the public partial network relative to the private 
partial network when !3 = 1, so that W(gP) > W(gPO). 
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conflict between stable and efficient networks within a private market is likely to occur when 
spillovers are relatively large and there are no subsidies to R&D. However, when subsidies to 
R&D are available, such a conflict is likely to arise when spillovers are very small or quite large. 
In this chapter, we investigated the possibility of resolving the potential conflict between stable 
and efficient networks that is likely to arise in a purely private market. Although this result has 
been derived within a rather limited context, it can be thought of as a building block that can 
guide future research aimed at improving our understanding of the circumstances under which 
privatisation programs should (not) be allowed because of the potential adverse consequences 
they might have on the formation of R&D networks that are of optimal size from a social welfare 
point of view. 
8(ge) 8(g80) 8(g8) 8(gPO) 8(gP) 8(g") 
(3 - 1 
-4 .173 .135 .148 .056 .086 .017 
(3_1 
-2 .416 .305 .330 .102 .178 .017 
(3_3 
-4 .955 .608 .646 .162 .310 .017 
(3=1 4.049 1.404 1.436 .244 .541 .017 
Table 2.13: Il&D subsidies (given a - c = 1) 
Finally, we examine R&D subsidies under the different networks. It appears that a higher 
degree of partnering activity or spillovers increases the returns to R&D, and this mandates 
a higher subsidy to R&D (Hinloopen, 1997). Notice that the private partial and private-hub 
star networks (gP, gS) are subsidised more heavily than the public partial and public-hub star 
networks (gPo, g80), respectively. This is due to the fact that the former network architectures 
lead to a higher level of R&D effort. 
2.5 Modelling extensions 
2.5.1 The timing of the subsidy selection 
In the main body of the chapter we have assumed that the firms choose first their pairwise 
links and then the government chooses the level of an R&D subsidy to maximise social welfare. 
One might wonder how our results would change if the sequencing of these choices is reversed, 
that is, if the government chooses first the subsidy and then firms choose their pairwise links. 
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In this case, it is not difficult to see that the complete network will still endogenously emerge, 
just like in the case where firms form a research network at the initial stage of the game. The 
intuition is as follows. When the subsidy is set at the first stage this enables the government 
to use the subsidy for strategic reasons - i.e. to influence the network architecture (see e.g. 
Leahy and Neary, 1997). Also, firms will have strategic reasons for altering the structure of the 
network in order to increase the R&D subsidy. Anticipating this, the government will in turn 
set the subsidy in such a way as to induce a welfare-maximising outcome, which corresponds 
to the complete network in the present setting. However, it should be noted that the complete 
network arises even in the absence of an R&D policy instrument. As explained above, the public 
firm is an aggressive competitor; this endows the private firms with an incentive to engage in 
collaborations (between themselves and with the public firm) so as to increase their output 
and profits. It turns out an R&D subsidy is redundant as a policy tool to encourage R&D 
collaborations because firms have always incentives to form alliances leading to the complete 
network46 Consequently, the sequencing of the network formation and the selection of the 
R&D subsidy are not expected to alter the predictions of our basic model. 
2.5.2 More than three firms 
There is broad agreement that the analysis of asymmetric networks with an arbitrary number of 
firms is very complicated. To overcome this obstacle, previous authors have concentrated on a 
three-firm oligopoly. Concerning symmetric networks where each firm has the same number of 
links, the analysis can be more fruitful, although a complete characterisation of stable networks 
is again not entirely feasible. 47 This has been pointed out by Goyal and Moraga-GonzaJez 
(2001) and Mauleon et al. (2008), among others. However, the simple setting employed here 
allows us to draw conjectures about the network architectures that one might expect to emerge 
in a more general context48 
First, the empty network cannot be stable since any two firms have an incentive to establish 
46 An R&D subsidy is still needed in the complete network in order to address important market failures related 
to the composition and total level of R&D investment. 
HThe underlying assumption of an equal number of links per firm would undoubtedly be restrictive in the 
context of competition between state-owned and private firms. 
48See ~\flauleon et al. (2008) for a similar discussion in the case of a unionised labour market at the level of 
each individual enterprise. 
110 
a new collaboration. Second, it might appear that most of the collaborative alliances are formed 
between the public firm and private ones. This is because the public firm invests a larger amount 
in R&D than each private firm. Therefore, we would expect to observe networks having the 
public firm as a central node. Third, the presence of a public firm reduces the asymmetries 
between linked firms and the isolated one in a three-firm oligopoly. In a more general setting, 
we would expect to observe that the smaller the number of private firms, the stronger is the 
influence of the public firm in redncing the competitive advantage of firms with a large number 
of links relative to the firms with a smaller nnmber of links, hence making the network structure 
more symmetric. Put differently, in an industry with a large number of public firms, we would 
expect to observe networks that consist of a relatively large number of links. These conjectures 
also present hypotheses that could be empirically tested. 
2.5.3 The mode of knowledge transmission 
The aim of this subsection is to see whether our results will still hold in the context of codified 
knowledge only. In this case, it is assumed that a firm can fully absorb knowledge spillovers from 
its direct partners and indirectly connected and/or unconnected firms receive partial spillovers. 
Thus, given a network 9 and a collection of R&D efforts {ei(g)}iEN, the effective R&D of firm 
i is as follows 
(2.27) 
where Ni(g) is the number of links of firm i in network g. 
This framework was proposed in the seminal work of Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001). 
The main difference with the preceding formulation, as would be expected, is that the pattern of 
both tacit and codified knowledge transmission places more emphasis on the role of a network. 
In other. words, when codified knowledge is relevant, indirectly connected firms as well as 
unconnected firms are treated alike, since they receive the same spillover inflow. In contrast, 
the pattern of both tacit and codified knowledge transmission distinguishes between direct 
and indirect partners, and it takes public spillovers to be negligible - thus making the role of 
a network more prominent (Mauleon et aI., 2008). Note that the computational details are 
similar under both specifications. It turns out that the role of a public firm in balancing the 
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market forces and reducing large disparities is present independently of the mode of knowledge 
transmission. Thus, although initially different, both formulations deliver the same results 
concerning the stability and efficiency properties of R&D networks. 
2.6 Conclusion 
A well-known result is that, under a wide set of circumstances, private firms underinvest in R&D 
due to a lack of full appropriability of the returns to R&D. Previous authors examined the role 
of a public firm in regulating innovative activity when firms remain independent competitors. 
Our approach extended these studies by offering a more comprehensive view of innovation 
activity as it allowed the strategic effects of R&D to be mediated through a network of R&D 
collaboration. The main novelty of our approach is that firms' strategic incentives to invest 
in R&D are shaped within a network of collaboration where they are embedded. Our work is 
also related to the literature on R&D networks, which has studied extensively the incentives 
of private firms to form collaborative alliances. This literature has recognised that individual 
incentives for R&D collaboration are often in conflict with the corresponding incentives from a 
social welfare viewpoint. 
In this chapter, we showed that a state-owned firm can enhance the innovation process, 
thereby altering the market structure and improving industry performance. We argued that this 
is merely due to the public firm's maximising behaviour, which leaves a small residual demand 
to the private firms, rather than the outcome of any enhancing effect of public ownership on the 
private firms' incentives to collaborate. Therefore, by forming additional links the private firms 
can, at least partially, counter the depressing effect on their profits resulting from the public 
firm's behaviour. Consequently, the complete network emerges endogenously as the unique 
stable network. From the point of view of the society at large, it turns out that the complete 
network maximises total surplus. 
What are the policy implications of the analysis? A public firm can potentially be used as 
a policy instrument in tackling the conflict between stable and efficient networks. However, we 
believe that the role of a public firm in restoring the 'correct' incentives for R&D collaboration 
would be more effective the smaller the size and/or competitiveness of the relevant industry. 
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Moreover, the fact that a public firm encourages R&D collaboration and thereby promotes R&D 
spending helps to overcome the so-called underinvestment problem. However, this introduces 
. another type of market failure that stems from the fact that the distribution of production costs 
is not efficient. Thus, a public firm may be a useful policy instrument, although with certain 
limitations. A future promising research direction is to empirically investigate the relationship 
between network architectures and the presence of state-owned firms. 
2.7 Appendix 
2.7.1 The complete network 
Under this network architecture, gC, all firms are linked to each other. The marginal cost of 
firm i is 
Ci(gC) = c - ei - (3(ej + ek) + 2qi, i"# j "# k. (A2.1) 
The resulting expressions for profits are given by 
11' i (g80) (a - qo - qi - qj)qi - [c - ei - (3(eo + ej))qi - qf - ef(g) + sei· (A2.2) 
Social welfare is the sum of public and private profits net of R&D subsidies (s(eo + el + e2)) 
plus consumer surplus ((1/2)(qo + ql + q2j2). 
Performing the relevant maximisations with respect to the firms' outputs, we obtain the 
following focs, respectively 
(a-c)-qi-qj-3qo+eo+(3(ei+ej) = 0, 
(a- c) -qo -4qi -qj +ei + (3(eo +ej) = O. (A2.3) 
The associated soc for the public firm is -3 < 0, and for each private firm -4 < O. Indeed, the 
focs are necessary as well as sufficient for an (interior) optimum. Solving the system of these 
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foes, we obtain the equilibrium of this stage game 
3(a - c) + (5 - 2(3)eo + (4(3 - l)(e; + ej) 
qO = 13 
qi 
6(a - c) + (11 - 5(3)e; + (9(3 - 3)eo + (8(3 - 2)ej 
39 
(A2.4) 
Using the solutions in (A2.4), we can express welfare and profits in terms of the firms' R&D 
efforts and the level of R&D subsidy. 
In the preceding stage, firms make their R&D investments to maximise their objectives. 
This yields the following foes 
(a - c)(35 + 64(3) + (ei + ej)( -16 + 99(3 + 16(32) - (271 + 64(3 - 96(32)eo = 0, 
24(a - c)(l1 - 5(3) - 2(1279 + 220(3 - 50(32)e; + 81eO + 82ej + 15218 = O. (A2.5) 
where 8 1 = -12(1 - 3(3)(11 - 5(3), 8 2 = -8(1 - 4(3)(11 - 5(3). The associated soc for the 
public firm is -(271 + 64(3 - 96(32) < 0, and for private firm i, -2(1279 + 220(3 - 50(32) < O. 
Rearranging the foes gives us the R&D best response functions 
(a - c)(35 + 64(3) + (-16 + 99(3 + 16(32)(e; + ej) 
= 
271 + 64(3 - 96(32 
= 
24(a - c)(l1 - 5(3) + 81eo + 82ej + 15218 
2(1279 + 220(3 - 50(32) (A2.6) 
Next, from the expressions in eq. (A2.6) we study the effect of a unit increase in a firm's R&D 
on the other firms' R&D effort, i.e. the slope of the R&D reaction functions. That is, 
oe; 
_ 12(1 - 3(3)(11 - 5(3) < 0 iff (3 < ~ 
= 
oeo 2(1279 + 220(3 - 50(32) 3' 
oei 8(1 - 4(3)(11 - 5(3) 0 .ff 1 
oej < 1 (3<-2(1279 + 220(3 - 50(32) 4' 
oeo 
-16 + 99(3 + 16(32 < 0 iff (3 < 0.158. (A2.7) = 
oe; 271 + 64(3 - 96(32 
This implies that R&D effort can be either a strategic substitute or complement. Furthermore, 
R&D is more likely to be a strategic complement (substitute) from the viewpoint of the public 
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(private) firm. Solving the system of the R&D reaction functions and invoking symmetry for 
the private firms, ei = ej = e, we obtain the equilibrium of this stage game 
eo(s} 
e(8} = 
(a - ;;}(83 + 224~ - 1O~2) + 3s( -16 + 99~ + 16~2} 
703 + 220~ - 322~2 + 20~3 
4(a - ;;}(33 - 4~ - 5~2} + 38(271 + 64~ - 96~2} 
1406 + 440~ - 644~2 + 40~3 (A2.8) 
Then, using eq. (A2.8) and (A2.4) we express welfare as a function of the subsidy 8. These 
computations have been performed with the help of Mathematica 4.0. Unfortunately, the 
resulting expressions are very lengthy, which prevents us from reporting them. At the subsidy 
selection stage, the government (or regulator) chooses a level of subsidy to maximise welfare. 
The foc to this problem is given by 
(A2.9) 
The associated soc is -3(231+48~-238~2-32~3+32~4} < O. From eq. (A2.9) the equilibrium 
subsidy turns out to be 
C 2(a - ;;}(6 + 187~ + 114~2 - 58~3} 
8(g } = 3(231 + 48~ _ 238~2 _ 32~3 + 32~4}' (A2.1O) 
Substituting the optimal subsidy into the expressions for R&D efforts, output, profits and 
welfare, we obtain the equilibrium solutions for gC 
where 
( C) _ (a-c)(27+64/3+24/3'-16/33) eo 9 - 231+48/3-238/3'-32/3'+32/3' 
( C) _ 6(a-c)(10+6/3-3/3') qo 9 - 231+48/3 238/3' 32/3' +32/3' 
( C) _ (a_c)' RI 71'0 9 - 3(231+48/3-238/3~-32/3'+32/3')' 
( C) _ 2(a-c)(6+187/3+114/3'-58/33) 8 9 - 3(231+48/3 238/3'-32/3'+32/3') 
( C) _ 3(a-c)2(25+16/3-8/3') W 9 - 231+48/3 238/3' 32/3'+32/1' 
( C) _ (a-c)(24+67/3+24/3'-16/33) e 9 - 231+48/3-238/3'-32/33+32/3' 
( C) _ 13(a-c)(3+2/3-/3') q 9 - 231+48/3-238/3'-32/33+32/3' 
( C) _ (a_c)' R, 71' 9 - 3(231+48/3-238/3'-32/33+32/3')' 
( C) _ 2(a-c)'(69+44/3-22/3')2 CS 9 - (231+48/3 238/3'-32/3'+32/3')' 
IT( C} _ (a-c)2 R3 
9 - (231+48/1-238/3' _32/13 +32/3' )' 
Table 2.14: Equilibrium solutions for the complete network 
RI = 8937 + 13458~ + 11612~2 + 9732~3 - 2548~4 - 4128~5 + 1088~6 > 0, 
R2 = 7686 + 12300~ + 11867~2 + 9876~3 - 2566~4 - 4128~5 + 1088,86 > 0, 
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R3 = 8103 + 12686,6 + 11782,62 + 9828,63 - 2560,64 - 4128,65 + 1088,65 > O. 
It is also easy to obtain the effective R&D levels for the public and the private firms 
Eo(gC) = e + ,6(e + e) = (a - e)(27 + 112,6 + 158,62 + 32,63 - 32,64) 
o • J 231 + 48,6 _ 238,62 - 32,63 + 32,64 ' 
E;(gC) = 1>( ) (a - e)(24 + 118,6 + 155,62 + 32,63 - 32,64) e + I-' eo + e = -'------'-'---.,----'------,""----,.,.:-----,0'---'-
• J 231 + 48,6 - 238,62 - 32,63 + 32,64 
Then, total effective R&D effort is 
E( C) _ 3(a - e)(l + 2,6)2(25 + 16,6 - 8,62) 
9 - 231 + 48,6 - 238,62 - 32,63 + 32,64 . 
2.7.2 The private-hub star network 
(A2.11) 
(A2.12) 
In the private-hub star network, gS, a private firm is at the hub and is connected with the other 
two firms. Without loss of generality, let firm 1 be the hub. As for the spoke firms, each has 
a collaboration link with the hub and there is no direct link among them, although they are 
indirectly connected via the hub. The marginal cost structures are then as follows 
e - eo - ,6el - (,6/2)e2 + 2qo; Cl (gS) = e - el - ,6(eo + e2) + 2ql; 
e - e2 - ,6el - (,6/2)eo + 2q2· (A2.13) 
These cost structures imply the following profits functions 
"0(g8) 
"I (g8) 
"2(g5) 
(a - qo - ql - q2)qO - le - eo - ,6el - (,6/2)e2]qO - qa - e5(g) + seo, 
(a - qo - ql - q2)ql - le - el - ,6(eo + e2)]ql - q? - e?(g) + sel, 
(a - qo - ql - q2)q2 - le - e2 - ,6el - (,6/2)eo]q2 - q~ -
Social welfare is the sum of these profits net of R&D subsidies plus consumer surplus. 
(A2.14) 
In the last stage, firms compete in quantities, given the R&D collaboration links under g8, 
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the levels of R&D subsidy and investments, which have been determined at the preceding stages 
of the game. The foes of this stage game for the public firm, the hub firm and the private spoke 
are, respectively 
(a - c) - (q\ + q2) - 3qo + eo + /3(e\ + e2/2) 0, 
(a-c) - (qO +q2) - 4q\ +e\ +/3(eo +e2) = 0, 
(a - c) - (qO + q\) - 4q2 + e2 + /3(eo/2 + e\) = 0, (A2.15) 
The socs for the public and the private firms, respectively, are -3 < 0, -4 < 0; so the foes 
are necessary as well as sufficient for an (interior) optimum. Solving the system of the foes, we 
obtain the equilibrium of the Cournot competition stage game 
q\ = 
6(a - c) + (10 - 3(3)eo + (8/3 - 2)e\ + (3/3 - 2)e2 
26 
12(a - c) + (22 - lO(3)e\ + (20/3 - 6)eo + (19/3 - 4)e2 
78 
12(a - c) + (22 - 7(3)e2 + (7/3 - 6)eo + (16/3 - 4)81 
78 
(A2.16) 
Using the solutions in (A2.16), we can express welfare and profits as functions of the R&D 
efforts and the level of R&D subsidy. 
In the third stage, firms choose simultaneously and independently their R&D levels to 
maximise their objectives. The ensuing foes for the public firm, the hub firm and the private 
spoke are, respectively 
12(22 - 7(3)(a - c) - D5(6 - 7(3)eo - 4D5(1 - 4(3)e\ - D6e2 + 15218 = O. (A2.17) 
Note that D\ = 144 - 952/3 +61/32, D2 = 288-625/3 -770/32, D3 = 11- 5/3, D4 = 1279+220/3-
50/32, D5 = 22-7/3 and D6 = 2558+308-49/32. The associated socs are given by, respectively, 
-(4878 + 864/3 - 1141(32) < 0, -2(1279 + 220/3 - 50(32) < 0, -(2558 + 308 - 49(32) < 0, and 
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thus are all fulfilled. Rearranging the foes gives rise to the following R&D reaction functions 
18( a - c) (35 + 48!'1) - 2DI el - D2e2 
4878 + 864!'1- 1141!'12 
24(a - c)(l1 - 5!'1) - 4D3(3 - 10!'l)eo - 2D3(4 - 19!'1)e2 + 1521s 
2(1279 + 220!'l- 50!'l2) 
12(22 - 7!'1)(a - c) - Ds(6 - 7!'1)eo - 4Ds(1 - 4!'1)el + 1521s 
2558 + 308 - 49!'12 
(A2.18) 
Then, from the following conditions, we can easily characterise R&D efforts as strategic substi-
tutes or complements 
Beo 
Bel 
Beo 
Be2 
Bel 
Beo 
Bel 
Be2 
Be2 
Bel 
Be2 
Beo 
= 
= 
= 
."2('-:-1.,,..44_---:-:-95--:2'--!'I-'-+--:6-,:W--:2:O,) < 0 iff !'I < 0.152 
4878 + 864!'1- 114W2 
-288 + 625!'1 + 770!'l2 < 0 iff !'I < 0.33 
4878 + 864!'1- 1141!'12 
2(11 - 5!'1)(3 - 1O!'I) < 0 iff!'l < 0.3 
1279 + 220!'l - 50!'l2 
(11 - 5!'1)(4 - 19!'1) < 0 iff!'l < 0.21 
1279 + 220!'l- 50!'l2 
4(22 - 7!'1)(1 - 4!'1) < 0 iff !'I < 0.25 
2558 + 308 - 49!'12 
(22 - 7!'1)(6 - 7!'1) < 0 iff !'I < 0.86. 
2558 + 308 - 49!'12 
(A2.19) 
It follows that a firm's R&D effort is a stronger strategic complement with respect to the R&D 
of the hub firm, 1. Solving the system of the R&D reaction functions (A2.18), the equilibrium 
of this stage game is 
eo(s) 
= 
2(a - c)(15770 + 36128!'1 + 7419!'12 - 2876!'13 + 70!'l4) - 3sMI 
267140 + 139916!'1- 85504!'12 - 18595!'13 + 5987!'14 - 280!'l5 ' 
4(a - c)(l1 - 5!'1)(1140 + 716!'1 + 102!'12 - 21!'13) + 3sM2 
2(267140 + 139916!'1- 85504!'12 - 18595!'13 + 5987!'14 - 280!'l5) , 
2(a - c)(22 - 7!'1)(570 + 293!'1- 126!'12 - 10!'l3) + 3sM3 
267140 + 139916!'1- 85504!'12 - 18595!'13 + 5987!'14 - 280!'l5' 
(A2.20) 
where !vIt = 6080 - 24743!'1- 15818!'12 + 212!'13 + 573!'1\ M2 = 102980 + 49428!'1- 26400!'l2 -
8041!'13 + 1337!'14; M3 = 51490 + 26588!'1 - 16095!'12 - 3394!'13 + 955!'14. Note that under the 
present network architecture, the asymmetries between firms are relatively pronounced, which 
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makes the relevant expressions very lengthy and thus not analytically tractable. Indeed, for the 
rest of the analysis we restrict attention to specific spillover values: f3 = ~, f3 = !, (J = i and 
f3 = 1. The equilibrium solutions for g8 are presented in Tables 2.4 - 2.13. 
2.7.3 The public partial network 
In the public partial network, gPO, the public firm and a private one maintain a single collabora-
tive agreement, while the remaining private firm stays isolated. Suppose that the collaboration 
link is among the public firm j = 0 and the private firm i = 1, without loss of generality. This 
generates the following (marginal) cost structures 
co (gPO) = C - eo - f3el + 2qo, Cl (gPO) = C - el - f3eo + 2q1 
C2(gPO) = c - e2 + 2q2. (A2.21) 
The resulting expressions for profits are given by 
7ro(gPo ) 
7r1 (gPo) 
7r2(gPO) 
(a - qo - q1 - Q2)qO - (c - eo - (JeIlQo - Q5 - e5(g) + sco, 
(a - qo - q1 - q2)ql - (c - el - f3eO)q1 - qi - ei(g) + sel, 
(a - qo - '11 - q2)q2 - (c - e2)q2 - q~ - e~(g) + se2· (A2.22) 
Then, one can easily obtain social welfare by adding to these expressions the consumer surplus 
and subtracting the R&D subsidies. 
In the last stage, firms choose simultaneously the level of output to maximise their objectives. 
This gives rise to the following focs for firms 0, 1 and 2, respectively 
(a - c) - (ql + q2) - 3qo + eo + f3el = 0, 
(a-c)-(qo+q2)-4q1+el+f3eo 0, 
(a - c) - (qo + qIl - 4q2 + e2 = O. (A2.23) 
The associated soc for the public firm is -3 < 0, and for each private firm -4 < O. Solving the 
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system of the focs, the equilibrium of this stage game is 
qo 
q1 = 
q2 = 
3(a - c) + (5 - (3)eo + (5(3 - l)e1 - e2 
13 
6(a - c) + (11 - 3(3)e1 + (11(3 - 3)eo - 2e2 
39 
6(a - c) + lle2 - (2(3 + 3)eo - (3(3 + 2)e1 
39 
(A2.24) 
Using the solutions in (A2.24), we can express welfare and profits as fnnctions of the R&D 
efforts and the level of R&D subsidy. 
In the preceding stage, firms choose simultaneously their R&D efforts to maximise their 
objectives4D The focs of this problem are given by 
9(a - c)(35 + 32(3) - (144 - 1157(3 + 144(32)e1 - 2(72 + 61(3)e2 - H1eo 
24(a - c)(l1 - 3(3) - 4(11 - 3(3)(3 - l1(3)eo - 8(11 + 3(3)e2 - 2H2e1 + 15218 
264(a - c) - 44(3 + 2(3)eo - 44(2 + 3(3)e1 - 2558e2 + 15218 = 0, 
0, 
0, 
(A2.25) 
where H1 = 2439 + 288(3 - 554(32 and H2 = 1279 + 132(3 - 18(32. The soc for the public firm 
is, -(2439 + 288(3 - 554(32) < 0; for the linked firm 1 is -2(1279 + 132(3 - 18p2) < 0; and for 
the isolated private firm, -2558 < O. Indeed, all conditions are fulfilled. From the focs above, 
we readily obtain the R&D reaction functions 
9(a - c)(35 + 32(3) - (144 - 1157(3 + 144(32)e1 - 2(72 + 61(3)e2 
2439 + 288(3 - 554(32 
24(a - c)(l1 - 3(3) - 4(11 - 3(3)(3 - l1(3)eo - 8(11 + 3(3h + 15218 
2(1279 + 132(3 - 18(32) 
264(a - c) - 44(3 + 2(3)eo - 44(2 + 3(3)e1 + 15218 
2558 
(A2.26) 
~9 Again, these computations turn out to be very lengthy, which does not allow us to report them. Instead, 
we present the foes corresponding to the maximisation problem of each firm using Mathematica 4.0 for these 
derivations. 
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Then, we can calculate the following 
8eo 144 - 1157,6 + 144,62 O'ff ,6 0 
8e1 
- < 1 < .126 
2439 + 288,6 - 554,62 
8eo 2(72 + 61(6) < 0 
= 8e2 2439 + 288,6 - 554,62 
8e1 
_ 4(11 - 3(6)(3 - 11(6) < 0 iff ,6 < 0.273 
= 8eo 2(1279 + 132,6 - 18(62) 
8e 1 8(11 + 3(6) < 0 
8e2 2(1279 + 132,6 - 18(62) 
8e2 44(3 + 2(6) 
8eo 
- <0 2558 
8e2 
_ 44(2 + 3(6) < O. (A2.27) = 8e1 2558 
It follows that the R&D effort between collaborating firms can be either a strategic substitute 
or complement. However, the strategic interaction underlying R&D efforts of non-collaborating 
firms is always of substitution, regardless of the spillover size. The solution to the system of 
the R&D best response functions is the equilibrium of this stage game 
eo(s) 
= 
(a - c)(15770 + 23488,6 - 1188(62) + 3sF1 
2(66785 + 16834,6 - 22472,62 + 778,63 + 12(64) 
4(a - c)(3135 + 124,6 - 311,62 + 12(63) + 3sF2 
2(66785 + 16834,6 - 22472,62 + 778,63 + 12(64) 
44(a - c)(285 + 24,6 - 122,62 + 6(63) + 3sF3 
2(66785 + 16834,6 - 22472,62 + 778,63 + 12(64)' (A2.28) 
where F1 = -3040 + 10829,6 - 1448,62 + 4,63; F2 = 25745 + 2916,6 - 6054132 + 12,63; F3 = 
25745 + 4790,6 - 9148,62 + 670,63 + 4,64. As in the case of the private hub-star network, we 
resort to specific values of the spillover for the rest of the analysis, i.e. ,6 = ~, ,6 = ~, ,6 = i 
and ,6 = 1. The equilibrium solutions are presented in Tables 2.4 - 2.13. 
2_7.4 The private partial network 
In the private partial network, gP, there is a research collaboration between the two private 
firms, while the public firm remains outside this collaboration. The relevant (marginal) cost 
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structures are given by 
c - eo + 2qo, cI(sf) = c - el - (3e2 + 2ql 
The ensuing expressions for profits are given by 
7ro(gP) 
7r1 (gP) 
7r2(gP) 
(a - qo - ql - q2)qO - (c - eo)qO - qa - ea(g) + seo, 
(a - qo - ql - q2)ql - (c - el - (3e2)ql - q? - ei(g) + sel, 
(a - qo - ql - q2)q2 - (c - e2 - (3el)q2 - q~ - e~(g) + se2· 
(A2.29) 
(A2.30) 
Social welfare results from the addition of these expressions to the consumer surplus and sub-
traction of the R&D subsidies. 
In the last stage, firms choose outputs to maximise their objectives. The foes are thus given 
by 
(a - c) - qi - qj - 3qo + eo 0, 
(a - c) - qo - qj - 4qi + ei + (3ej 0, i -I j, i,j E {1, 2}. (A2.31) 
The soc for the public firm is -3 < 0, and for each private firm, -4 < O. Solving the system of 
the foes above, the equilibrium at the output selection stage is 
qo 
qi = 
3(a - c) + 5eo - (1 + (3)(ei + ej) 
13 
6(a - c) - 3eo + (11 - 2(3)ei + (11(3 - 2)ej 
39 i -I j. (A2.32) 
Using the solutions in (A2.32), we can express welfare and profits as functions of the R&D 
efforts and the level of R&D subsidy. 
At the preceding stage, firms choose simultaneously their R&D efforts to maximise their 
objectives, anticipating perfectly the levels of output in stage 4. This gives rise to the following 
focs 
35(a - c) - 16(ei + ej)(1 + (3) - 271eo = 0, 
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24(a - c)(l1 - 2(3) - 12(11 - 2(3)eo - 4(11 - 2(3)(2 - l1(3)ej - 2Fei + 15218 = 0, (A2.33) 
where F = 1279 + 88(3 - 8(32 The associated socs, respectively, for the isolated and for the 
linked firms are -271 < 0, and -2(1279 + 88(3 - 8(32) < O. From the focs, the R&D reaction 
functions turn out to be 
( ) 35(a - c) -16(ei + ej)(l + (3) eo ei, ej = 271 ' 
( ) 24(a - c)(l1 - 2(3) - 12(11 - 2(3)eo - 4(11 - 2(3)(2 - l1(3)e) + 15218 e e e -
, 0, ) - 2(1279 + 88(3 - 8(32) 
These reaction functions can be analysed as follows 
Deo 
Dei 
Dei 
Dej 
Dei 
Deo 
16 
= -271(1 +(3) < 0 
_ 4(11 - 2(3)(2 - 11(3) < 0 iff (3 < 0.182 
2(1279 + 88(3 - 8(32) 
6(11 - 2(3) 
1279 + 88(3 _ 8(32 < O. 
(A2.34) 
(A2.35) 
Notice that the R&D effort of a linked firm with respect to the isolated one is a strategic 
substitute, and vice versa. However, the R&D effort of a linked firm with respect to its partner 
is a strategic complement unless spillovers are very small. Solving the system of the R&D 
reaction functions and invoking symmetry for the linked firms, ei = ej = e, we obtain the 
equilibrium of this stage game 
80(8) 
8(8) = 
(a - c) (83 - 18(3 + 4(32) - 48(1 + (3)8 
703 - 90(3 + 20(32 
3[4(a - c)(l1 - 2(3) + 2718J 
2(703 - 90(3 + 20(32) (A2.36) 
At the subsidy selection stage, the government chooses a level of su bsidy to maximise welfare. 
This gives rise to the following foc 
4(a - c)(l + 14(3) - (231 - 80(3 - 40(32)8 = O. (A2.37) 
The associated soc reads as -(231 - 80(3 - 40(32) < O. The solution to the foc above yields the 
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equilibrium subsidy 
s( P) = 4(a - ';)(1 + 14;5') 
9 231 - 80;5' - 40;5'2' (A2.38) 
Substitutions reveal the equilibrium solutions of the entire game, which are presented in the 
Table below. 
Linked firms (private) 
l( P) _ 24(a-c)(l+l'I) l( P) _ 39(a-c) 
e 9 - 231 801'1-401'1' q 9 - 231 801'1 401'1' 
l( P) _ 6(a-o)'(427+481'1+128I'1') 
"g - (231-801'1-401'1')' 
Isolated firm (public) 
( P) _ (a-c)(27-161'1-BI'I') eo 9 - 231-801'1-401'1' 
( P) _ 4(a-o)(15-BI'I-4I'1') qo 9 - 231-BOI'l-401'l' 
( P) _ (a-of(2979-152BI'I-164BI'I'+320fl3+1921'14) 
"0 9 - (231 801'1 401'1')' 
( P) _ 4(a-o)(1+141'1) S 9 - 231 801'1 401'1' 
II( P) _ (a-o)'(8103-9521'1-112I'1'+3201'13+1921'14 ) 
9 - (231-801'1-401'1')' 
CS ( P) _ 2(a-o)'(69-16fl-BI'I')' 
9 - (231 801'1 40fl')' 
W( P) = (a-o)'(75-161'1-BI'I') 
9 231-80/3-40/3' 
Table 2.15: Equilibrium solutions for the private partial network 
Then one can easily obtain the effective R&D efforts of the firms. Since the public firm has 
no collaboration links, its effective R&D is its autonomous cost reduction. That is, 
Eo 
(a - ';)(27 - 16;5' - 8;5'2) 
eo = 231 _ 80;5' - 40;5'2 
24(a - ';)(1 + ;5')2 
Ei = ei + ;5'ej = 231 _ 80;5' _ 40;5'2' 
Total effective R&D is then given by 
E = E + 2E = 5(a - (;)(15 + 16;5' + 8;5'2) 
o , 231 - 80;5' - 40;5'2 
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(A2.39) 
(A2.40) 
2.7.5 The empty network 
In the empty network, ge, there are no collaboration ties. Therefore, firms cannot acquire part 
of their rivals' knowledge, given the absence of spillovers. The associated costs structures are 
c;(ge) = C - e; + 2q;, i E {O, 1, 2}. (A2.41) 
Ensuing expressions for profits are as follows 
(A2.42) 
Then, one can easily obtain social welfare. 
In the last stage of the game, firms choose simultaneously the levels of output to maximise 
their objectives. This gives rise to the following foes for the public and the private firms, 
respectively 
(a - c) - q; - qj - 3qo + eo 0, 
(a - c) - qO - qj - 4q; + e; o. (A2.43) 
The associated socs are given by -3 < 0, and -4 < 0, respectively. The solution to the system 
of the focs above is the equilibrium of this stage game 
qo = 
q; 
3( a - c) + 5eo - e; - ej 
13 
6(a - c) - 3eo + lIe; - 2ej 
39 
(A2.44) 
At the third stage, firms choose simultaneously their R&D efforts to maximise their objec-
tiveSO The resulting focs are 
35(a - c) - 16(e; + ej) - 271eo = 0, 
"Using (A2.44), social welfare is given by 30'4' «891{a' + c') - 2439x5 - 288xoXi - 2488{x; + xll - 288xoxj -
244xiXj - 18{a{99c - 35xo - 32{Xi + Xj)) + c{35xo + 32{Xi + Xj))), and the profit of firm i is l5'" (72{a' + c') + 
18x5 + 1521sxi -132xoxi -1279x; + 24xoxj - 88xiXj +8x; - 24{a{6c+3xo -llXi +2xj) +c{ -3xo + llXi - 2xj ))). 
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264( a - c) - 132eo - 88ej - 2558ei + 1521s = O. (A2.45) 
The socs for the public and the private firms are given by -271 < 0 and -2558 < 0, respectively. 
The focs give rise to the following reaction functions in R&D efforts 
= 
35(a - c) - 16(ei + ej) 
271 
264(a - c) - 132eo - 88ej + 1521s 
2558 (A2.46) 
Using the R&D reaction functions, one can notice that R&D effort is always a strategic substi-
tute. That is, 
Deo 
Dei 
Dei 
Dej 
Dei 
Deo 
16 
--<0 
271 
= 88 < 0 
- 2558 
66 
-1279 < O. (A2.47) 
The solution to the system of best response functions is the equilibrium of this stage game 
eo(s) 
e(s) = 
83(a - c) - 48s 
703 
3[44(a - c) + 271sJ 
1406 
Substituting (A2.48) and (A2.44) into the expression for social welfare gives us 
( ) _ 320746(a2 + (2 ) - 641492ac + 19512(a - c)s - 563409s2 
W s - 988418 
(A2.48) 
(A2.49) 
At the second stage of the game, the government chooses the level of subsidy to maximise 
welfare. The ensuing foc is given by 
19512(a - c) - 1126818s = O. (A2.50) 
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The soc is -1126818 < O. From (A50) the equilibrium subsidy level is 
s( e) = 4(a - c) . 
9 231 (A2.51) 
Then one can easily obtain the equilibrium solutions for the empty network structure. These 
are presented in the following Table. 
( C) _ 9(a-c) eo 9 ------rr-
( C) 20(a-o) qo 9 = 77 
( C) _ 331(a-c)2 7r0 9 - 5929 
( C) _ 4(a-c) S 9 - 231 
W( C) _ 25(a-c)2 9 - 77 
( C) _ 8(a-c) e 9 - 77 
( C) _ 13(a-o) q 9 - 77 
( C) _ 122(a-c)2 7r 9 - 2541 
CS( C) _ 1058(a-cf 9 - 5929 
II( C) _ 2701(a-o)2 9 - 17787 
Table 2.16: Equilibrium solutions for the empty network 
Since there are no spillovers, each firm's effective R&D is its own unit cost reduction. Then 
total effective R&D is given by 
2.7.6 Proofs 
E = 25(a - c). 
77 (A2.52) 
Proof of Claim 2: We first show that the complete network gC is pairwise stable. The 
stability conditions i(b) and (ii)b are trivially satisfied since no links can be added to the 
complete network. There are two cases to be considered. First, we show that the pair of private 
firms i and k have no incentive to delete their link (condition i(a)). Note that if the firms do 
so, the resulting network of collaboration will be the public-hub star network, g'o. To prove 
our claim, we have to establish the relationship 7r(gC) > 7r(g'O). Notice that the subscripts are 
dropped due to symmetry, i.e. 7ri(gC) = 7rk(gC) = 7r(gC). Using Table 2.8, it can be easily seen 
that 7r(gC) > 7r(gSO), which implies that condition i(a) is satisfied. 
We now turn to show that the stability condition ii(a) is satisfied. This condition says 
that the public firm j and a private firm, say k without loss of generality, are better off by 
not severing their link. Notice that the resulting network when firms j and k break their 
collaboration tie is the private-hub star network, g', with firm k being a "spoke" in g'. We 
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prove our claim using Tables 2.8 and 2.9. Then it is easily established that W(gC) > W(g8) 
and 7I"(gC) > 7I"(g8). Therefore, we have shown that the complete network of collaboration is 
pairwise stable. This also proves that the star networks (public-hub star and private-hub star) 
are not pairwise stable. 
We show next that the empty network is not pairwise stable. The stability conditions i(a) 
and ii(a) are trivially satisfied because there are no links to be deleted from the empty network. 
However, condition i(b) is not satisfied for the empty network since the private firms have an 
incentive to form a link. To see this, note from Table 2.8 that 7I"(ge) < 71"1 (gP). This suffices 
to establish that the empty network is not pairwise stable. Alternatively, one can show that 
condition ii(b) is violated because the public firm and a private firm have an incentive to form 
a collaboration tie, i.e. W(ge) < W(gPO) and 7I"(ge) < 7I"1(gPO). 
The next step is to show that the partial networks are not pairwise stable. Notice that 
conditions i(a) and ii(a) are satisfied because no pair of firms wants to sever their link. (This 
follows from the proof above that the empty network is not stable.) Thus it remains to show 
that either condition i(b) or ii(b) is not fulfilled so that the partial networks are not stable. 
We begin to show this for the private partial network, gP. The relevant condition here is ii(b). 
That is, a private firm, say firm i without loss of generality, and the public firm j = 0 are 
better off by forming a collaboration tie, with firm i being a "hub" in the resulting private-hub 
star network, g8 (violation of condition ii(b)). From Tables 2.8 and 2.9, it can be seen that 
W(g8) > W(gP) and 7I"h(g8) > 7I"1(gP). Thus the private partial network is not stable. 
Finally, we show that the public partial network gPo is not pairwise stable. The relevant 
conditions here are i(b) and ii(b). Thus it suffices to show that any condition is violated for 
the public partial network to be unstable. Considering the incentives of the non-linked private 
firm, say k without loss of generality, and the public firm j = 0 to form a connecting link we 
have that W(gPo) < W(gSO) and 7I"(gPo) < 71" (g-'o), with firm k being a "spoke" in the resulting 
public-hub star network, g80 . This constitutes a violation of condition ii( b) for stability, and 
in turn, establishes our claim. One can show instead that condition i(b) is violated, because 
7I"h(g8) > 7I"1(gPo) and 7I"(g8) > 7I"(gPo). The proof is now complete. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Claim 3: Note first that strong stability is a refinement of pairwise stability 
and therefore the only candidate for a strongly stable network is the complete network, gC. 
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Consider the case that the coalition of the two private firms sever the link with the public firm 
(Le. we check stability condition (i)). If the private firms will do so, the resulting network 
of collaboration is the private partial network, gP. The private firms will have an incentive 
to delete their links with the public firm if and only if 1I"i(gC) < 1I"1(gP) and 1[k(gC) < 1I"1(9P). 
The subscripts can be dropped due to symmetry and so the condition 1[(gC) < 1[1 (gP) need 
only hold (for the complete network to be unstable). As in the proof of Claim 2, we compare 
the expressions for profits 1[(gC) and 1[1(gP) by resorting to Table 2.8. Inspection of Table 2.8 
indicates that 1I"(gC) > 11"1 (gP). Hence, condition (i) is satisfied. 
Next, we check the stability condition (ii). Indeed we check whether the coalition of the 
public firm j = 0 and a private firm, say i without loss of generality, have an incentive to delete 
their link with the private firm k. The resulting network of collaboration from deletion of these 
links is the public partial network, gPo. We use again Tables 2.8 and 2.9 for our comparisons. 
It follows that W(gC) > W(gPo) and 1[(gC) > 1I"1(gPo), and hence condition (ii) is satisfied. 
Finally, we show that when S == N the complete network remains strongly stable. In other 
words, we show that the coalition of the public and the two private firms have no incentives 
to break their ties to form the empty network. Indeed we have that W(gC) > W(g") and 
1[(gC) > 1[(g"). Since the complete network, gC, survives all possible deviations by a coalition of 
players, it follows that gC is the (unique) strongly stable collaboration network. Q.E.D. 
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Chapter 3 
Wage Contracts • In Oligopoly with 
Spillovers 1 
3.1 Introduction 
There is an ever increasing interest in the investigation of the relation between unionism and 
spending on R&D. Despite the large body of theoretical and empirical literature on this issue, 
the findings so far seem to a large extent inconclusive. On the one hand, it is often argued 
that intangible assets such as R&D investments are vulnerable to the unions' rent extraction, 
thereby providing firms with weaker incentives to engage in R&D activities.2 On the other 
hand, unions are sometimes perceived as institutions with constructive presence in labour mar-
kets. 3 It has been argued that they smooth industrial relations, encourage greater employee 
training, and therefore, they accelerate the adoption of new technologies. The purpose of this 
1 The present chapter has been presented at the 34th EARIE Conference (Valencia, September 
2007). I wish to thank the participants for helpful comments and stimulating discussions. 
2For instance, Grout (1984) has shown that when a single firm bargains with Cl single union and there are 
no binding contracts, then an increase in the bargaining strength of the union will reduce the returns to R&D, 
thereby leading to lower investment. In a model with strategic aspects to R&D, i.e. in the presence of two 
firm-union bargaining units, Ulph and Ulph {1994} found that when bargaining takes place over wages alone) 
then an increase in the union strength will lead to a higher wage) which) in turn) will reduce profit and R&D 
investment. For more details see the next section. 
:1 For example, Ulph and Ulph (1994) pointed out that when bargaining is over both wages and employment 
(short-term efficient bargaining), then an increase in the union strength can make its firm to win a patent race, 
provided that the union is risk averse and also is initially relatively weak. More recently, Haucap and Wey (2004) 
showed that "centralh,ed" wage setting entails stronger incentives for R&D than less centralised forms of wage 
negotiations - ';coordinated:) and ';decentralised" wage setting. 
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chapter is precisely to point out that apart from such behavioural considerations that may on 
occasion encourage or deter innovation, equally as important are other factors in influencing 
innovation decisions: the sequencing of R&D investment and wage determination that underlies 
the specification of a "wage contract". is another important factor. 
The literature on cost-reducing investments in vertically related industries or in the presence 
of unions has paid comparatively little attention on this issue4 Most of the existing papers 
assume that wage (or input price) negotiations take place after the firms' investment decisions 
(see e.g. Lyons and Sekkat, 1991; Barcena-Ruiz and Campo, 2004; Haucap and Wey, 2004; 
Buehler and Schmutzler, 2008). In the present chapter, we show that the sequencing of R&D 
investment and wage determination is crucial for our understanding of investment decisions 
and union welfare in oligopoly. In particular, we show that there is a raising rivals' cost effect 
when investment decisions precede the wage selection. There is thus a strategic motive for 
cost-reducing investment, which, we argue, is not sufficiently strong to compensate for the 
union's potential for rent extraction via wage increases. In contrast, considering that wages 
are set prior to cost-reducing investment, we show that this leads to lower wages, resulting in 
higher investment and profit. In this case, the level of employment is higher and the union 
attains higher utility too, which allows us to shed some light on the relation between cost-
reducing investment and wage setting behaviour, in the context of wage contract specification 
for unionised industries. 
We consider a two-tier market structure consisting of two downstream firms and an upstream 
labour unionS The union is presumed able to set the wages unilaterally, whereas the choice 
of employment remains at the firms' discretion. This is the monopoly union model that takes 
the view that the union has all the power in setting the wage. The monopoly union model is 
a simplified way to conceptualise the strategic interactions between the union and the firms 
and is a common assumption in the literature on unionised oligopolies (see e.g. Manasakis 
and Zikos, 2007; Haucap and Wey, 2004; Lommerud et aI., 2005; Mauleon et aI., 2008). It 
allows us to focus sharply on the effect that the sequencing of R&D investment and wage 
determination has on the firms' investment decisions. We also assume that firms compete in 
4 A notable exception is I3anerjee and Lin (2003). 
5This type of organisation characterises the labour markets of several countries such as Ireland, Purtugal, 
Norway and Finland. 
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the market of a homogeneous good and in addition invest in reducing their costs, which is 
decisive for their competitive position in the product market. Alternative contracts specify the 
sequencing of R&D investment and wage determination: they can be classified as fixed when 
the union sets the wage before the firms make their investment decisions, or floating when the 
union determines the wage after firms have invested in R&D. We also consider an 'intermediate' 
type of institutional arrangement which requires that investment and wage decisions take place 
simultaneously (rather than sequentially) - a reference wage contract. These types of contracts 
are often observed in the real world. For example, large Japanese companies use fixed wage 
labour contracts whereas in Britain and the US wage contracts are floating or reference, their 
maximum duration being three years (see Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen, 2003). 
In this environment, we can readily identify the following forces: R&D investments by 
producers at the downstream section of the industry reduce their marginal cost, which works 
towards increasing the demand for the final product. However, under a floating wage con-
tract the size of this direct effect of cost-reducing investment is diminished by increases in 
the wage. In particular, higher efficiency for the downstream firms increases the demand for 
labour, which induces the labour union to set a higher wage - acting in an opportunistic man-
ner. However, there is another potential countervailing effect: the increase in the wage due 
to higher downstream efficiency translates into higher marginal costs for all downstream firms, 
given the presence of an industry-wide union (setting a uniform wage). The latter motive for 
cost-reducing investment - the raising rivals' cost effect - helps explain strategic behaviour 
under a floating wage contract. It is clearly absent under a fixed wage contract, where wages 
are determined prior to the firms' investment decisions and remain fixed thereafter. 
A floating wage contract enables the union to adjust the wage after firms have invested in 
R&D. As a way of overcoming this "hold-up" problem for the firms we propose a fixed wage 
contract. In the latter case, the wage is determined before the firms' selection of R&D. Since a 
fixed wage deal leads to lower wages, it tends to encourage R&D spending. As a result, firms 
increm;e their demand for labour while the union can still appropriate a relatively large amount 
of rents. This in turn implies an one-to-one relationship between union and firm preferences 
over the contract type selection. Our analysis also indicates that higher investments lead to 
lower prices, and so consumers benefit as well. 
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Since a floating wage contract implies lower R&D investments but also has a raising rivals' 
costs potential, whereas a fixed wage contract leads to higher investments, it is not a priori clear 
which contract type firms will find most preferable. It turns out, though, that a fixed wage 
contract yields always higher profits for the firms and also enables the trade union to capture 
a large enough portion of these profits. This stems from the fact that a fixed wage contract 
triggers lower wages and thereby stimulates R&D spending by constraining the union's wage 
claims. 
Some of the themes studied here have also been addressed in a number of other papers. 
A study closely related to the present one is Banerjee and Lin (2003). Their paper, in line 
with ours, considers a two-tier market structure characterised by an upstream input supplier 
and a multitude of downstream firms. The authors allow the downstream firms to engage in 
cost-reducing R&D, and the input supplier to set unilaterally the price for the input. The 
strategic interactions between the upstream and downstream agents are modelled by a three 
stage game with the same sequencing of moves as in our setting. In particular, Banerjee and Lin 
focus on the analysis of fixed and floating wage contracts and, without explicitly deriving the 
equilibrium of a reference wage contract, the use it to facilitate their comparisons. Another key 
assumption in their framework is that there are no technological spillovers among the firms at 
the downstream section of the industry. In our main analysis, we assume instead the presence 
of such spillover effects and examine how they influence the main forces operating in our model 
- the size of the cost reduction effect and raising rivals' cost effect. It turns out though that 
spillovers moderate both effects, and even more so regarding the firms' potential for raising 
their rivals' costs, which in turn leads to both higher profits and union utility under a fixed 
wage contract - in line with Banerjee and Lin. 
Importantly, the same is no longer true concerning the comparison between floating and 
reference wage contracts. When spillovers are sufficiently small, a floating wage contract can 
generate a higher level of profit. This result relates to the raising rivals' cost effect of a floating 
wage contract: when spillovers are sufficiently small, a floating wage contract is more attractive 
than a reference wage contract as a firm can increase the costs of its rivals without hurting 
itself as much due to wage changes induced by spillovers. Thus, one contribution of the present 
chapter is to demonstrate that the assumption of zero spillovers should not always be considered 
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"innocuous" in this setting. At the same time, a reference wage contract always leads to higher 
utility for the union than a floating wage contrast does. Therefore, we can overall state that the 
union and firm preferences over the contract type selection can be fully reconciled as long as 
spillovers are not too small. Consequently, consideration of a reference wage contract together 
with R&D spillovers helps to shed more light on the desirability of different wage contracts 
which are often used in the real world. 
Lyons and Sekkat (1991) study the decision of a monopoly firm (or entrepreneur) between 
vertical integration and separation in the presence of labour unions. In particular, they consider 
a model involving two essential production stages, each requiring a specific investment, where 
the entrepreneur faces the decision of whether to produce at both stages or at one only. An 
important assumption is that the employees are organised into a separate labour union at 
each production stage. The main prediction of the paper is that, under certain circumstances, 
the entrepreneur makes a higher profit by deciding to subcontract (or outsource) the input 
production stage, as the subcontractor may erode the union's potential for rent extraction. 
However, the focus of the analysis in the present chapter differs from Lyons and Sekkat (1991) 
in several important ways. First, Lyons and Sekkat consider a setting with a single firm. The 
present chapter, though, studies a downstream duopoly, showing the presence of a strategic 
incentive for cost-reducing investment - the raising rivals' cost effect of a floating wage contract. 
Allowing for a downstream duopoly also enables us to look at how technological spillovers 
influence cost-reducing investment and hence the potential for raising the cost of rival firms. 
Second, Lyons and Sekkat explore a monopolist's incentives for subcontracting a particular 
production stage as a way of mitigating the opportunistic behaviour of the labour union that 
is active at that production stage.G Our analysis focuses instead on the role of the sequencing 
of R&D investment and wage determination in alleviating the union's opportunism and shows 
that a contract where wages are set before the firms' investments is beneficial both for the firms 
and the union. Finally, contrary to Lyons and Sekkat, the level of investment is endogenously 
6 Buehler and Schmutzler (2008) examine the interplay between vertical integration and cost-reducing invest-
ment in a model with two downstream firms each locked into an exclusive relation with an upstream supplier. 
They show that vertical integration eliminates the mark-up at the upstream section, and this reinforces the 
incentives for cost-reduction. The approach in the present chapter is very different. Instead of looking at vertical 
integration as a way of eliminating input price changes after investment is sunk, we look at the sequencing of 
R&D investment and wage determination. 
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determined and, in addition, is influenced by technological spillovers at the downstream section 
of a vertically-related industry. 
Our motivation also derives from the literature on unionised oligopoly, which has dealt 
extensively only with specific aspects of innovation activity and labour market organisation. 
First, most of the studies postulate that wage negotiations take place at the firm-level (e.g. 
Ulph and Ulph, 1989; 1994; 2001; Barcena-Ruiz and Campo, 2003; Manasakis and Zikos, 
2007). Haucap and Wey (2004) mention that: "As this literature has focused exclusively on 
decentralised modes of wage setting ... the relative performance of more centralised wage systems 
remains an open issue ... ". Second, R&D has usually been modelled as a patent race, where 
the firm first to innovate is rewarded by an infinitely lived and a fully effective patent. 7 This 
is a useful way to capture the tournament nature of R&D activity, albeit restrictive. Third, 
there is scant attention on how the sequencing of R&D investment and wage determination 
affects innovation8 Fourth, the received literature has to a large extent neglected the issue 
of involuntary and unpaid leakage of information among firms, namely, the appropriability 
problem. Thus, the present chapter aims at addressing these issues within a single model, 
attempting to investigate how alternative contract types influence wages and, consequently, the 
level of firms' cost-reducing investments, profits, employment, union utility, and social welfare. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related literature on unionism 
and innovation. The formal analytical framework is presented in section 3.3. Sections 3.4, 3.5 
and 3.6 deal, respectively, with the cases of floating, fixed and reference wage contracts. Section 
3.7 compares the different contract types. Section 3.8 extends the basic model in four directions: 
first, we investigate the case in which the form of labour market organisation is decentralised, 
that is, there are firm-level unions; second, we consider Bertrand (price) competition; third, we 
investigate the case whereby the wage is conditioned on the amount of R&D spending under a 
fixed wage contract; and finally, we discuss how much functional forms matter for our results. 
Section 3.9 concludes. Finally, some proofs of the results are relegated to the Appendix, which 
is the last section, 3.10. 
'See, for instance, Ulph and Ulph (1989, 1994,2001) and Haucap and Wey (2004). 
I:IThere is large body of literature investigating the timing of wage negotiations in the absence of R&D (see 
e.g. De Fraja, 1993; Dobson, 1994; Barcena-Ruiz and Campo, 2000). 
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3.2 Related literature on unionisation and innovation 
The present chapter contributes to the literature on unionisation and R&D. One of the recurring 
themes in this literature is how the union's bargaining power and objectives influence the firms' 
incentives to innovate. For instance, in an excellent survey, Ulph and Ulph (1998) have pointed 
out that, under certain circumstances, there is a negative association between union power and 
R&D, while in some cases a stronger union may help its firm to win a patent race it would 
otherwise have lost. In this section our purpose is not to replicate this study but rather to 
discuss the (diverse) conclusions reached in the various models, thus highlighting that these 
differences arise in large part due to the specific assumptions made in each model. 
The literature on unionisation and R&D was initiated by Grout (1984).9 In his influen-
tial paper Grout (1984) showed that in a single firm-union set-up an increase in the union's 
bargaining power will induce a lower investment in R&D. This result emerges under two main 
assumptions: (1) R&D investment is irreversible and takes place prior to the wage and employ-
ment decisions; and (2) bargaining takes place over wages alone (right-to-manage bargaining), 
or over both wages and employment (short-term efficient bargaining). Intuitively, the firm will 
be vulnerable to post-R&D wage exploitation by the union since R&D investment is assumed 
to be irreversible. 
However, the present result also hinges on the assumption that there is no strategic di-
mension to R&D (Le. single firm/union bargaining) and that the type of bargaining employed 
during the union-firm negotiations is short-term only (see Ulph and Ulph, 1998). Relaxing 
the latter assumption, it can be shown that if the union is risk neutral (Le. there is internal 
insurance against unemployment by the union) and R&D is included in the negotiation agenda, 
this implies that the equilibrium R&D and employment levels are Pareto efficient (and are the 
same as under a perfectly competitive labour market) - see again Ulph and Ulph (1998). Thus, 
the scope of bargaining and more precisely the issue of whether R&D is part of the union-firm 
negotiation agenda is decisive for the firms' investment decisions. 
In a series of very important papers, Ulph and Ulph (1989, 1994, 2001) qualified Grout's 
9Crout's (1984) fundamental idea that unions discourage R&D spending by capturing quasi rents earned on 
capital goes back to the seminal work of Simmons (1944). 
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(1984) conclusion by incorporating a strategic dimension to R&D. lO More precisely, the authors 
assumed that firms engage in a patent tournament to discover a new labour saving innovation 
where each firm's investment in R&D determines the probability of winning the patent race. ll 
Once the new technology is discovered, it is immediately introduced and the winner of the race 
is rewarded by a perfect patent of infinite duration. As noted by Ulph and Ulph (1998) there 
are two key issues related to the literature focusing on the tournament nature of innovation. 12 
First, the firms' innovative activity is driven by the competitive threat, namely the difference 
in profits between winning and losing the patent race. Second, in the course of the patent 
race firms overinvest in R&D, as they attempt to prevent their rival(s) from being the first to 
innovate. Thus, by placing these issues in the context of a unionised labour market, Ulph and 
Ulph investigated how the nature of the bargaining process and the different objectives of each 
firm-specific union affect the level of, and the incentives for, R&D. It turns out that there is no 
emerging consensus concerning the relationship between the union's strength and R&D, and 
thus, the main insights of each model are highly dependent on the nature of the assumptions 
adopted (Le. the union's objectives, the form of bargaining). 
To shed some light on this issue, note that bargaining can take two main forms: first, it can 
be long-term (or ex ante), whereby each firm-union bargaining unit negotiates over everything: 
amount of R&D, wages and employment. Alternatively, bargaining can take the form of short-
term (or ex post), which can be either right-to-manage (negotiations over wages only) or efficient 
bargaining (negotiations over wages and employment). 
The main results can be briefly outlined as follows. First, if the unions are risk neutral then 
under ex ante bargaining R&D investment is independent of the union's bargaining power - and 
therefore, R&D and employment are the same as under a perfectly competitive labour market; 
they are in fact not Pareto efficient due to strategic overinvestment in the course of the R&D 
lOUlph and Ulph (2001) suggested that incomplete contracts (ex post bargaining) may Pareto-dominate com-
plete contracts (ex ante bargaining) both in the case of risk neutral and risk averse unions. This stems from 
the fact that incomplete contracting alleviates the overinvestment problem that arises within a tournament 
R&D setting. However, when the decision over the contract type is endogenous, union/firm pairs may opt for 
Pareto-inefficient contracts independently of which contract type is Pareto efficient. 
11 The same results can be derived in the simpler case that the innovation is discovered by an independent 
scientist. Then an infinitely lived and fully effective patent on this technology is put up for auction and is awarded 
to the firm that is willing to pay the most for it. The advantage of this choice of the set up is that it allows the 
authors to focus sharply on the competitive threat of a patent tournament. 
12This literature takes the view that labour markets are not unionised. 
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tournament. Second, if the unions are risk averse then an increase in the union's bargaining 
strength may increase or decrease R&D depending on whether or not the union stands to gain 
relatively more than its firm after the new technology is introduced. Importantly, a lower 
amount of R&D expenditure may make the firm and its union better off, as it alleviates the 
overinvestment problem. 
Turning to the case of ex post bargaining where R&D is excluded from the negotiation 
agenda, Ulph and Ulph (1989, 1994) found that in most cases unions induce a lower amount 
of R&D investment. This occurs under right-to-manage bargaining as well as under (short 
term) efficient bargaining when the unions are risk neutral (i.e. they care about their total 
wage income). If, however, unions are risk averse (i.e. there is no internal scheme against 
unemployment) and bargaining is efficient, the result might be reversed. Specifically, if the 
union is initially very weak and cares a lot about employment, then an increase in its bargaining 
power will have the effect of increasing employment that will outweigh the (negative) effect 
stemming from a move along the contract curve. The effect of an increase in employment is to 
expand output, thereby decreasing the rival's output and profit. Consequently, an increase in 
the union's strength may help its firm to win a patent race that it would otherwise have lost. 
However, for higher levels of union power this result is reversed, suggesting that the relationship 
between union strength and R&D is inverse U-shaped. 13 
Comparing the two forms of union-firm bargaining - long-term vs. short-term - it follows 
that in a single firm/union setting (see Grout, 1984) long-term bargaining brings about a Pareto 
efficient outcome and thus is superior to short-term bargaining (which is Pareto inefficient). 
However, when bargaining takes place in parallel sessions (i.e. there is a strategic aspect to 
R&D) this may not be true any longer. As in the course of conducting R&D firms strategically 
overinvest, it follows that ex post bargaining - which reduces the firms' R&D levels - may 
Pareto dominate ex ante bargaining. 
The series of papers by Ulph and Ulph have concentrated on how the union bargaining 
power and/or objectives can influence R&D. This view rules out the possibility that other 
factors, namely the degree of wage setting centralisation (Haucap and Wey, 2004; Calabuig 
13 Menezes-Filho, Ulph and Van Reenen (1998a, b) explicitly test for the presence of nonlinearities in the 
union-R&D relationship and find evidence in support of the theory of ex post efficient bargaining. 
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and Gonzalez-Maestre, 2002), the timing of wage setting (Barcena-Ruiz and Campo, 2003), the 
formation of a Research Joint Venture (RJV) among the firms (Manasakis and Zikos, 2007), 
or the sequencing of R&D investment and wage determination (present chapter) can affect 
investment levels. The rest of this section explores these issues and their bearing on the firms' 
investment decisions. 
Haucap and Wey (2004) investigate the relationship between unionisation structures and 
innovation incentives. This avenue of research aims at exploring the circumstances under which 
the "hold-up" problem - being responsible for discouraging R&D - can be alleviated or elimi-
nated. 
The first finding uncovers a non-monotone relationship between the degree of wage setting 
centralisation and innovation incentives. Namely, firms are willing to spend most in R&D under 
a centralised regime, while they are least willing to do so under a coordinated regime. This 
result may seem initially surprising because complete centralisation constitutes a labour market 
rigidity in the sense that wages are not flexible to reflect local conditions at the firm level. 
However, there is a simple rationale for this result. Note first that under a fully centralised 
system an industry union sets a uniform wage, whereas under a coordinated system an industry 
union can act in a more flexible manner by setting wages at the level of each individual enter-
prise to reflect the productivity of each employer. Suppose further that there are two initially 
symmetric firms. The sole winner of the patent race improves its labour productivity, which 
in turn increases the union's wage demand. Under a coordinated system the more productive 
firm will pay a higher wage because wages are adjusted by the central union according to each 
firm's productivity improvement. This in turn partially dissipates the competitive advantage 
of the more productive firm. 
By contrast, under wage centralisation with a uniformity rule the more efficient firm can 
capture a larger amount of rents resulting from its innovation activity, since any wage increase 
would effectively be imposed on the less productive firm. This, in turn, reinforces the competi-
tive advantage of the innovating firm. Thus, a centralised system can, to some extent, constrain 
excessive post-R&D wage increases, which are responsible for discouraging R&D spending under 
coordinated wage setting. 
The next result pertains to the levels of employment under the different structures of union-
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isation. Haucap and Wey (2004) found that a decentralised regime outperforms both a cen-
tralised and a coordinated regime. This suggests the following trade-off between innovation and 
employment: complete centralisation generates greater innovation relative to decentralisation, 
although the latter regime leads to higher employment. 
The analysis by Haucap and Wey (2004) yields some potentially interesting insights for 
public policy. First, the government (or regulator) should not allow the formation of monopoly 
unions. Although this would increase employment, as mentioned above, it would however dis-
courage innovation activity. Second, any institutional adjustment from a completely centralised 
regime to a less centralised one should impose non-discrimination rules in wage determination 
to avoid dampening the firms' innovation incentives. The main message is that a coordinated 
wage setting regime performs worst among all possible regimes and thus should be avoided. 
This stems from the fact that wage coordination leads to the smallest innovation incentives and 
generates an employment level that, undcr certain circumstanccs, can only exceed the employ-
ment level under a completely centralised regime. Thus, recent reforms in the labour markets 
of several counties (e.g. Germany, Belgium, Spain, Sweden), reflecting a move towards less 
centralised regimes while maintaining the union's monopoly power largely intact, should be 
critically reviewed (Haucap and Wey, 2004). Finally, the government should take into account 
the potential trade-off between innovation and employment levels of a completely centralised 
system relative to a decentralised one. 
Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre (2002) investigated the same question as Haucap and Wey 
(2004) by proposing a model in which firms incur a fixed cost in order to attain an exogenously 
specified reduction in their labour requirements per unit of output (i.e. firms adopt a new 
labour-saving technology). Moreover, Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre (2002), unlike the study 
by Haucap and Wey (2004), analyse two extreme structures concerning the degree of wage 
setting centralisation: complete centralisation and decentralisation. Two important effects can 
be recognised in the present set-up. First is the labour saving effect, namely an increase in the 
union's bargaining power (and the consequent increase in the wage) will strengthen the firms' 
incentives to aclopt a labour saving innovation so as to balance the negative effect resulting 
from the union's hold-up. Second is the rent-seeking effect, namely an increase in the union's 
strength will increase the rents that can potentially be extracted from the firm, which, in turn, 
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will lead to less R&D. 
The main result of the paper concerns the incentives of firms to adopt a new technology. 
Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre (2002) showed that a new technology is more likely to be 
adopted under a centralised system if the size of the market is small enough. The reason is that 
when the market is relatively small only the innovating firm will remain active in equilibrium. 
Noting that a centralised regime enables the union to extract a larger amount of rents via 
wage increases due to its monopoly power, this implies that each firm will have a stronger 
incentive to adopt the new technology under a centralised structure in anticipation of becoming 
a monopolist. Put differently, the labour saving effect dominates the rent-seeking effect as long 
as the size of the market is sufficiently small. By contrast, if the size of the market is relatively 
large, then both firms will stay active in equilibrium, and therefore a centralised regime will 
lead to less R&D relative to a decentralised regime. In other words, the rent-seeking effect is 
dominant when the size of the market is large enough. In this case, it is more likely that firms 
will adopt a labour saving innovation under a decentralised union structure. 
Next, we discuss the paper by Barcena-Ruiz and Campo (2003). This paper builds on the 
literature related to the timing of wage setting (simultaneous or sequential) under different 
modes of wage setting centralisation (complete centralisation or decentralisation) when firms 
do not invest in R&D. We now discuss briefly the results of this strand of literature in order to 
highlight how the addition of innovation issues into the frame of analysis can alter some of the 
main conclusions. 
In a model where a central union enters into simultaneous or sequential negotiations with 
firms, Dobson (1994) showed that the union will first bargain with a firm in a weaker bargaining 
position, or alternatively, with a firm that makes a larger profit. In that way, the union can 
use the commonly agreed wage rate as a benchmark for its subsequent negotiations. Thus 
sequential bargaining is more likely to be preferred by the union whenever it wants to break 
coordination among firms in the process of wage determination, and in that way increase its 
rent extraction potential (see Dobson, 1994). 
De Fraja (1993) and Barcena-Ruiz and Campo (2000), among others, showed that when 
bargaining is decentralised at the firm level the leader union sets a higher wage and obtains a 
higher level of utility than the union that enters into negotiations as a follower (i.e. there is 
141 
a stmtegic effect). Moreover, both unions obtain higher wages as well as utility levels relative 
to the case that wages are set simultaneously; meanwhile firms make lower profits than under 
simultaneous negotiations. There is thus a conflict in the interests of the parties since the firms 
will prefer simultaneous wage bargaining but the unions will opt for sequential negotiations. 
Baxcena-Ruiz and Campo (2003) extended this line of research by considering a model 
of decentralised wage setting at the firm level, where in the first stage unions/firms decide 
about the timing of wage setting (employing the monopoly union model) and then take their 
actions; in the next stages, firms make their R&D investments and compete in quantities. In 
the present context, apart from the strategic effect which arises under sequential wage setting, 
there is an additional effect due to the firms' investment decisions - so-called productivity effect. 
The latter effect is largest when unions set the wages simultaneously (i.e. R&D investment is 
maximised). Thus, an interplay between the strategic effect and the productivity effect arises: 
the strategic effect 'pushes' towards sequential wage setting meanwhile the productivity effect 
'pushes' towards simultaneous negotiations. It turns out that when the size of the market is 
small enough and the efficiency of the new technology is large enough the productivity effect 
is dominant and each union-firm pair will opt for simultaneous wage setting. This result is in 
contrast to earlier contributions where firms do not conduct R&D as in these studies unions 
are always better off when wages are set sequentially. 
More recently, Manasakis and Zikos (2007) investigated the incentives of firms to form 
an R.JV when wages are set simultaneously at the level of each individual enterprise. They 
developed a four-stage game where in stage one firms decide whether or not to form an RJV, 
and then in stage two firms invest in R&D either cooperatively, if an RJV has been formed in the 
preceding stage, or non-cooperatively, if firms have decided to stay separated. In stage three, 
firm-level unions set the wages (under the monopoly union model). Finally, firms compete in 
quantities in stage four. 
Manasakis and Zikos (2007) found that profits are always higher under cooperation, although 
cooperative R&D, output, employment, wages, union utility and labour productivity will be 
higher as long as spillovers are sufficiently large. Thus, a conflict in the interests of the unions 
and firms concerning the formation of an RJV is likely to arise when the spillovers are relatively 
small. As a way of resolving this conflict, Manasakis and Zikos (2007) proposed that firms should 
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offer the unions some share of their cooperative profits. More precisely, firms should offer an 
amount at least as high as the union utility differential between the cases of non-cooperative 
and cooperative R&D; in turn firms will be willing to part with this amount of money as long 
as the difference in their profits (between cooperation and non-cooperation) is at least as high 
as the amount of money they need to give up. It is interesting to note that the latter condition 
can be rearranged to read as: the joint benefit of the union and its firm under the RJV should 
be at least as high as their joint benefit under R&D competition, so that the conflict between 
the two parties within each firm-union pair is resolved and at the same time it is still profitable 
for firms to part with some rents resulting from R&D cooperation. It can be shown that the 
latter condition may only hold if spillovers are not too small. It follows that when spillovers are 
relatively small the presence of labour unions discourages R&D cooperation. Seen from another 
perspective, the profitability of an RJV is large enough to balance the unions' claims for more 
rents when the extent of inter-firm information flow is substantial. 
The next paper to discuss is Banerjee and Lin (2003). As mentioned in the Introduction 
the model employed in the present chapter is an extension of Banerjee and Lin's (2003) two-
tier market structure where at the upstream tier lies an input supplier and at the downstream 
there is an arbitrary number of identical firms competing in the market of a homogeneous 
good. In this setting, the R&D decisions of the downstream firms affect the supplier's ability 
to extract rents through higher input prices after firms have made their investment decisions. 
The same effect is also present in the context of a unionised labour market. More precisely, a 
higher amount invested in R&D reduces production costs and thereby reduces the price and 
expands output. This, in turn, increases the demand for the input and thus drives up the input 
price. Therefore, one can recognise two conflicting effects. First, an increase in the input price 
reduces the marginal returns to R&D (negative effect). Second, an increase in the input price 
increases the production costs of rival firms, because the input supply is completely monopolised 
(positive effect) - see Banerjee and Lin (2003). It turns out that in an oligopolistic industry 
where competition is not too intense each firm invests more in R&D than a monopolist. 
As a way of overcoming the opportunistic behaviour of the input supplier, namely to raise 
the input price after firms have made their investment decisions, Banerjee and Lin (2003) 
proposed a fixed input price contract. According to this contract type, the input supplier first 
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sets the input price, then firms choose their R&D levels, and finally firms compete in quantities 
in the final good market. The attractiveness of a fixed input price contract stems from the 
fact that it promotes R&D, which, in turn, increases the supplier's profit as firms purchase a 
larger amount of the input. Moreover, under a fixed input price contract the level of output 
is higher, prices are lower and also total surplus is higher relative to the level achieved under 
a floating input price contract (where the input supplier can adjust the input price after the 
firms' investment decisions). 
We now turn to a brief discussion of studies in the empirical literature concerning the 
relationship between unions and R&D - see Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen (2003) for an 
excellent survey of the empirical and theoretical literature. Here the findings are also to a 
large extent inconclusive. Menezes-Filho, Ulph and Van Reenen (1998a, b) find a negative 
relationship between unionisation and R&D in the case of the US (see also Connoly, Hirsch 
and Hirschey, 1986; Hirsch, 1992; Bronars and Deere, 1993). However, they report that the 
evidence in support of such relationship is less compelling for the case of Europe. That is, there is 
initially a negative (raw) correlation between union density and R&D; this becomes statistically 
insignificant when one controls for the age of the enterprise and technological opportunity. In 
fact, Menezes-Filho et al. (1998a, b) reveal in the UK data an even more complex relationship 
between unionisation and R&D that is characterised by nonlinearities. In particular, they find 
that an increase in union density may have a positive effect on R&D provided that the union 
bargains over both wages and employment. However, unionisation has a negative impact on 
R&D when bargaining takes places only over wages. 14 Menezes-Filho et al. (1998a, b) note 
that the divergence between the UK and the US points to the differences in the underlying 
industrial relations: UK unions care more about employment rather than wages, implying that 
the wage mark-up is twice as large in the US. 
Nair-Reichert (2000) attempted to establish a causal relationship between innovation, union-
isation and import competition. She found that in less unionised industries strategic R&D is 
more effective in preventing import penetration. This result may help explain the lu>s of 
competitiveness in some highly unionised industries of the US manufacturing sector. More 
14 Machin and Wadhwani (1991) show that in the UK unionism may encourage R&D Hpending. This is because 
unionism is associated with higher wages, more organisational change and greater 'lcollective voice" . 
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interestingly, the study by Nair-Reichert (2000) suggests that unions may not always act in 
a myopic way: when unions are in a weak bargaining position they will typically negotiate a 
lower wage in order to prevent reductions in the level of employment resulting from import 
penetration. 
Finally, we discuss some directions for future research. First, the empirical study by Nair-
Reichert (2000) provides the necessary motivation for developing a theoretical model to explain 
the causal link between unionisation, R&D and import competition. This could be analysed in 
the context of a model with three firms located in two different countries (Le. two firms located 
in a 'home' country and one firm located in a 'foreign' country). One may assume that the 
foreign country is not unionised and/or does not invest in R&D, meanwhile it exports its output 
to the home country (e.g. within an economic union) where firms do invest in R&D. In addition, 
it can be assumed that the home country is unionised at the level of each individual enterprise 
and that unions differ in the degree of their bargaining power. One would expect this model to 
predict that the firm entering into negotiations with the stronger union should have a smaller 
market share as a result of more acute import penetration. Alternatively, one can assume that 
the unions' bargaining power is the same across firms in the home country and, in addition, the 
home country is unionised either at the firm level or at an industry level. We would expect that 
comparison of these two scenarios would yield similar predictions regarding the relationship 
between union strength and import competition when firms in the home country engage in 
R&D. 
A second promising research direction would be to develop theoretical models that explain 
the effect of unionisation on the firms' incentives to cooperate in R&D. This is because the 
literature to date has mainly looked at the R&D incentives of individual firms in the context 
of unionised labour markets. However, as noted by Mauleon et al. (2008) this is a restrictive 
approach because the firms' investment incentives can be better understood within the network 
of collaboration where firms are embedded. The paper by Manasakis and Zikos (2007) is an 
attempt in that direction. It is also important to note that the relative importance of non-
equity forms of alliances (e.g. R&D networks) has grown in recent years over equity forms of 
partnerships (e.g. RJVs). The study by Mauleon et al. (2008) and chapter 4 of the thesis are 
the first studies in that direction. 
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3.3 The model 
We consider a two-tier industry consisting of an upstream labour union and two downstream 
firms producing a homogeneous good. Our focus is directed towards the case of a central 
union which we find most interesting as it captures important economic effects. 15 This form of 
labour market organisation also reflects the empirical observation that an important number of 
countries have maintained a relatively high degree of centralisation in their wage negotiations, 
such as Ireland, Portugal, Norway and Finland (OEeD, 2004).l6 We further assume that the 
production process involves labour as the sole input and takes place under constant returns to 
scale such that qi = li. The inverse demand function is of the linear form P(Q) = a - Q, where 
Q = ql + q2 and Q :'0 a. 
Each downstream firm produces using at a fixed proportion both labour inputs - at the 
price w - and non-labour inputs - at the price c. 17 We further assume that each firm can 
invest into process R&D to lower its marginal cost from c + w to c + w - Xi, 0 :'0 Xi :'0 c + w. 
The cost of R&D activity is assumed to be quadratic, r(Xi) = ,xr, , > O. This reflects that 
process innovations take place at decreasing returns. For simplicity, we set, = 1 which ensures 
non-negativity of all variables. In addition, there are inter-firm spillover effects that induce a 
further reduction in a firms' marginal cost. Thus, the effective marginal cost borne by firm i is 
Ci(Xi, Xj) = (c + w) - Xi - (JXj, i -# j, i,j E {I, 2}, (3.1) 
where (J captures the extent of technological spillovers across firms. The following assumption 
is maintained throughout the chapter: 
Assumption 3.1. Let A == a - c be a measure of the market size. Given 0 :'0 (J :'0 1, we 
have that (i) 0 :'0 w < A and (ii) Xi + (JXj :'0 w + c < a. 
15The structure of the unions is substantially different across countries. Importantly, several countries have 
moved recently to more decentralised systems. In section 3.8.1, we also analyse the case in which wages are 
settled at the firm level. In the latter case, the main mechanism that underlies our model can survive. 
IGSpecifically, Ireland adopted a decentralised system in the 19808, and then it returned to complete centrali-
sation again. 
17 An alternative interpretation of c is that it represents the marginal cost of transforming one unit of labour 
into one unit of output. In this case, the effect of c08t-reducing inve8tment is to increase the tran8formation 
efficiency. 
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Part (i) implies that the wage is sufficiently small relative to the market size so that pro-
duction is meaningful (i.e. firms do always have incentives to hire workers); part (ii) ensures 
an economically meaningful investment level. 
We assume that the wage is set according to the monopoly union model. That is, the wage 
is set unilaterally by the union whereas employment decisions remain at the firms' discretion 
(see e.g. Booth, 1995). The monopoly union model is a special case of the right-to-manage 
model according to which the wage is the outcome of union-firm bargaining and the level of 
employment is set unilaterally by the firms. It assumes that the union possesses all the relevant 
bargaining power in setting the wage. Clearly this is a simplified way of formalising the union-
firm interactions and is intended to capture the idea that in the real world unions typically 
have more strength when it comes to wage bargaining. In the present chapter, the monopoly 
union model is used for the purpose of tractability. Importantly, as Mauleon and Vannetelbosch 
(2005, 2006) have shown, when the union's bargaining power is relatively small, a union that 
maximises its rents would send to the negotiation table delegates that maximise the wage -
and this would mimic the monopoly union outcome used in this chapter. Finally, the monopoly 
union model which is a common assumption in the literature (see e.g. Manasakis and Zikos, 
2007; Barcena-Ruiz and Campo, 2004; Haucap and Wey, 2004; Lommerud et aI., 2005, 2006; 
Mauleon et aI., 2008) allows us to focus sharply on the impact of the timing of R&D and wage 
setting for the equilibrium outcomes in the present setting. 
Moreover, the union is of utilitarian type, that is, it seeks to maximise the sum of its 
members' utilities, given identical union members. The utility function of the union is thus 
given by18 
U = (w -wo)(li +Ij ), 0 < Wo < A, (3.2) 
where Wo is the workers' reservation wage, and li is the employment level of firm i, for i # j, 
i, j E {1,2}. As noted by Petrakis and Vlassis (2000), the workers' reservation wage can be 
thought of as representing a weighted average of two components: the competitive wage and 
18 !\.lore generally, the objective function of the union can be written as U = (w - wo),.p(li +lj), where t.p E (0,1] 
can be conceptualised in two alternative ways in this setting, as noted by Petrakis and Vlassis (2000). It can 
be thought of either as the relative rate of risk aversion of the representative union member, or alternatively, as 
the elasticity of substitution between wages and employment. Following Haucap and \Vey (2004), Petrakis and 
Vlassis (2004), ~:Ianasakis and Zikos (2007), Mauleon et al. (2008), we have restricted our attention to the case 
of risk neutral unions where rp = 1. 
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unemployment benefits; the respective weights are the probabilities of finding, or not, a job in 
the competitive sector. We can also easily see that (3.2) is equivalent to the objective function 
of an industry-wide profit-maximising input supplier if Wo = 0, as in Banerjee and Lin (2003). 
We assume that the order of the selection of R&D and wages is exogenously given. Alter-
native wage contracts are characterised by a three-stage game with the following timing: 
(i) "Fixed wage contract" (FI). In this case, the union sets the wage in stage one. Firms 
then choose their R&D levels in the second stage, and make their output/employment decisions 
in the third stage. 
(ii) "Floating wage contract" (FL). Firms choose their R&D levels in stage one. The union 
then sets the wage in stage two, and finally, firms choose their output/employment levels. 
(iii) "Reference wage contract" (R). In stage one the union and firms act simultaneously so 
as to maximise their objectives, and in stage two, firms choose their output/employment levels. 
The different types of wage contracts are central to our analysis so we discuss the ideas 
underlying them. First, an important feature of labour market contracts is the time period 
for which they are negotiated. In the real world, wage contracts can be long-term when the 
union(s) and firms have struck a bargain to stay valid in the long-run; similarly, they can be 
medium-term or short-term. The duration of wage agreements typically reflects institutional 
factors surrounding bargaining such as bargaining costs, uncertainty in the economy, among 
other factors (see e.g. Wallace, 2001; Canzoneri, 1980; Harris and Holmstrom, 1987; Danziger, 
1988).19 
A second important feature of wage contracts relates to their implications for the firms' 
innovation incentives. In this respect, a long-term contract implies commitment on the part 
of the union not to alter the wage in response to the firms' innovation. As such, a long-
term contract is likely to encourage innovation because workers commit themselves not to 
appropriate part of the rents earned on capital. This type of contract is observable in large 
Japanese companies. In these companies wage contracts act as a kind of commitment device 
against opportunistic wage increases (see Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen, 2003). We refer to 
this type of contract as foxed wage contract. 
19Uncertainty typically stems from inflation, money-supply shocks, oil price shocks and industry-specific 
characteristics. 
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It should be noted, however, that umons and firms do not always engage in long-term 
contractual relations. For example, fixed wage contracts are not commonplace in Britain and the 
U.S. As noted by Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen (2003), contracts in these countries are more 
short-term with duration up to three years. To capture this empirical observation reflecting 
shorter-term contractual agreements, we consider two different types of contracts, a short-term 
and a medium-term contract. We refer to the former as floating wage contract and to the latter 
as reference wage contract. 
Next we turn to discuss the order of moves of the games above. The different timings reflect 
an interaction between long-run and short-run decisions that may have considerable effects on 
the wage and investment levels. In particular, a floating wage contract captures the idea that 
the choice of the wage level is a short-run decision. As such, it may have an influence on longer-
run decisions, namely, the firms' investment level because firms anticipate the wage when they 
choose their investments. In contrast, a fixed wage contract reflects the idea that the choice of 
the wage level is a long-run decision, since the wage is set at the initial stage of the game and 
remains fixed thereafter. Therefore, as explained above, a fixed wage contract can be seen as a 
way of eliminating the uuion's opportunistic behaviour. A key assumption is that a fixed wage 
contract implies a great deal of commitment by the union. That is, as in Banerjee and Liu 
(2003) the union does not have an incentive to behave opportunistically and alter the wage after 
the firms' have made their investment decisions. As noted by Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen 
(2003), this is a natural assumption in the present context: commitments are not difficult to 
sustain given the absence of uncertainty and informational asymmetries between the union 
and firms. Finally, a reference wage contract which can be viewed as an 'intermediate' type 
of arrangement, requires that wages and R&D investment decisions are made simultaneously 
rather than sequentially. Consequently, in line with existing empirical evidence, the contract 
form that characterises the form of the relationship between the union and firms can be seen as 
representing a multi-dimensional concept. As is standard in the literature, the games (i), (ii) 
and (iii) are solved by backward induction. 
The profit function of firm i is given by 
71"i=(a-Qi-Qj)Qi-(C+W-Xi-(3Xj)qi, ifj, i,jE {1,2}. (3.3) 
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Maximising profits with respect to qi gives rise to the foe 
A - w - 2qi - qj + Xi + (3Xj = O. (3.4) 
The soc is given by -2 < 0, so the foe is necessary and sufficient for an (interior) optimum. 
The solution to the foes is the equilibrium of this stage game 
1 
qi = 3(A - w + (2 - (3)Xi + (2(3 - l)xj). (3.5) 
Then total output obtains 
1 Q = 3(2(A - w) + (1 + (3)(Xi + Xj)). (3.6) 
Equilibrium profits and employment, given the R&D investment and wage determined at the 
preceding stages of the game, are 
(3.7) 
The solution to the firms' R&D maximisation problem along with the union's wage selection 
are characterised in the next three sections. 
3.4 Floating wage contracts (F L) 
In the second stage, the union chooses w to maximise its objective (3.2) where the level of total 
employment is given by (3.6). The resulting foe is given by 
2(A + wo) - 4w + (1 + (3)(Xi + Xj) = O. (3.8) 
The soc of this maximisation problem is given by -4 < o. The solution to the foe is the 
equilibrium of this stage game 
1 
W(Xi, Xj) = 4:(2(A + wo) + (1 + (3) (Xi + Xj)). (3.9) 
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The wage rate increases with the workers reservation income, Wo. More interestingly, it 
increases with the firms' R&D efforts, Xi and Xj' That is, higher R&D effort lowers production 
costs and thus expands output. Greater efficiency also leads to an increase in labour demand, 
which in turn, drives up wages. 
Lemma 4 Under a floating wage contract, the wage and Rf3D investments are strategic com-
plements from the industry-wide union's perspective. 
Using (3.9), we can identify the following effects for firm i's marginal cost 
8mc; 
8Xi 
= 
= -~+~ ~ 
cost reduction effect 
1 3(3 
---4 4 
~
raising rivals' cost effect 
if. j. 
(3.10) 
(3.11) 
If (3 = 0 the right-hand side of (3.10) and (3.11) becomes, respectively, -3/4 and 1/4, 
which is the result obtained by Banerjee and Lin (2003) in the context of input price contracts 
between suppliers and retailers when n = 2. Intuitively, a marginal increase in a firm's R&D 
reduces own costs. Ceteris paribus, this leads to an increase in the demand for output, which 
in turn increases the demand for labour, making the union to push for higher wages. A higher 
wage implies not only a negative but also a positive effect for an innovating firm. The positive 
effect of a higher wage under a floating wage contract - the raising rivals' cost effect - implies 
that there is a strategic motive to carry out R&D. Importantly, the main driving force behind 
the latter derives from the fact that the labour market is organised at an industry level. As a 
result, an increase in a firm's wage deal (after it has made its R&D investment) applies to all 
downstream producers. It is also intuitive that the presence of spillovers across firms tends to 
moderate the size of the cost reduction effect and, by implication, the size of the raising rivals' 
cost effect. 
Next, substituting w into (3.5) and (3.7) yields equilibrium output, profits and employment 
as a function of the firms' R&D levels. Then at the R&D stage of the game, the profit function 
of firm i is given by 11' i(Xi, Xj) = (qi)2 - xl. Maximising the relevant expression with respect to 
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Xi and imposing symmetry Xi = Xj, we obtain the following focs 
5(1 + ,6)(19 - 5,6)Xi - (7 - 5,6)(2(A - wo) - (5 - 7,6)xj) = O. (3.12) 
Note that the soc to this problem is given by -5(19 + 14,6 - 5,62)/72 < O. It is easy to verify 
that this condition is always fulfilled. Solving the system of the focs yields the equilibrium of 
this stage game20 
FL (7 - 5,6)(A - wo) 
x· = 
, 65 - ,6(2 - 5,6) . (3.13) 
Using (3.13) and the expressions for output and wage, (3.5) and (3.9), we obtain 
n FL 12(A - wo) 
qj = lj = 65 - ,6(2 - 5,6) ; (3.14) 
wF L _ _ 36_A_+,-;;-:-w::..,o(,--;2",9 ;:--..:..,6-:-(2-;;-,--5,6,--,),"-) 
- 65 - ,6(2 - 5,6) . (3.15) 
Then from (3.14), (3.15) and (3.2) we can find union utility 
un _ ( FL _ )( FL FL) _ 864(A - WO)2 
- W Wo qj + q) - (65 _ ,6(2 _ 5,6))2 (3.16) 
Finally, each firm will make profits 
FL 5(1 + ,6)(19 - 5,6)(A - wO)2 
7ri = (65 - ,6(2 - 5,6))2 . (3.17) 
3.5 Fixed wage contracts (FI) 
We now turn to investigate the case where the union acts as a Stackelberg leader in setting the 
wage. The output selection stage of the game is the same as under the previous wage contract. 
In the second stage, however, each firm maximises profits with respect to Xi, given Xj. That is, 
1 
rnax[-(A - w + (2 - ,6)Xi + (2,6 - l)xjW - xr 
Xi 3 (3.18) 
20For (3 < (»0.71, the R&D competition game is played in strategic substitutes (complements). That is, 
8'1[,/8x,8x; = (7 - 513)( -5 + 713)/72 < (»0 if and only if 13 < (> )P, where p '" 0.71. 
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Performing the maximisation gives rise to the following foes 
(5 + 4f3 - (32)Xi - (2 - (3)(A - w + (2f3 - l)xj) = O. (3.19) 
The soc is given by -2(5 + 4f3 - (32)/9 < o. Solving the system of the foes using symmetry 
Xi = Xj, we obtain the equilibrium of this stage game21 
(A - w)(2 - (3) 
Xi(W) = 7 - f3(1 - (3) . (3.20) 
Notice that the R&D investment of a downstream firm depends negatively on the wage. 
The intuition is simple: when the union opts for a higher wage, this reduces the amount of 
money available for spending on R&D. 
Lemma 5 Under a fixed wage contmct, the wage and Rf3 D investments are strategic substitutes 
from each downstream firm's perspective. 
Together, Lemma 4 and 5 portray the conflicting objectives between the union and the 
downstream firms. Indeed, it suggests that an alternative order of moves in the selection of 
R&D and wages may lead to different results regarding investment, profits, employment and 
union utility. This, in turn, highlights how crucial is the distribution of union-firm roles that 
underlies the specification of the various forms of institutional arrangements (wage contracts) 
within this setting. 
In the first stage, the union chooses the wage that maximises its rents, anticipating how its 
decision will affect the firms' choice at the R&D selection stage. The foe yields 
6(A - 2w+wo) _ 0 
7 - f3(1 - (3) - , (3.21) 
21 For f3 < (> }1/2, the R&D competition game is played in strategic substitutes (complements). That is, 
a2,,;jaxiaXj = 2( -2 + 5(3 - 2(32)/9 < 0 if and only if (3 < (»"/3, where {J = 1/2. Furthermore, note that {J < T3. 
Intuitively, the intensity of competition under a floating wage contract is higher than under a fixed wage contract 
because a floating wage contract implies a raising rivals' costs potential. Consequently, R&D is less likely to be 
a strategic complement under a floating wage contract. 
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with associated soc -12/(7 - ,6(1 - ,6)) < O. The equilibrium wage turns out to be 
W FE = _A_+,::--w-"o 
2 . (3.22) 
Then the equilibrium solutions of the entire game follow by entering (3.22) into the expressions 
above 
FI (2 - ,6)(A - wo) 
x; = 2(7 - ,6(1 - ,6)) ; (3.23) 
FI FI 3(A - wo) 
q; = l; = 2(7 - ,6(1 - ,6)); (3.24) 
UF1 = (wF1 _ W )(qFI + qFI) = 3(A - WO)2 . 
0, J 2(7 - ,6(1 - ,6)) , (3.25) 
FI (1 + ,6)(5 - ,6)(A - wo)2 
7f; = 4(7 - ,6(1 - ,6))2 (3.26) 
3.6 Reference wage contracts (R) 
In this section, we turn to compute the equilibrium of an 'intermediate' type of institutional 
arrangement, which we refer to as a "reference wage contract" (R). A reference wage contract 
is characterised by the following sequence of moves: in the first stage, the union and firms act 
simultaneously to choose the wage and level of R&D investment, respectively. In the second 
stage, firms choose output and employment. 
We turn to discuss the nature of the reference wage equilibrium. In this case, the players 
choose simultaneously the wage and investments in R&D. Therefore, the ensuing wage is a best 
response to the firms' level of investment and vice versa. Moreover, the wage chosen by the union 
reflects the fact that the wage is a strategic complement with the firms' investment decisions 
(recall Lemma 4). This in turn implies that the union will set a higher wage as firms become 
more efficient. Therefore, because firms are competing in R&D and thus are trying to gain at 
their rivals' expense, a reference wage contract can be seen as a way of making firms compete 
less vigorously. To put it differently, the union's behaviour that is manifested according to a 
reference wage contract is effectively coordinating the firms' R&D decisions, thereby eliminating 
the possibility of excessive R&D spending. Note that the problem of excessive R&D spending is 
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more pronounced when spillovers are relatively small and would be even more so in the context 
of a patent race (see e.g. Ulph and Ulph, 1989, 1994,2001). 
We proceed to solve for the reference wage equilibrium. The equilibrium output in the last 
stage of the game is given by (3.5). Then in stage one, the union and firms, respectively, decide 
simultaneously the wage and R&D levels to maximise their objectives. Solving the system of 
(3.19) and (3.8) and invoking symmetry, Xi = Xj, we obtain the equilibrium wage-R&D pair for 
the reference wage contract game22 
R (2 - .8) (A - wo) 
Xi = 16 - .8(1 -.8) ; 
W R _ _9 A----'c+:-;w:-"o-,-( 7-,;-;-,,",.8,-,('-,1 ;-;---'...8..!..!..) )
- 16-.8(1-.8) . 
Substitutions reveal the remainder equilibrium solutions 
R R 3(A - wo) 
qi = li = 16 - .8(1 - .8); 
uR = 54(A - wof . 
(16 - .8(1 - .8))2' 
R (1 + .8)(5 - .8)(A - wO)2 
IT, =~7(1~6~-~.8~(1-'--~.8=)~)2~ 
3.7 Comparing the wage contracts 
(3.27) 
(3.28) 
(3.29) 
(3.30) 
(3.31) 
We begin our analysis by providing a classification of the wage and employment levels according 
to the type of wage contract that underlies the union-firm relationship. Our main result is stated 
in the following Proposition. 
Proposition 5 A fixed wage contract leads to the lowest wage but the highest employment level. 
That is, the following ordering obtains: 
(i) wF1 < wFL < wR , 
(ii) LfL < lfl < If!. 
22 Note that the soc for firm i and for the union are the conditions reported at stage 2 of the fixed and floating 
wage contract games) respectively. 
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Proposition 5 identifies the varying effects that the timing of wage-setting implies for wages 
and employment. Under a reference wage contract, the workers are entitled to the highest 
wage, while the lowest wage is due to a fixed wage contract. This ordering suggests that 
the relationship between wages and the duration of wage selection is non-monotone. That is, 
wages are intermediate for a floating (or short-term) institutional arrangement and highest 
for a reference (or medium-term) wage arrangement. In particular, comparing the wage rates 
for a floating and a fixed wage contract, we find that the former is always dominant. The 
rationale is simple: under a fixed wage arrangement, unlike a floating wage one, the wage is set 
before the firms' selection of R&D and, as a consequence, the wage is not conditioned on the 
investment level.23 Indeed, a floating wage contract reflects an opportunistic behaviour by the 
trade union - in response to downstream innovation. That is, by raising the wage level after 
firms have invested in R&D, the industry union can extract some of the rents resulting from the 
firms' innovation activity. Furthermore, our finding regarding employment levels is intuitively 
appealing, suggesting that firms will be willing to hire the most workers under the F I regime. 
The predictions above also suggest the type of contract that is most conducive to innovation. 
As firms anticipate the opportunistic behaviour of the trade union that underlies a floating 
wage arrangement, they would be willing to undertake larger investments under a credible 
commitment on the wage level, namely a fixed wage contract. We can therefore state the 
following result: 
Proposition 6 A fixed wage contract generates the largest innovation; i.e., xiI> xf > x;L. 
Proposition 6 shows that a fixed wage institutional arrangement generates the largest in-
vestment. The reason is that under this contractual regime, the problem that stems from the 
opportunistic behaviour of the trade union, namely setting a higher wage after investment is 
sunk, vanishes. In turn, this suggests that a fixed wage settlement can promote innovation 
relative to any other type of arrangement, where the wage rate is not (ex ante) specified. Thus, 
a fixed wage contract can be viewed as representing a commitment device against the union's 
reaction to the firms' investment decisions, which, in turn, tends to encourage R&D spending. 
23 In other words, under a fixed wage contract the union commits credibly to a wage level, which remains 
unaltered after firms have invested in R&D. 
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What are the implications for empirical work of the present result? Empirical studies report 
conflicting evidence concerning the relationship between unionism and spending on R&D (for 
instance, Connolly et aI., 1986; Machin and Wadhwani, 1991; Hirsch, 1992; Menezes-Filho et 
aI., 1998a, b). Interestingly, while for the case of the US empirical evidence points towards a 
negative association between unions and R&D, it turns out that there is no consistent empirical 
pattern for the case of Europe. The empirical literature to date has only used union density 
and/or strike activity as proxies for the union bargaining power, given that the latter is not 
observable. Thus, our results may be viewed as suggesting that the duration of wage contracts 
(or equivalently, the time horizon for which wages are set) may shed new light on the relationship 
between unionisation and R&D. Further empirical research is therefore required to confirm 
whether this theoretical argument can be valid. 
We are now in position to characterise the union's preferences over the set of wage contracts, 
were the union able to choose one. The next Proposition offers the result: 
Proposition 7 Under a foxed wage contract, the industry-wide union's utility is maximised; 
i.e., UFI > U R > U FL . 
From Proposition 5, the relevant forces to determine the size of the wage bill (above the 
reservation wage) are the wage and employment levels. It turns out that the latter has a 
larger impact on union utility: although wages are the lowest under a fixed wage contract, 
employment is the highest among all conceivable regimes. This observation suggests that a 
fixed wage contract is the union's most preferred scenario. Combining Propositions 6 and 7, 
we can readily identify a positive and one-ta-one relationship between investment and union 
utility: a fixed wage contract implies the highest level of investment and union utility. 
Next, we compare the profit of the different contract types. Starting with a floating and 
a fixed wage contract, we know that in the former case it remains in the union's discretion 
to adjust the wage in response to R&D. Hence, as already discussed, a marginal increase in 
firm i's R&D will influence own profit in two main ways: (a) by lowering own costs and (b) 
by raising the costs of rival firms. Note further that effect (a) is larger under a fixed wage 
contract, because in this case the wage is not conditioned on the amount of R&D (i.e. the 
hold-up problem is absent). Effect (b), however, is absent under a fixed wage contract. It 
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turns out that the raising rivals' cost effect of a floating wage contract is not strong enough to 
compensate for the associated lower efficiency. It is thus not surprising that rr;! > rr;D By 
analogous reasoning, lower wages under a fixed wage contract work towards higher investment 
and profits relative to a reference wage contract. 
Proposition 8 (i) A fixed wage contract leads to the highest profits, rrt > rr;L, rr;! > 
and it will be always preferred by the firms. 
R 7r i , 
(ii) There exists a threshold value ~ such that rr;L < rr{l if and only if f3 > ~, and rr;L > rr{l 
otherwise. 
Result (i) that all firms are better off under a fixed wage contract coincides with Banerjee and 
Lin (2003). In Banerjee and Lin (2003) there are no technological spillovers among downstream 
firms, that is, R&D is perfectly protected against imitation. One might wonder how the presence 
of spillovers in our setting affects this result. An understanding of the influence that spillovers 
have on the marginal returns to R&D and, as a consequence, on equilibrium profits, requires us 
to analyse how spillovers affect the size of the two main forces determining the desirability of 
a floating wage contract, namely, the cost reduction and the raising rivals' cost effect. Notice 
from eq. (3.10) and (3.11) that spillovers tend to make both effects weaker. In particular, the 
size of cost reduction is reduced by the term ~, whereas the raising rivals' cost effect becomes 
less important according to the term ¥. The prospects of the R&D incentives under a floating 
wage contract thus depend on the magnitude of these two terms. Clearly, the latter term is 
greater than the former, which implies that it is less likely that a floating wage contract will 
make the firms better off in the presence of spillovers. A finding suggesting that the (implicit) 
assumption of perfect patent protection by Banerjee and Lin (2003) is "innocuous" concerning 
the relationship between floating and fixed wage contracts in the present setting. This, however, 
does not hold true regarding the relationship between floating and reference wage contracts, as 
part (ii) of Proposition 8 indicates. 
Interestingly, the ranking in part (ii) depends on the extent of spillovers. As mentioned 
above, a floating wage contract implies a raising rivals' cost effect. This effect, however, vanishes 
both under a fixed and a reference wage contract. According to Proposition 8(ii), a firm will 
choose a floating wage contract if spillovers are relatively weak. The reason is that in this case a 
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firm can raise its rivals costs - without hurting itself as much - due to increases in its own wage 
induced by R&D spillovers. In contrast, when spillovers are relatively intense, an innovating 
firm will prefer a reference wage contract.24 
Using the results in Propositions 7 and 8 we conclude the following: 
Corollary 1 The preferences of the union and firms over the choice of wage contmct can fully 
be aligned if and only if (3 > ~. 
Then from Propositions 5, 6, 7 and 8 the following result is immediate: 
Proposition 9 A fixed wage contmct leads to the highest level of social welfare; i.e. SWFI > 
SWR > SW FL . 
Proposition 9 suggests that the union and firms will always prefer to engage in a fixed wage 
contractual relation - independently of the extent of spillovers. Under a fixed wage contract the 
union will act as a Stackelberg leader (in setting a uniform wage), while the firms will be the 
followers. Recall from Proposition 6 that this contract type promotes innovation relative to any 
other institutional arrangement. A higher investment will lower the firms' marginal cost. This, 
in turn, reduces the market price and expands output, leading to higher consumer surplus. In 
addition, according to Propositions 7 and 8, union utility and the firms' profits are higher when 
wages are set under a fixed wage contract. Therefore, a fixed wage relationship will not only 
be preferred by firms and the labour union but will also lead to higher total surplus than the 
level achieved under a floating or a reference wage contract. Social welfare under the different 
contractual regimes is presented below. 
Define social welfare as the (unweighted) sum of consumer surplus, firm profits and union 
utility. That is, 
(3.32) 
Using the equilibrium solutions in sections 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6, ·we can obtain the following 
expressions for the cases of the floating, fixed and reference wage contracts 
SW FL = 2(671 + 5(3(14 - 5(3))(A - wo? 
(65 - i3(2 - 5(3))2 , (3.33) 
24 A reference wage contract generates larger investment while wages will be higher too. 
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swFI = (35 + (3(1 + 2(3))(A - wo? 
2(7 - (3(1 - (3))2 ' 
SW R = 2(41 + (3(4 - (3))(A - wO)2 
(16 - (3(1 - (3))2 
(3.34) 
(3.35) 
Comparing the expressions above, we obtain: SWFI - SWR > 0 and SW R - SW FL > 0; 
hence, SW FI > SWFD 
swFI _ SWR = 3(308 + 216(3 - 135(32 - 23(33 + 9(34 - 9(35 + 2(36)(A - WO)2. 
2(7 - (3(1 - )3))2(16 - (3(1 - (3))2 ' 
swR _ SWFL = 18(161 + 1088(3 + 894(32 + 32(33 + 65(34)(A - wO)2 
(16 - (3(1 - (3))2(65 - (3(2 - 5(3))2 
3.8 Extensions 
(3.36) 
(3.37) 
Our model is rather stylised and so it is natural to examine the robustness of our results. 
Below we investigate how our results may change when we allow for decentralised wage setting, 
Bertrand competition, the wage to be conditioned on R&D under a fixed wage contract and 
more general functional forms. 
3.8.1 Firm-specific unions 
In the main body of this chapter we have assumed the presence of an industry-wide union. 
One might wonder what would happen if we assume instead that wage setting is completely 
decentralised and takes place at the level of each individual enterprise, which is consistent with 
recent trends in Europe (see OECD, 2004). Thus, we assume that the industry now consists 
of two firm-union pairs. For tractability, we maintain the assumption that each firm-level 
union sets the wage unilaterally, taking as given the wage set by the other union, whereas the 
employment decision remains at the firms' discretion inside each firm-union pair (monopoly 
union model). 
When the type of wage contract is not selected, and thus is exogenously specified, there are 
two cases to consider. First, we have to compare between the cases that both firm-union pairs 
choose either a floating or a fixed wage contract.25 In this scenario, it is easy to see that a fixed 
2''''We restrict attention to this comparison which is the most interesting case, neglecting the case of a reference 
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wage contract will always be preferred by the unions and firms. The intuition is simple: under 
industry-wide unionisation and floating wage contracting, we have identified two main effects 
related to R&D: the cost reduction effect and the raising rivals' cost effect. Even though under 
a fixed wage contract the latter effect is absent, we argued that the sole cost reduction effect 
under a fixed wage contract dominates the combined influence of the cost reduction and raising 
rivals' cost effects under a floating wage contract. Notice, however, that in the presence of 
two firm-level unions the raising rivals' cost potential associated with a floating wage contract 
vanishes. It follows that a fixed wage arrangement will always yield a higher level of profits and 
union utility relative to a floating wage arrangement, which reinforces the result of our basic 
model. 
The second case to consider is when one firm-union pair sticks to a fixed wage contract, 
whereas the other firm-union pair opts for a floating wage contract. Without loss of generality, 
suppose that firm-union 1 has chosen a fixed wage relation while firm-union 2 has entered a 
floating wage relationship. For simplicity, let Wo = 0.26 
The profit function of firm i is given by: 
(3.38) 
In the last stage, firm i chooses qi to maximise its profit for given qj. The resulting focs are 
given by: 
A - qj - 2qi - Wi + Xi + fJXj = O. (3.39) 
The associated soc is always fulfilled, -2 < O. Hence, the focs are necessary as well as sufficient 
for an (interior) optimum. Solving the system of the focs in (3.39), we obtain the equilibrium 
of this stage game: 
A - 2Wi + Wj + (2 - fJ)Xi + (2fJ - l)xj 
~= 3 . (3.40) 
Substituting the resulting expressions for qi and qj into (3.38), we can express the profit of firm 
i as a function of the investment levels (Xi, Xj) and the wages (Wi' Wj). 
In stage two, firm 1 chooses its R&D level to maximise its profit, while union 2 chooses its 
wage contract. 
26Note that this assumption is made without loss of generality. 
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wage to maximise its rents. The utility of union i is given by Ui = Wili, i E {1, 2}. Ensuing focs 
turn out to be, respectively: 
(2 - (3)(A - 2Wl + W2 + (2f3 - 1)x2) - (5 - (3)(1 + (3)XI = 0, 
(3.41) 
The socs for firm 1 and union 2, respectively, are -(5 - (3)(1 + (3) < 0 and -4 < O. Solving the 
focs with respect to Xl and W2, we obtain the following reaction functions: 
( ) _ (2 - (3)(A - 2Wl + W2 + (2f3 - 1)x2) Xl W2 - (5 - (3)(1 + (3) , 
(3.42) 
Note that dx!/dw2 = (2-f3)/(5-f3)(1+f3) > O. Intuitively, union 2 recognises that an increase 
in its own wage reduces the R&D investment and market share of its own firm, given that firm-
union pair 2 enters a floating wage relation. A reduction in the market share of firm 2 increases 
the sales of firm 1,27 and this enables firm 1 to increase its R&D spending, because an increase 
in R&D at higher demand for output is more valuable. Moreover, dw2/dxl = (2f3 - 1)/4; thus 
dW2/ dXI > 0 if and only if f3 > 0.5. When the spillover is large enough, an increase in the R&D 
of firm 1 expands the market share of firm 2 by increasing its R&D investment and thereby 
increases the available rents to be shared between firm 2 and its own union. This, in turn, leads 
to a higher wage for firm-union pair 2. The equilibrium of this stage game is the solution to 
the system of equations (3.42): 
(2 - (3)(5A - 7Wl + (7f3 - 1)x2) 
Xl = 22 + f3(1l - 2(3) , (3.43) 
3(8 - x2(2 - (3)(2 + (32) 
W2 = 22 + f3(1l - 2(3) . (3.44) 
In stage one, union 1 sets Wl and firm 2 chooses X2, taking the decisions of each other as 
27 Output decisions are strategic substitutes. 
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given. The focs of this maximisation problem are as follows: 
5A + (7(3 - 2)X2 - 14wl = 0, 
4(2 - (3)(2 + (32)A(1 + (3(3 - (3) + Wl (3 - (3(2 - (3)) - ZX2 = O. (3.45) 
where Z = (14 + (3(15 - 6(3 + 2(32))(30 + (3(7 + 2(3 - 2(32)). The associated socs are -14 < 0 
and -(14 + (3(15 - 6(3 + 2(32))(30 + (3(7 + 2(3 - 2f32)) < O. Rearranging the focs gives us the 
reaction functions: 
5A + x2(7(3 - 2) 
W -
1 - 14 ' 
4(2 - (3)(2 + (32)A(1 + (3(3 - (3) + w1(3 - f3(2 - (3)) 
X2= Z . (3.46) 
Note that dwt/dx2 = (7(3 - 2)/14 > 0 if and only if (3 > 0.286, and 
dX2 4(3 - (3(2 - (32))(4 - (3(2 - 2(3 + (32)) 
dW1 = Z > O. 
The intuition is similar to that elaborated on at stage two of the game. Solving the system 
(3.46) leads to: 
* A(22 + (3(11 - 2(3))(94 + f3(79 - 26(3 + 12(32 - 4f33) 
W1FI = 2B1 ' (3.4 7) 
* 2A(2 - (3)(2 + (32)(29 + f3(32 - 9f3)) 
X2FL = B1 ' (3.48) 
. where B1 = 2988 - (3( -3612 + 77(3 + 2(32(46 + 27(3 - 26(32 + 7(33)). Substituting wjF[ and x 2FL 
in the solutions at the preceding stages of the game we obtain: 28 
* 3A(22 + (3(11 - 2(3)) (29 + (3(32 - 9(3)) 
W2FL = 2B1 ' (3.49) 
* 7 A(2 - (3)B2 
x1FI = 2B1 
(3.50) 
28The expressions for utility of the firm-level unions are very lengthy, and so we report their difference only. 
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(3.51) 
• _[' A(638 + ,6(1023 + 96{3 - 163{32 + 18,63)) 
q2FL = 2FL = BI ' 
(3.52) 
, A2(29 + ,6(32 - 9,6))Z 
7r2FL = B2 ' 
I 
(3.53) 
where B2 = 94 + ,6(79 - 26,6 + 12,62 - 4,63). We are now ready to compare the expressions 
above. That is, 
(3.54) 
A(154 - 297{3 - 179,62 + 309,63 + 42,64 - 68,65 + 8{36) 
= 2B1 >0 
if and only if,6 < 0.5, (3.55) 
, , A(698 - 387{3 - 738{32 + 578{34 - 120,64) 
qlFf - q2FL = 2BI > 0, (3.56) 
, • 3A2B4 ( ) UIFf - U2FL = 4(BI)2 > 0, 3.58 
where B3 = 751940 + 409044,6 - 1944091,62 - 767356,63 + 1183211,64 - 32204{35 - 236912,66 + 
33592{37 + 21824,68 - 6560,69 + 512{31D, and B4 = 546656 + 356884,6 - 1109788{32 - 365811,63 + 
721362,64 - 38420,65 - 128034,66 + 41640,67 - 10504,68 + 2576{39 - 224,610 > O. 
The results above indicate that the profit of a firm facing a fixed wage contract is higher than 
the profit of a firm facing a floating wage contract when the spillover is not too large. This result 
hinges on two effects. First is the efficiency effect of a fixed wage contract: higher investment 
reduces own costs and thereby increases output. This direct effect is further reinforced by the 
decrease in the demand for output of the rival firm. Second, a floating wage contract transforms 
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a firm into a Stackelberg leader in the R&D competition game. It turns out that the former 
effect will dominate the latter when the spillover is not too large - and in this case a firm-union 
pair will collectively prefer a fixed wage contract. This in turn, implies that our main result 
regarding the desirability of a fixed wage contract remains, to a large extent, robust the level 
of wage setting specification (degree of centralisation). 
3.8.2 Bertrand competition 
In our basic model we have assumed that firms compete in quantities. Next, we discuss the 
case of price competition. The analysis is in general quite complicated. For this reason we 
restrict attention to the case of no technological spillovers between the downstream firms.29 
This assumption, though, is not expected to affect our main results in important ways, because 
the desirability of a fixed wage contract is due to the higher efficiency it generates, which is 
largely independent of the extent of spillovers. Note that the same assumption is also made by 
Banerjee and Lin (2003). Therefore, our derivations yield the same equilibrium outcomes as in 
their article. For completeness, we illustrate below the derivations of the solutions for all cases 
considered according to our basic model and present the results of the relevant comparisons as 
well. 
The linear demand system Pi = a - qi - .rqj, i # j, i,j E {I, 2}, can be inverted to yield 
the demand functions as:30 
a Pi "(pj 
qi(Pi,Pj)=-l+ --1--2 +-1--2 ' i#j, i,jE{1,2}, 
"( -"( -"( 
(3.59) 
where "( E [0,1) represents an exogenous measure of the degree of product substitutability. 
That is, the higher is "(, the closer substitutes the products of the downstream firms are. We 
begin our analysis with the case of a floating wage contract. 
29This can be interpreted as saying that firms operate under a very efficient patent system, i.e. (3 = O. 
30To obtain this demand system one could alternatively maximise the utility function U(qll q2) = a(ql + q2) -
(1/2)(q? + q~ + ,QlQ2) + rn, where m denotes the consumption of a numeraire commodity. 
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Floating wage contracts 
This game has three stages. In stage one, firms choose their R&D levels. The union then 
chooses its wage in stage two, and firms compete in prices in stage three. Note that the cost 
structures of the firms are given by C;(W,Xi) = C+W-Xi. Solving the game above by backward 
induction, in the last stage firm i chooses Pi taking Pj as given in order to maximise its profit 
(Pi - C;)qi. Ensuing focs for firm i are given by: 
a(1 - "I) + C; + -YPj - 2Pi = O. (3.60) 
The associated soc is negative, -2 < 0, so the focs are necessary as well as sufficient for an 
(interior) optimum. Solving the system of the focs above, we obtain the equilibrium of this 
stage game: 
P
.(c. c.) = a(1 - "1)(2 + "I) + 2c; + -YCj 
t "'ll J 4 2 
-"I 
(3.61) 
Then, from the production function qi = li, (3.59) and (3.61), we can find total employment as 
follows: 
(3.62) 
where the subscript B denotes Bertrand competition. 
In the preceding stage, the union maximises its rents (w - WO)lB(W' Xi, Xj) with respect to 
w. To simplify our derivations, we set without loss of generality, Wo = O. The resulting foes to 
this problem are: 
2A + Xi + Xj - 4w = O. (3.63) 
The soc is given by -4 < O. Solving with respect to W yields: 
(3.64) 
At the R&D selection stage, each downstream firm chooses its R&D level to maximise its 
profit (Pi - C - W + Xi)qi - X;' The resulting foes are given by: 
(3.65) 
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where 8 = 220 - 12")' - 349")'2 + 6")'3 + 135")'4 - 16")'6 > O. The associated soc is given by 
-(220 - 12")' - 349")'2 + 6")'3 + 135")'4 - 16")'6) < O. Rearranging gives rise to the following R&D 
reaction functions: 
x () _ (6 + ")'(1 - 3")'))[2A(2 - ")'(1 + ")')) - xj(2 + ")'(3 - ")'))] 
,B xJ - 220 _ 12")' _ 349")'2 + 6")'3 + 135")'4 _ 16")'6 . (3.66) 
Solving the system of the R&D reaction functions in (3.66), we obtain the equilibrium level of 
R&D: 
Substituting (3.67) into (3.64) yields the equilibrium wage: 
W FL iB 
4A(2 - ")')2(1 + ")')(2 + ")') 
58 + ")'(31 - 45")' - 8")'2 + 8")'3) . 
(3.67) 
(3.68) 
Substitution of (3.67) and (3.68) into the expressions for union utility, profit and the production 
function reveals the equilibrium solutions: 
~FL 
"iB 
Fixed wage contracts 
uFL _ 32A2(2 - ")')2(4 - ")'2)(1 + ")')(2 + ")') 
B - [58 + ")'(31 - 45")' - 8")'2 + 8")'3)]2 , 
A2[220 - ")'(12 + 349")' - 6")'2 - 135")'3 + 16")'5] 
[58 + ")'(31 - 45")' - 8")'2 + 8")'3) J2 
FL = lFL = 4A(4 - ")'2) 
q,B ,B 58 + ")'(31 - 45,,), - 8")'2 + 8")'3)' 
(3.69) 
(3.70) 
(3.71) 
In this case, the union chooses its wage in stage one; each firm then chooses its R&D level, and 
finally firms choose their prices. Equilibrium prices in the last stage are given by (3.61). 
In the preceding stage, each firm maximises its profit (pi - c - W + Xi)qi - xr with respect 
to Xi. The ensuing focs are given by: 
(2 - ")'2) [A(2 - ")'(1 + ")')) + w( -2 + ")'(1 + ")')) - ")'Xj] - 8tXi = 0, (3.72) 
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and only if, E [0,0.932526). Hence, for these values of, each firm's payoff is strictly concave 
in own action Xi, so that the focs are necessary as well as sufficient for an (interior) optimum. 
Rearranging the focs above leads to the following R&D reaction functions: 
(3.73) 
The solution to the system of R&D reaction functions is the equilibrium of this stage game: 
(3.74) 
From the production function qi = li and (3.74), (3.59), (3.61), total employment turns out to 
be: 
l' 2(A-w)(4-,2) 
B(W) = 6+,(4 _ 5,_,2 +,3)" (3.75) 
In stage one, the industry-wide union chooses W to maximise its objective wl'B(w). This 
gives rise to: 
A - 2w = o. 
Solving with respect to w gives us the equilibrium of the wage selection stage game: 
Substitution of (3.77) into (3.74) reveals the equilibrium investment level: 
FI A(2 - ,2) 
XiB = 2[6+,(4-5,-,2+,3))" 
From (3.77) and (3.78), we obtain the rest of the equilibrium solutions: 
FI _ A2[12 +,2(-20+8,2 _,4)[ 
"iB - 4[6 + ,(4 - 5,_,2 + ,3)]2 , 
lFI = FI = A(4 _,2) 
,B q,B 2[6 + ,(4 _ 5, _,2 + ,3)]" 
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(3.76) 
(3.77) 
(3.78) 
(3.79) 
(3.80) 
(3.81) 
Reference wage contracts 
The timing of the game unveils as follows: in stage one, the union and firms simultaneously 
and independently choose the wage and R&D levels, respectively, to maximise their objectives; 
subsequently the downstream firms set their prices. As in the previous games, equilibrium 
prices are given by (3.61). In the preceding stage, one, the foes for the union and the firms 
are given byeq. (3.63) and (3.72), respectively. Solving the system of these foes gives us the 
equilibrium wage and investment as follows: 
A(2 - 'i) 
xfk = -=-14-:--+-1-(;::8-----':-1:-11-----'---:2=-1"2-+---=-21--03>7)' 
R _ A(2 - 1)2(2 + 1)(1 + 1) 
wB - 14 + 1(8 - 111 - 212 + 213)' 
Substitutions reveal the rest of the equilibrium solutions: 
Comparison 
uR _ 2A2(2 - 1)2(4 - 12)(2 + 1)(1 + 1) 
B - [14 + 1(8 - 111 - 212 + 213)]2 , 
R A2[12 - 12( -20 + 812 - 14)1 
?riB = [14 + 1(8 - 111 - 212 + 213)]2' 
(3.82) 
(3.83) 
(3.84) 
(3.85) 
Below we compare R&D investments, union utility and firm profits under the three regimes. 
From (3.78) and (3.82) we obtain: 
FI R A(2 - 12)2 
xiB - xiB = 2[6 + 1(4 _ 51 _ 12 + 13)][14 + 1(8 _ 111 _ 212 + 213)1 > O. (3.86) 
Similarly from (3.82) and (3.67) we have that: 
R FL 2A( 4 - 12]2(1 - 12) 
xiB - XiB - > 0 
- [58 + 1(31 - 451 - 812 + 813)][14 + 1(8 - 111 - 212 + 213)] . (3.87) 
It follows that x[J > x[tf, and therefore the result in Proposition 6 carries over to the case of 
price competition. The reason for this outcome has been explained in the main body of our 
analysis. 
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Next, we examine whether Proposition 7 continues to hold under price competition. Using 
equations (3.79), (3.84) and (3.69) we have the following: 
(3.88) 
uR _ UFL = 2A2(4 _{2)3(114 + 63{- 203{2 - 79{3 + 105{4 + 16{5 - 16{6) > 0 (3.89) 
B B [58 + {(31 - 45{- 8{2 + 8{3)12[14 + {(8 - 11{ - 2{2 + 2{3)]2 . 
It follows that ut/ > ut? and hence Proposition 7 continues to hold under Bertrand compe-
tition. 
Finally we investigate what happens in the case of Proposition 8, paying particular attention 
to part (i), which compares profits under a fixed wage contract with profits under a reference 
and a floating wage contract. Taking the relevant differences, we can confirm once again that 
the variable over which competition takes place in the product market is not important for our 
results. 
(3.90) 
where S = 624 + 384{- 1856{2 - 928{3 + 2124{4 + 784{5 - 1224{6 - 304{7 + 380{8 + 56{9 -
61{1O _4{11 +4{12 > O. The latter expression is positive for every {such that the soc is satisfied 
- i.e. for every { E [0,0.932526). From equations (3.80) and (3.70) we obtain: 
(3.91) 
where I = 8688 + 2640{- 27108{2 - 6744{3 + 31544{4 + 5816{5 - 17868{6 - 2284{7 + 5355{8 + 
430{9 - 825{1O - 32{11 + 52{12, which is positive for every value of { that satisfies the soc, 
{ E [0,0.932526). Thus, part (i) of Proposition 8 holds under price competition too. 
As for part (ii), from (3.85) and (3.70) we have that: 
FL R Rv 
7r iB - 7r iB = "[ 5:::8-+-{""'(;:::3::-1 ---4""5-{---:8=-{"2 -+-:8=-{"'3 )"']2"'[ 1""4:-+-{ (7.::8-----:-:11:-{----=-2{--;;2:-+--=-2{-;;3""')]2 , (3.92) 
where V = 172 + 236{- 313{2 - 418{3 + 212{4 + 214{5 - 83{6 - 32{7 + 12{8 > O. Indeed, we 
are able to confirm part (ii) of Proposition 8 for the case that (3 = o. 
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3.8.3 Fixed wage contract - Conditioning the wage on R&D 
Throughout the analysis of the fixed wage equilibrium we have assumed that the union cannot 
condition the wage on the amount of R&D firms do. In our analysis, only the R&D is conditioned 
on the wage since, according to the order of moves under a fixed wage contract, the union first 
sets the wage, then firms invest in R&D and finally they compete in quantities. Thus, one 
might wonder how our results would change if the union conditions the wage on the level of 
R&D investment too, which has been used in the union-oligopoly literature (see e.g. Ulph and 
Ulph, 1996). 
In particular, under ex ante bargaining, unions and firms negotiate over everything - R&D, 
wages, employment - the latter two conditional on the outcome of the patent race that firms 
are engaged in.:ll As demonstrated by Ulph and Ulph (1996), when the amount of R&D is part 
of the negotiation agenda, the union bears directly some of the R&D costs. :12 Interestingly, the 
same thing occurs here - the union shares part of the R&D costs. That is, by setting a higher 
wage, the union makes the firms spend less on R&D. A lower level of investment reduces the 
demand for labour and thereby reduces the utility that accrues to the union. In other words, 
the union hurts itself by choosing too high a wage, much as lower utility arises in the floating 
wage equilibrium of our basic model. Therefore, firms will carry out more R&D when the wage 
is conditioned on the amount of R&D spending. In this case, the efficiency of a fixed wage 
contract, which is the main driving force behind the desirability of this contract type, would 
increase - thus reinforcing the results of our basic model. 
3.8.4 Beyond the linear Cournot model 
The setting presented in this chapter is rather special. Therefore it will be important to discuss 
the extent to which the functional forms employed matter for our results. 
Our main results presented in Propositions 7, 8 and Corollary 1 can be summarised as 
follows. First, a fixed wage contract can make both the firms and the union better off. Second, 
the preferences of the two parties - union and firms - over the type of wage contract can be 
31 Under ex post bargaining though R&D h; not part of the negotiation agenda (Ulph and U\ph, 1994, 1998). 
:!2The intuition is that a higher wage reduces the probability of winning the R&D race and hence can lower 
the level of the union utility if instead the rival firm innovates. 
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aligned when the spillover is not too small (recall Corollary 1). These results, as explained 
above, are driven by a comparison between the relative magnitude of the two main strategic 
forces operating in the model - the cost reduction (or efficiency) effect and the raising rivals' 
cost effect. As Banerjee and Lin (2003) have shown, the presence of both effects is independent 
of the particular form that cost and demand functions can take. Therefore, in a more general 
oligopoly model, our results would still follow from a recognition that R&D spending has a dual 
role: it reduces own costs but also - under a floating wage contract - it contributes towards 
raising rivals' costs. In a model with these features, we would expect our main findings to go 
through, keeping the rest of the assumptions fixed. 33 The intuition is as follows. Consider first 
the result that a fixed wage contract leads to the highest level of profits and union utility. The 
level of profits follows from the fact that a fixed wage contract acts as a kind of commitment 
device for the union and hence causes firms to do more R&D. A higher investment enables 
firms to expand their market share and output so the union benefits itself. Thus our first result 
derives from the efficiency effect of a fixed wage contract, and the nature this effect - depending 
on the sequencing of R&D and wage setting - is largely independent of the specific form of the 
demand and cost functions. As shown above, this effect is also to a large extent robust to 
whether spillovers are present, the degree of wage setting centralisation and the variable over 
which competition takes place in the product market. 
Next we discuss the extent to which functional forms matter for Corollary 1. This builds on 
Propositions 7 and 8 so it remains to discuss the importance of the functions we have used for 
the comparison between a floating and a reference wage contract. The intuition is as follows. A 
floating wage contract implies that the union acts as a Stackelberg follower and hence leads to 
a lower level of utility than a reference wage contract. Again, this result is an implication of the 
order of moves so we would expect it to be robust to the form of the demand and cost functions. 
Finally, a reference wage contract makes a firm better off than a floating wage contract when 
the spillover is large enough. This result is driven by the raising rivals' cost effect of a floating 
wage contract, which is independent of the functional forms used (see Banerjee and Lin, 2003). 
Thus, it is important to recognise that consideration of a more general setting may provide new 
insights of interest, it seems though unlikely to reverse the main findings of this chapter. 
a:1 In our model, there is no uncertainty and firms have complete information on each other's actions. 
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3.9 Conclusion 
The key purpose of the present study has been to asseSs the effects of different contract types 
on investment, profits, employment and union utility, rather than to explain how one contract 
type emerges over the other in a unionised oligopoly.:!4 Alternative contract forms specify the 
sequencing of R&D investment and wage determination. In particular, a fixed wage contract 
describes the situation in which an industry-wide union sets the wage before the firms make 
their R&D decisions, whereas a floating wage contract requires that the order of these choices 
is reversed. 
Our results suggest that a floating wage contract leads to higher wages: higher downstream 
efficiency results in higher wages due to a higher labour demand, given that the union sets 
the wage following the firms' investment decisions. A higher wage tends to discourage R&D 
spending. There is, however, a potential countervailing effect: a floating wage contract implies 
a raising rivals' cost effect, which is a strategic incentive for a firm to invest in cost-reduction. 
This effect is clearly absent for a fixed wage contract, where the wage is set prior to the firms' 
investment decisions. We have shown that the strategic motive for cost reducing investment 
is not strong enough to compensate for the lower efficiency of a floating wage contract. Thus, 
a fixed wage contract promotes R&D spending and thereby increases profits and union utility 
relative to a floating wage arrangement. 
Finally, our findings may guide future empirical research regarding the relationship between 
unions and R&D. Such an attempt is particularly relevant provided that the results in the 
received literature are mixed. More precisely, empirical tests could go along the lines of the 
following claims: (i) wages are lower and less volatile for fixed (or long-term) wage contracts 
relative to floating (or short-term) wage contracts. (ii) Since fixed wage contracts smooth wages, 
34 One possible extension would be to endogenise the choice over the contract type in the following way. 
Considering a framework with two downstream firms each locked in a bilateral monopoly situation with an 
upstream labour union, we could postulate that a particular configuration of wage contracts remains stable 
unless either the firm and/or the union inside a firm/union pair are in favour of switching to another contract 
type. Or, equivalently, if neither the firm nor the union, inside a firm/union pair, has an incentive to switch 
to another contract type configuration, then, and only then, the candidate configuration can be ~mstained in 
equilibrium. In this case, it can be shown that fixed wage contracts will emerge across firm-union pairs, with 
the exception of relatively risk averse unions. The reason is that when the unions have a strong preference over 
employment, they will not push for very large wage increases under a floating wage contract, anticipating the 
negative effect of doing so on the ensuing level of employment. 
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innovation and employment are expected to be higher and less volatile under fixed than under 
floating wage contracts. This analysis should offer practical advice that may help distinguish 
between different contract types, which are implemented by unions and firms in actual practice. 
3.10 Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 5: We begin with part (i). From (3.28) and (3.15) we obtain 
R FL 9(1 + ,8j2(A - wo) 
w - w = (16 _ ,8(1 _ ,8))(65 _ ,8(2 _ 5,8)) > O. (A3.1) 
Similarly, from (3.15) and (3.22) we have that: 
FL _ FE _ (7 + 2,8 - 5,82)(A - wo) 0 
w w - 2(65 _ ,8(2 - 5,8)) >. (A3.2) 
From (A3.1) and (A3.2) it is immediate that w R > w FE . This completes the proof. 
Next we show part (ii). From (3.24) and (3.29) we obtain 
FE R 3(2 +,8 _B2)(A - wo) 
I; - I; = 2(7 _ ,8(1 _ ,8))(16 _ ,8(1 -,8)) > O. (A3.3) 
From (3.29) and (3.14) we obtain 
IR _ In = 3(1 + ,8j2(A - wo) O. 
, , (16 - ,8(1 - ,8))(65 - ,8(2 - 5,8)) > (A3.4) 
Using the results in (A3.3) and (A3.4) we obtain that If! > IfL, which completes the proof. 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 6: From (3.23) and (3.27) we obtain 
FE R (1 + ,8)(2 - ,8)2(A - wo) 
Xi - Xi = 2(7 _ ,8(1 _ ,8))(16 _ ,8(1 _ ,8)) > O. (A3.5) 
From (3.27) and (3.13) we obtain 
R FL 18(1 + ,8)(A - wo) 
Xi - Xi = (16 _ ,8(1 _ ,8))(65 _ ,8(2 _ 5,8)) > O. (A3.6) 
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It follows that XiI > x;L and the proof is complete. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 7: From (3.25) and (3.30) we have that: 
FI R 3(2 + (3 - (32?(A - wO)2 
U - U = 2(7 _ (3(1 _ (3))(16 _ (3(1 _ (3))2 > o. (A3.7) 
From (3.30) and (3.16) we get: 
uR _ UFI- = 162(1 + (3)2(43 - 2(3 + 3(32)(A - wo? o. 
(16 - (3(1 - (3))2(65 - (3(2 - 5(3))2 > (A3.8) 
It follows that U FI > U FL and therefore the proof is complete. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 8: First we prove part (i). Taking the difference of (3.26) and 
(3.17) gives us: 
7r FI _ 7rFI- = 3(835 + 2400,8 + 375,82 - 688(33 + 357(34 - 120,85 + 25(36)(A - wO)2 > o. 
, , 4(7 - (3(1 - (8))2(65 - ,8(2 - 5(3))2 (A3.9) 
Similarly, we establish the sign of the following difference: 
FI R _ 3(1 + (8)2(100 - 80(3 + 27(32 - 8(33 + (34)(A - wo? 0 
7r; - 7r; - 4(7 _ (3(1 - (3))2(16 - ,8(1 - (8))2 > . (A3.1O) 
This completes part (i) of the proof. 
Next we proceed to part (ii). Taking the difference 7rf - 7r;L gives us: 
R FL 9G(A - wO)2 
7r; - 7r; = (16 _ (3(1 - (3))2(65 - ,8(2 - 5(3))2' (A3.11) 
where G = -355 + 80,8 + 390,82 - 16,83 + 29,84. The sign of this difference depends on G. Note 
that G = -355 if,8 = 0 and G = 128 if,8 = 1. Further, dG/d,8 = 80+ 780,8 -48,82 + 116,83 > o. 
Hence, there exists a critical value of the spillover parameter (3,13, defined as 13 = {(3 I G = o}. 
Straightforward calculation yields 13 '" 0.85. Indeed, 7rf > 7r;L if and only if f3 > 13. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 9: Follows directly from the proofs of Propositions 5(ii), 7 and 8(i). 
Q.E.D. 
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Chapter 4 
Wage-Setting Institutions and R&D 
Collaboration Networks l 
4.1 Introduction 
Labour market institutions exhibit substantial differences across countries. An important di-
mension of wage setting negotiations is the level where collective contracts are formally set 
(OECD, 2004; Haucap and Wey, 2004). While most countries have progressively adopted wage 
setting institutions characterised by a lower degree of centralisation, it also appears that be-
tween the 1970s and 1990s no country has moved towards a more centralised system (OECD, 
2004). For instance, in the US, Canada and Japan wage negotiations are decentralised at the 
firm-level, that is, they take place between a single employer and a firm-level union. More 
recently, the UK and New Zealand joined this group of countries. Furthermore, countries such 
as Germany that traditionally negotiated over wages at a relatively high degree of centrali-
sation adopted 'intermediate' systems, allowing for wage adjustments at the firm-level while 
negotiations remain under the auspices of an industry union (Haucap and Wey, 2004). Still, 
in Ireland, Norway, Portugal and Finland wage negotiations are highly centralised, irrespective 
of the recent trends towards making wages more flexible to reflect 'local' conditions at the 
firm-level. 
11 am grateful to seminar participants at the Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne (CES) -
Universite Paris 1 and especially to David Encaoua for very helpful suggestions. 
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Labour markets have evolved alongside a rapid growth in firms' R&D collaboration. During 
the period 1975-1999 we witnessed an upsurge in alliances within the context of R&D networks. 
This has led to the so-called "age of alliance capitalism" whereby hi-tech companies engage in a 
variety of flexible, contract-based research projects involving the pooling of funds by two or more 
parties for the purpose of sharing know-how with a view to enhancing existing (or developing 
new) technological capabilities (Narula and Duysters, 2004; Roijakkers and Hagedoorn, 2006). 
Furthermore, while R&D alliances were initially intended to grant firms access to new markets, 
they are now oriented towards the development of technological competencies. Cast in this 
light, R&D alliances are typically established for strategic reasons, namely to affect the product-
market positioning of firms. 
The question remains, though, whether recent trends towards introducing more flexibility 
into the system of wage determination has influenced the profitability of R&D collaboration, 
and hence the incentives of firms to participate in R&D alliances. The purpose of this chapter is 
to apply an endogenous network formation model to analyse the role of wage setting institutions 
in influencing firms' incentives for R&D collaboration. We note that most of the terminology 
in the present chapter is taken from chapter 2. The reader is therefore directed to that chapter 
(section 2.4.3) for more details. 
In particular, we are primarily interested in the following questions: 
(i) What are the incentives of competing firms to form cooperative links for the purpose of 
sharing know-how on a new technology that reduces their costs? What is the architecture of 
the networks that will endogenously emerge? 
(ii) What is the role of union structures that exhibit differences in the degree of wage setting 
centralisation in influencing the structure of collaboration networks? 
(iii) Could it be that the observed labour market deregulation towards more decentralised 
union structures offers an alternative explanation for the observed growth in R&D partnering 
activity over the recent years? 
To analyse these questions, a natural starting point would be existing models of R&D 
networks in the context of a unionised oligopoly. However, most of the existing studies have 
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concentrated on the incentives of individual firms to carry out R&D and how these incentives 
are affected by the presence of labour unions.z In contrast, we focus on the role oflabour unions 
in shaping firms' incentives to form collaborative links. Our approach is thus centred on the 
idea that the network of R&D collaboration - induced by the specific structure of the labour 
market organisation - is the natural context within which investment decisions can be analysed 
(Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996). 
One exception to the literature mentioned above is the study by Mauleon, Sempere-Monerris 
and Vannetelbosch (2008). In this paper, the authors investigate which network architecture 
will materialise when the process of wage determination is characterised by two alternative 
regimes: in the first case, each firm sets its own wage (or there is no union), and in the second, 
firm-level unions choose the wage unilaterally. In the context of an industry consisting of three 
firms, Mauleon et al. (2008) showed that an increase in the union strength will induce "stable" 
networks3 consisting of a larger number of links - or equivalently, more symmetric networks.4 
This seems to suggest that labour market deregulation may actually make R&D collaboration 
less prevalent, which is in sharp contrast to the empirical evidence. At the same time, the move 
from firm-level unions to the case that firms set their own wages is not in line with the stylised 
facts either. Our article helps explain the empirically observed phenomenon of R&D alliance 
growth by showing that tendencies towards less centralised union structures - allowing wages 
to reflect 'local' conditions at the firm-level - can have distinctly different effects on the firms' 
incentives to collaborate and thus on the level of industry investment and employment. 
We distinguish between three different ways to organise the labour market following the 
recent contribution by Haucap and Wey (2004). Unionisation structures can be ordered with 
an increasing degree of centralisation as follows. Under "decentralisation", wages are formally 
set at the level of each individual enterprise. This case was analysed by Mauleon et al. (2008) 
'See, most notably, Grout (1984), Tauman and Weiss (1987), Ulph and Ulph (1989,1994,2001), Calabuig and 
GonztHez-Maestre (2002), Haucap and Wey (2004), and Menezes-Filho et al. (1998a, b) for empirical evidence. 
3 A network is pairwise stable if no firm has an incentive to delete one of its links and no pair of firms wants 
to add a new link. Similarly, we say that a network is strongly stable if it survives all possible deviations by a 
coalition of firms. The next section briefly presents the formal definitions. For more details see chapter 2 (section 
2.4.3). 
4See, among others, Goyal and IVloraga-Gonzalez (2001), Goyal and Joshi (2003), Song and Vannetelbosch 
(2007), and Goyal, Konovalov and ~loraga-Gonzalez (2008) for contributions on network formation models of 
R&D collaboration without labour unions. 
178 
and it will be our benchmark. Under "coordination", there is an industry-wide union that 
sets firm-specific wages, whereas under "centralisation", there is an industry-wide union that 
sets a uniform wage for all workers in the industry. We show that the form of the labour 
market organisation is crucial for our understanding of the equilibrium network architecture. 
In particular, we demonstrate that a decreasing degree of centralisation - in line with the stylised 
facts - induces R&D networks which are characterised by a larger number of collaboration links. 
Our focus is first directed towards the case of a central union, which alters the results of 
models with decentralised wage setting. To get an intuitive feeling for our results consider 
a partially connected network within an industry consisting of three firms. In this case, a 
decentralised regime implies that the linked firms incur higher wage costs relative to the isolated 
firm because of their higher efficiency. As a result, the relative cost advantage of the linked firms 
is partially dissipated due to the underlying "business stealing" opportunity of the isolated firm 
through its lower wage level. The partially connected network is thus destabilised, giving rise to 
the complete network. 
By contrast, under centralisation the industry-wide union internalises the business stealing 
externality: a uniform wage rule allows the linked firms to raise their rival's costs, which serves 
to strengthen the own competitive position when spillovers are sufficiently large. Consequently, 
the partially connected network endogenously emerges not only as pairwise stable but also 
strongly stable network. Furthermore, the complete network is still pairwise stable because the 
two "spoke" firms within a star network have an incentive to link to each in order to reduce 
the competitive strength of the "hub" firm. However, the complete network is never strongly 
stable because a two-firm coalition has an incentive to delete its links with the third firm. As a 
result, the partially connected network is the unique pairwise stable and strongly stable network 
when the level of spillovers is sufficiently high. 
If wages are determined under a coordinatec\ regime, our results are reversed. In this 
case, the complete network is the unique pairwise stable network. This finding is driven by 
the fact that coordination represents an intermediate form of wage setting centralisation, and 
as such it induces a differentiated wage profile between the linked firms and the isolated one 
within a partially connected network. The resulting wage differential is large enough and 
thus diminishes the relative cost advantage of the linked firms, which, in turn, destabilises the 
179 
partially connected network. Consequently, the complete network emerges endogenously as the 
unique pairwise stable network. The complete network is also strongly stable as long as the 
level of spillovers is not too high. 
Pairwise stability Strong stability 
Decentralisation * complete complete 
Coordination "'* complete complete if spillovers not very large 
Centralisation •• complete 
partial if spillovers sufficiently large partial if spillovers sufficiently large 
Table 4.1: Unionisation structures and stable network architectures 
(* f\'lauleon et al., 2008; ** new results) 
We then turn to an investigation of total investment and employment in the context of stable 
networks. We show that policy-makers may face a trade-off between attaining both a high level 
of industry investment and employment. Particularly, this trade-off arises in our model when 
technological spillovers obtain intermediate values. For higher spillovers, though, this dilemma 
disappears, and we find that a decentralised union structure performs better in both respects 
- R&D and employment. Finally, we show that recent trends in continental Europe towards 
greater wage flexibility, as reflected by the adoption of 'intermediate' wage setting systems, can 
seriously impede firms' growth by reducing investment activity and can also adversely affect 
employment. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 presents the model. The equilibrium 
solutions of the different network architectures are derived in section 4.3. The next section 4.4 
contains our results on the stability and efficiency properties of R&D networks. Section 4.5 
compares industry investment and employment levels under the alternative modes of labour 
market organisation. Finally, section 4.6 concludes. The proofs of our results are relegated to 
the Appendix (section 4.7). 
4.2 The model 
Collaboration networks. Let N = {1, 2, 3} be the set of firms. We say that any two members 
of N, i and j, are linked under network 9 if {i,j} E g. We shall abuse notation by writing ij 
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to represent the link {i, j}. Then ij E 9 implies that firms i and j maintain a link in network 
g. Define a network of collaboration as a collection of such pairwise links {(ij)i,jEN}. In any 
network, nodes represent the firms and links the R&D relationships. Firms can add or sever 
links from a given network. Let 9 + ij denote the network resulting from 9 if i and j form a 
new link, and 9 - ij the network after deleting this link. Given N = {l, 2, 3}, four conceivable 
network architectures can arise in this setting: (i) under the complete network (ge), the level 
of collaborative activity is maximal, i.e. all firms are connected to each other; (ii) under the 
star network (gS), there is one firm ("hub") that is directly connected with two other firms 
("spokes"), whereas the latter remain indirectly connected via the hub. (iii) In the partially 
connected network (gP), any two firms are connected while the third firm is isolated. (iv) 
Finally, in the empty network (ge) the level of collaborative activity is minimal, i.e. there are 
no collaboration ties. 
0 0 V 0 
The empty network The complete network 
0-----0 \ 0 
The partial network The star network 
Figure 4.1: Four possible network architectures 
Technologies, R&D efforts and spillovers. Each firm produces by using both labour 
and non-labour inputs in a fixed proportion. In particular, the production of one unit of output 
requires one unit of labour incurring a cost equal to Wi. 5 It also requires a given amount of 
non-labour inputs at the price c (see e.g. Lommerud et al., 2006; Mauleon et al., 2008). We 
also assume that firms invest into process R&D in order to reduce their marginal cost. R&D 
effort is costly according to the function f(Xi) = I'Xr, I' > O. This reflects diminishing returns 
5 Under centralised unionisation there is a uniform wage profile across firms, that is Wi = Wj = Wk = w. 
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to the level of R&D effort (Xi). For simplicity, we set 1=1 which ensures nonnegativity of all 
variables. 
Firms have an opportunity to attain a further reduction in their marginal cost by forming 
collaboration links. Then the effective level of a firm's R&D is the total reduction in own 
marginal cost and consists of two components: the own research output Xi and the output 
profile of firm i's research partners {Xj, xd, i of j of k. We assume that the extent of information 
leakage (degree of spillovers) benefit collaborating firms at an exogenously given rate (3, (3 E 
(0,11. Suppose further that the rate of knowledge transmission depends on the distance between 
collaborating firms." The distance between two firms i and j in network g is specified by the 
number of links in the shortest path between them. We denote by t( ij) the number of links 
in the shortest path between i and j (and we set t(ij) = 00 to denote the absence of a path 
between them).7 Given a network g, a collection of R&D outputs {Xi(g)};EN and per unit 
labour costs Wi, the marginal cost of firm i is given by 
(4.1) 
where Xi = Xi + (3( t(;}j + dJj) is firm i's effective R&D output. 
Unionisation structures. Employees are organised in labour unions. An important fea-
ture of wage setting negotiations is the level where collective contracts are formally set. We 
distinguish between three different levels of wage setting, reflecting varying degrees of "central-
isation", as is elaborated on below. We further assume that wages are determined according 
to the monopoly union model. That is, wages are set unilaterally by the respective labour 
union(s) at the firm-level - under decentralisation or coordination - or at an industry-level -
under centralisation. Each union has an objective of utilitarian type, that is, it seeks to max-
imise the sum of its (risk neutral) members' utilities, given identical union members (see e.g. 
Booth, 1995; Petrakis and Vlassis, 2004)8 
6This is a natural assumption and it has also been made operational by Piga and Poyago-Theotoky (2005) in 
a different context. The authors develop a HateHing-like model of product differentiation in which the spillover 
depends on the firms' loeational choices. 
7 As there is clear distinction between direct and indirect links, it follows that direct spillovers are always 
larger, since t(ij) = 1 in the case of a direct relationship. 
8\Vhen the union members are risk neutral, a utilitarian type objective function is equivalent to rent 
maximisation. 
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More precisely, the wage setting procedure is characterised according to the following struc-
tures of labour market organisation, where p E {d, u, c} indicates the respective regimes. That 
is, p = d denotes decentralisation, p = u denotes centralisation (uniform wage rule) and p = c 
coordination. 
First, wages may be determined at the level of each individual enterprise. This is the most 
decentralised system where workers are organised in firm-specific unions. Thus, union i aims 
to maximise 
(4.2) 
where Wo is the workers' reservation income.9 Without loss of generality, we set Wo = O. Note 
that this case has already been analysed by Mauleon et al. (2008) and it will be contrasted 
with our results on alternative forms of labour market organisation. 
At the other extreme, an industry-wide union may set a uniform wage covering all workers 
in the industry. This is the most centralised regime, where the union seeks to maximise the 
industry wage bill 
uu = 2: li(W - wo). 
iEN 
(4.3) 
We also consider an 'intermediate' form of centralisation according to which an industry 
union sets the wage at the level of each individual enterprise to maximise the industry wage bill. 
Because the u-regime accounts for differences in the firms' competitiveness, it follows that a 
differentiated wage profile may prevail across firms. Thus, the union's objective is to maximise 
uc = 2: li(Wi - wo). 
iEN 
(4.4) 
This form of collective negotiations reflects recent trends in continental Europe towards the 
introduction of wage negotiations characterised by a lower degree of centralisation intended 
to allow for greater flexibility at the firm-level while maintaining largely intact the union's 
monopoly power (Haucap and Wey, 2004). For example, in Germany, the Netherlands and, 
to some extent, in Spain wage negotiations include "opening" clauses, which, under certain 
9 A worker's reservation wage can be viewed as representing a weighted average of two components: the 
competitive wage and unemployment benefits. The respective weights are the probabilities of finding, or not, Cl 
job in the competitive sector (see e.g. Petrakis and Vlassis, 2000; Manasakis and Zikos, 2007). 
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circumstances, allow firms to negotiate with their workforce wages below the level collectively 
agreed at an industry level (see OECD, 2004). 
A key assumption that underlies our modelling approach is that workers are not mobile 
across unions. ID It captures the fact that workers have an incentive to behave opportunistically. 
That is, they have an incentive to switch to another firm that offers a higher wage. However, 
this behaviour would eliminate any potential wage differentials across firms, and thus, it would 
remove the interaction between the form of labour market organisation and the corresponding 
incentives of the firms to establish collaborative alliances. Finally, this is a standard assumption 
in the context of unionised oligopoly models (see e.g. Mauleon et aI., 2008; Lommerud et aI., 
2006; Petrakis and Vlassis, 2000; Haucap and Wey, 2004; Barcena-Ruiz and Campo, 2004) and 
also reflects the fact that workers may have undertaken highly specialised training, which serves 
to increase their switching costs, thus creating "lock-in" effects. 
Profits. A network of collaboration is defined as a collection of pairwise links. In turn, 
each specific network together with the R&D efforts and wages define the firms' operating 
costs. Given these costs {c;(g)};EN, firms compete in the market of a homogeneous good by 
setting quantities {qi(g)};EN. We assume a linear inverse demand curve P(Q) = a - Q, where 
Q = 2::iEN qi, Q ::; a. The profits of firm i in network 9 are therefore given by 
r;;(g) = [a - qi(g) - L qj(g) - c;(g)]qi(g) - [xi(g)f 
Hi 
(4.5) 
Stability and efficiency. In this section, we briefly present the definitions of stable and 
efficient networks that will be useful for our analysis. These definitions have already been 
discussed in chapter 2 and the reader is directed to that chapter for more details. 
We will say that a network 9 is pairwise stable if and only if (i) for all ij E g, 'lfi(g) ~ 'lfi(g-ij) 
and 'lfj(g) ~ 'lfj(g - ij), and (ii) for all ij ~ g, if 'lfi(g) < 'lfi(g + ij) then 'lfj(g) > 7rj(g + ij). 
This definition is due to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). It says that a network is pairwise 
stable if it survives all possible deviations at a bilateral level, that is, if no firms have an incentive 
to delete one of their links and no pair of firms want to form a new link. This definition is quite 
10 An alternative interpretation of the case that wage setting is characterised by coordination would be that 
firm-specific unions act collusively with a view to coordinating their wage claims. 
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weak and should therefore be seen only as a necessary condition for stability - see Jackson and 
Wolinsky (1996). 
However, it could be the case that a group of firms can all be made better off by deleting or 
adding several links at a time, which is not taken into account when studying pairwise stable 
networks. To this end, Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) introduced the concept of strong 
stability. Specifically, we will say that a network 9 is strongly stable if it survives all possible 
deviations in the number of its links by any coalition of agents. Let us first briefly explain what 
is meant by 'reorganisation' of links in network 9 by a coalition of agents S. A network g' E G 
is obtainable from 9 E G via deviations by S if (i) ij E g' and ij ~ 9 implies ij C S, and (ii) 
ij E 9 and ij ~ g' implies ij n S oF 0. This definition reflects two main ideas (see .Jackson and 
van den Nouweland, 2005). First, a link is formed between members of a coalition S (condition 
(i)). Second, if a link is deleted it must be the case that at least one of the firms who deleted 
their link be in S (condition (ii)). Building on this definition, a strongly stable network is 
defined as follows: A network 9 is strongly stable if for any S eN, g' that is obtainable from 
9 via deviations by S, and i E S such that 7ri(g') > 7ri(g), there exists j E S such that 7rj(g') 
< 7rj(g). 
Next, we present our notion of efficiency using the standard concept of Pareto efficiency. 
We will say that a network 9 E G is Pareto efficient if there does not exist any g' E G such 
that 7ri(g') :::: 7ri(g) for all i, and with strict inequality for some i. That is, a network is Pareto 
efficient if there is no other network which Pareto dominates it (see e.g. Mauleon et aI., 2008). 
We also use the notion of strong efficiency that is based on aggregate profits. We will say that 
a network 9 is strongly efficient if LiEN 7ri(g) :::: LiEN 7ri(g') for any other network g'. That 
is, a network is strongly efficient if it generates at least as high a level of profit as any other 
network. 
The timing of moves. We consider a four-stage game. In stage one, firms choose their 
links to share knowledge on a cost reducing technology.ll We suppose, as in Mauleon et al. 
(2008), that the formation of links incurs no additional costs. In stage two, firms carry out their 
investments simultaneously and independently. In stage three, the wage rates are determined 
11 All conclusions are expected to remain valid in the alternative framework that R&D is aimed at enhancing 
productivity of the labour input. 
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under three possible institutional regimes 'P E {u, c, d}: 
1. Decentralisation (p = d). The employees of each firm are organised into a separate union, 
which, acting non-cooperatively with the other unions, sets the wage for its own firm.12 
2. Centralisation (p = u). Wage setting takes place at the industry level where an industry-
wide union chooses a (uniform) wage for all workers in the industry.13 
3. Coordination (p = c). An industry-wide union sets the wage at the level of each individual 
enterprise to maximise the industry wage bill. 14 
The wages, R&D efforts and the network of collaboration define effective costs of the firms. 
In stage four, firms compete in quantities, taking collaborative links, R&D levels and wages as 
given. This multi-stage game is solved by backward induction to obtain first the equilibrium 
of stages two to four. Next, we solve stage one, the network formation stage, by applying the 
notion of pairwise stability. 
The timing above reflects the idea that the formation of R&D collaborations is a long-run 
and strategic decision. This means that when firms decide which links to establish, it is natural 
to anticipate how this may influence their R&D selection, the wage setting behaviour of the 
union(s) as well as their product-market positioning. Moreover, we would expect the firms 
to anticipate the effect of their R&D decisions on the wage deal which materialises according 
to the variety of forms that wage-setting institutions can take. As noted by Mauleon et al. 
(2008), this sequencing of moves is consistent with the timing typically associated with the 
respective decisions. In particular, the selection of pairwise links is a long-run decision and can 
be viewed as a way of formalising the relationship between the research partners. After the R&D 
agreements have been established, firms choose how much to spend in R&D and wages are then 
determined by the union(s). According to this sequencing of moves, the choice of the amount 
of R&D investments within the context of collaborative agreements is a decision with longer-
run characteristics than the wage setting behaviour of the union(s). This can be explained as 
12The institutional regime of decentralised negotiations is prevalent in Canada, .Japan, Korea} and the United 
States, which traditionally engaged in negotiations at the firm-level. l\lore recently, the United Kingdom, New 
Zealand and some eastern European countries adopted the same form of wage negotiations. 
l:IThis form of wage setting is consistent with existing evidence from Norway, Finland, Ireland, Portugal, and 
partly with the arbitration system in Australia where wage negotiations have progressively moved towards the 
level of the individual enterprise with a "safety net" at national level (see OEeD, 2004). 
14 This 'intermediate' form of wage setting captures empirical evidence from most continental European coun-
tries such as Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden, among others. 
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follows. First, unions typically have a shorter-time horizon than firms because unions do not 
have property rights in jobs (see Baldwin, 1983). Second, under certain circumstances, R&D 
projects might need sufficient time to materialise. l5 As an example of this consider PhRMA, 
a leading pharmaceutical company in the U.S. PhRMA reports that in the pharmaceutical 
industry the time required for the introduction and development of a new chemical entity is 
quite long, requiring an average of at least 14 years (Mauleon et aI., 2008). Finally, the timing 
of our game which is standard in the literature allows us to capture the commitment value of 
R&D collaborations (see e.g. Narula and Hagedoorn, 1999). 
4.3 Equilibrium outcomes: R&D outputs, quantities and wages 
In this section, we obtain the equilibrium of the different network architectures. The analysis 
of the decentralised wage setting system follows Mauleon et al. (2008) and will be a benchmark 
for our comparisons. 
4.3.1 The complete network 
In the complete network gC all firms are linked to each other. The associated cost structures 
are 
Ci(gC, u) = c + W - Xi - (3(Xj + Xk); (4.6) 
c;(gC, c) = C + Wi - Xi - (3(Xj + Xk) = c;(gC, d), i # j # k, (4.7) 
where u denotes the centralised regime, c stands for the coordinated regime and d for the 
decentralised regime. 
Ensuing profit functions are 
7ri(gC, u) = (a - qi - qj - qk)qi - (c + W - Xi - (3(Xj + Xk))qi - (xif; (4.8) 
15This stems from the fact that in the real world investments in R&D are highly uncertain. 
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7[i(gC, c) 
= 7[i(gC,d), i i-j i- k. (4.9) 
Maximising with respect to output yields the following focs 
(a - c) - W - qj - qk - 2qi + Xi + (3(Xj + Xk) = 0, (4.10) 
under centralised wage setting (p = u), and 
(a - c) - Wi - qj - qk - 2qi + Xi + (3(Xj + Xk) = 0, (4.11) 
under coordinated wage setting (p = c) and decentralised wage setting (p = d) . The socs are 
-2 < O. Hence, the focs are necessary as well as sufficient for an (interior) optimum. The 
solution to the focs is the equilibrium of this stage game 
qi(gC, u) 1 = 4((a - c) - W + (3 - 2(3)x;+ (2(3 - 1)(xj + Xk)), i i- j i- k; 
qi(gC,C) 1 = 4((a - c) - 3Wi + Wj + Wk + (3 - 2(3)Xi + (2(3 - 1)(xj + Xk)) 
= qi(gC, d), i i- j i- k. 
Then total output is given by 
Q(gC, u) 
Q(gC, c) 
1 
= 4(3(a -c- w) + (1 + 2(3) LXi); 
iEN 
1 
= 4(3(a-c) - LWi + (1 +2(3) LXi)) = Q(gC, d). 
iEN i€N 
( 4.12) 
( 4.13) 
(4.14) 
(4.15) 
In the preceding stage, under the u-regime the industry-wide union chooses W to maximise 
its rents, ~iEN liW. Under the d-regime firm-level union i sets Wi to maximise its wage bill Wili, 
whereas under the c-regime the industry-wide union coordinates its wage demands Wi, Wj, Wk 
to maximise the industry wage bill, ~iEN liWi. Noting that qi = li' the foes yield, respectively 
3(a - c) - 6w + (1 + 2(3) LXi = 0; ( 4.16) 
iEN 
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(a-c) -6Wi +Wj +Wk + (3-2!3)Xi + (2!3-1)(xj +Xk) = 0; (4.17) 
(a - c) + 2(wj + Wk) - 6Wi + (3 - 2!3)Xi + (213 -1)(xj + Xk) = O. (4.18) 
The associated socs are -6 < O. Then, the equilibrium of this stage game is 
1 
w(gC, u) = '6(3(a - c) + (1 + 213) LXi); (4.19) 
'EN 
1 
Wi(gC, d) = 28 (7(a - c) + (13 - 6!3)Xi - (3 - lO!3)(xj + Xk)); (4.20) 
1 
Wi(gC,C) = '2((a- c) +Xi +!3(Xj +Xk)), i #j # k. (4.21) 
At the R&D selection stage, firms make their R&D investments to maximise their profit, 
ITi = (qi)2 - (Xi)2, i E N. Note that the output levels of the firms arc as follows 
qi(gC,U) 1 24 (3(a - c) + (17 - 14!3)Xi - (7 - lO!3)(xj + Xk)); 
qi(gC, d) 3 = 112(7(a - c) + (13 - 6!3)Xi - (3 - lO!3)(xj + Xk)); 
qi(gC,C) 1 S((a - c) + (3 - 2!3)Xi - (1 - 2!3)(xj + Xk)), i # j # k. 
Maximising profits gives rise to the following foes, respectively 
( 4.22) 
( 4.23) 
(4.24) 
(17 - 14!3)(3(a - c) - (7 - lO!3)(xj + Xk)) - 7(1 + 213)(41 - 14!3)Xi = 0; (4.25) 
9(13 - 6!3)(7(a - c) - (3 - lO!3)(xj + Xk)) - (151 - 1813)(73 + 18!3)Xi = 0; (4.26) 
(3 - 2!3)((a - c) - (1 - 2!3)(xj + Xk)) - (5 + 213)(11- 2!3)Xi = O. (4.27) 
The sodor the u-regime is -7(1+213)(41-1413) < 0, for the d-regime is -(151-1813)(73+ 1813) < 
0, and for the c-regime -(5 + 213)(11 - 213) < O. All conditions are indeed fulfilled. Rearranging 
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gives rise to the R&D reaction functions 
(17 - 14,8)(3(a - c) - (7 - lO,8)(xj + Xk)). 
7(1+ 2,8) (41 - 14,8) , ( 4.28) 
9(13 - 6,8)(7(a - c) - (3 - 10,8)(xj + Xk)). 
(151 - 18,8)(73 + 18,8) , (4.29) 
(3 - 2,8)((a - c) - (1 - 2,8)(xj + Xk)) 
(5 + 2,8)(11 - 2,8) ( 4.30) 
Next, from the expressions in eq. (4.28), (4.29) and (4.30), we study the effect of a unit increase 
in a firm's R&D on the other firms' R&D output (or effort), i.e. the slope of the R&D reaction 
functions. That is, 
8Xi(gC,U) 
8xj 
8Xi(gC, d) 
8xj 
8Xi(gC, c) 
8xj 
= 
(17 - 14m(7 -10,8) .ff 
7(1 + 2,8)(41 _ 14,8) < 0 1 ,8 < 0.7; 
9(13 - 6,8)(3 - 10,8) . 
(151 _ 1813)(73 + 18,8) < 0 lff ,8 < 0.3; 
(3 - 2,8)(1 - 2,8) . 
(5 + 2,8)(11 _ 2,8) < 0 lff ,8 < 0.5. (4.31 ) 
The results indicate that R&D investments are initially strategic substitutes and then be-
come strategic complements when the spillover rate exceeds a certain threshold. Related to 
this is the observation that R&D is less likely to be a strategic complement when the degree 
of wage setting centralisation increases. Intuitively, an increase in a firm's investment reduces 
own cost and thus leads to higher output and profit. However, the resulting increase in profit 
is moderated by the associated increase in the wage due to a higher demand for the labour 
input.16 In the presence of an industry-wide union, the higher wage drives up the production 
costs for all industry participants. This implies a raising rivals' cost effect, which works towards 
reducing the competitive strength of rival firms. In contrast, a firm's higher input cost remains 
independent of the input costs of rival firms under a completely decentralised union structure. 
By analogous reasoning, under coordinated wage setting, the effect of a firm's higher invest-
ment on the rival input prices is less pronounced relative the case of complete centralisation. 
Consequently, it is more likely that R&D investment is a strategic complement when the degree 
of wage setting centralisation decreases, as the results above indicate. 
1GRecall that one unit of input produces one unit of output. 
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Solving the system of the R&D reaction functions using symmetry Xi = Xj = Xk, we obtain 
the equilibrium of this stage game 
'( C )_ (17-14,6)(a-c) 
xi g,u - D (4.32) 
under the centralised wage setting regime, 
'( C d) = 9(13 - 6,6)(a - c) 
x, g, R ( 4.33) 
under the decentralised wage setting regime, and 
'(C )_(3-2,6)(a-c) 
xi 9 , c - G ( 4.34) 
under the coordinated wage setting regime, where D = 175 + 4,6(7,6 - 5) > 0, R = 1675 -
36,6(5 - 3,6) > 0 and G = 61 - 4,6(1 - ,6) > O. Substitutions yield the equilibrium solutions for 
the complete network gC 
~(C ) = 24(a-c). '( C d) _ 336(a-c). ~(C ) _ 8(a-c). 
q~ 9 ,U D' ql g, - R ,qt 9 ,C - G ' 
7(41 + 4,6(17 - 7,6))(a - c)2. 
D2 ' 
9(151 - 18,6)(73 + 18,6)(a - cJ2 
R2 
(5 + 2,6)(11 - 2,6) (a - cJ2. 
G2 ' 
'( C ) 96(a-c) '( Cd) 448(a-c) '( C ) _ 32(a-c) 
w g, u = D ; w g, = R ; wi 9 , c - G . 
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( 4.35) 
(4.36) 
( 4.37) 
The effective R&D of firm i is given by Xi + (3(Xj + Xk). Total effective R&D is thus 
E'(gC, u) 
E'(gC, d) = 
E'(gC, c) 
3(1 + 2(3)(17 - 14(3)(a - c) . 
D ' 
27(13 - 6(3)(1 + 2(3)(a - c) 
R 
3(1 + 2(3)(3 - 2(3)(a - c) 
G 
Finally, one can easily obtain total employment 
L'( C ) = 72(a-c). L'( Cd) = 1008(a-c). L'( C ) = 24(a-c) g,u D' g, R' g ,C G' 
4.3.2 The star network 
( 4.38) 
(4.39) 
( 4.40) 
In the star network g8 there is a hub firm which maintains one collaboration link with two spoke 
firms, while the latter are indirectly connected via the hub. Let firm i be the hub and firms j 
and k be the spokes. The relevant cost structures under this network architecture are 
c;(gS,u) 
Cj(g", u) (4.41 ) 
Ci(gS,C) C + Wi - Xi - (3(Xj + Xk) = Ci(gS, d), 
( 4.42) 
where u denotes the centralised regime, C represents the coordinated regime and d the decen-
tralised regime. The resulting profit functions are given by 
7ri(gC, u) (a - qi - qj - qk)qi - (c + W - Xi - {3(Xj + Xk))qi - (Xi)2, 
(a - qi - qj - qk)qj - (c + W - Xj - {3xi - (f3/2)Xk)qj - (Xj)2; (4.43) 
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7ri(gC, c) (a - qi - qj - qk)qi - (C + Wi - Xi - f3(Xj + Xk))qi - (Xi)2 
= 7ri(gC,d) 
7rj(gC,c) = (a - qi - qj - qk)qj - (C+Wj - Xj - f3Xi - (f3/2)Xk)qj - (Xj)2 
( 4.44) 
Maximising the expressions above with respect to the firms' outputs results in the following 
foes 
(a - c) - W - qj - qk - 2qi + Xi + f3(Xj + Xk) 0, 
(a - c) - W - qi - qk - 2qj + Xj + f3(Xi + (1/2)xk) = 0 ( 4.45) 
under centralised wage setting (p = u), and 
(a - c) - Wi - qj - qk - 2qi + Xi + f3(Xj + Xk) 0, 
(a - c) - Wj - qi - qk - 2qj + Xj + f3(Xi + (1/2)xk) = 0 ( 4.46) 
under coordinated wage setting (p = c) and decentralised wage setting (p = d). The socs are 
- 2 < 0, so the foes are necessary as well as sufficient for an interior optimum. Solving the 
system of the foes, we obtain the equilibrium of this stage game 
qi(gS,U) 1 S(2(a - c - w) + (6 - 4(3)Xi + (5f3 - 2)(xj + Xk)), 
qj(gS,u) = 
1 S(2(a - c - w) + (4f3 - 2)Xi + (6 - 3(3)xj + (f3 - 2)Xk); (4.47) 
qi(gS,C) = 
1 S(2(a - c) - 6Wi + 2(wj + Wk) + (6 - 4(3)Xi + (5f3 - 2)(xj + Xk)) 
= qi(gS, d), 
qj(gS,c) 1 S(2(a - c) + 2(Wi + Wk) - 6wj + (4f3 - 2)Xi + (6 - 3(3)xj 
+(f3 - 2)Xk) = qj(g', d), i if'" k. (4.48) 
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Total output is, respectively 
Q(gS, u) 
Q(gS, c) 
1 
S(6(a - c - w) + (2 + 4(3)Xi + (2 + 3(3)(xj + Xk); 
1 
S(6(a - c) - 2 L Wi + (2 + 4(3)Xi + (2 + 3(3)(xj + Xk)) 
'EN 
= Q(q',d), i#Uk. 
( 4.49) 
( 4.50) 
In stage three, under the u-regime the industry-wide union chooses W to maximise its surplus, 
EiEN liW. Under the d-regime firm-level union i sets Wi to maximise its wage bill Wili, whereas 
under the c-regime the industry-wide union sets Wi, Wj, Wk to maximise the industry wage bill, 
EiEN liWi· The foes are given by 
6(a - c) - 12w + (4(3 - 2)Xi + (3(3 - 2)(xj + Xk) = 0 (4.51 ) 
under centralisation, 
2(a - c) - 12wi + 2(wj + Wk) + (6 - 4(3)Xi + (5(3 - 2)(xj + Xk) 0, 
2(a - c) + 2(Wi + Wk) - 12wj + (4(3 - 2)Xi + (6 - 3(3)xj + ((3 - 2)Xk o ( 4.52) 
under decentralisation for (the union of) the hub and for (the union of) a spoke, respectively, 
and 
2(a - c) + 4(wj + Wk) - 12wi + (6 - 4(3)Xi + (5(3 - 2)(xj + Xk) 0, 
2(a - c) + 4(Wi + Wk) -12wj + (4(3 - 2)Xi + (6 - 3(3)xj + ((3 - 2)Xk o ( 4.53) 
under coordination for the hub and for a spoke, respectively. The associated socs read as 
-12 < o. The solution to the foes is the equilibrium of this stage game 
1 
w(gS, u) = 12 (6(a - c) + (2 + 4(3)Xi + (2 + 3(3)(xj + Xk)); ( 4.54) 
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Wi(gS, d) 1 = 56 (14(a - c) + (26 - 12t1)xi + (231'1- 6)(xj + Xk)), 
1 
56 (14(a - c) + (26 - 9t1)xj + (201'1- 6)Xi + (71'1- 6)Xk); (4.55) 
Wi(gS, c) 1 2"((a - c) + Xi +B(Xj + Xk)), 
1 
= 4(2(a - c) + 2xj + t1(2Xi + Xk)), iI- j I- k. ( 4.56) 
At the preceding stage, firms make their R&D investments to maximise their profit, ITi = 
(qi)2 - (Xi)2, i E N. Note that the output levels of the firms are given by 
qi(gS,U) 1 48 (6(a - c) + 2(17 - 14,B)xi + (21'1- 14)(xj + Xk)), 
1 
= 48 (6(a - c) + (201'1- 14)xi + (34 - 2W)xj + (31'1- 14)Xk); ( 4.57) 
qi(gS, d) 3 = 224 (14(a - c) + (26 - 12t1)Xi + (231'1- 6)(xj + Xk)), 
3 _ 
= 224 (14(a - c) + (201'1- 6)Xi + (26 - 9t1)xj + (71'1- 6)Xk); ( 4.58) 
qi(gS, C) 1 = 16 (2(a - c) + (6 - 4t1)Xi + (51'1- 2)(xj + Xk)), 
qi(gS, C) 1 = 16 (2(a - c) + (41'1- 2)x;+ (6 - 3t1)xj + (1'1- 2)Xk' if. j I- k. ( 4.59) 
Maximising profits leads to the following foes for the hub and the spokes, respectively 
(17 - 141'1) (6(a - c) - (14 - 27t1)(xj + Xk)) - MXi = 0, 
(34 - 21t1)(6(a - c) + (201'1- 14)xi + (31'1- 14)xk) - NXj 
° 
(4.60) 
under centralised wage setting, 
9(13 - 6t1)(14(a - c) - (6 - 23t1)(xj + Xk)) - 2Txi 0, 
9(26 - 9t1)(14(a - c) - (6 - 20t1)Xi - (6 - 7t1)xj) - ZXj 
-
° 
(4.61 ) 
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under decentralised wage setting, and 
(3 - 2;3)(2(a - c) - (2 - 5;3)(xj + Xk)) - 2(5 + 2;3)(11 - 2;3)Xi = 0, 
3(2 - ;3)(2(a - c) + (4;3 - 2)Xi + (;3 - 2)Xk) - (10 + 3;3)(22 - 3;3)xj = 0 (4.62) 
under coordinated wage setting, where M = (14(1 + 2;3)(41 - 14;3)) > 0, N = (7(2 + 3;3)(82-
21;3)) > 0, T = (151 - 18;3)(73 + 18,8) > 0 and Z = (302 - 27;3)(146 + 27;3) > o. The 
associated soc for the hub firm under the u-regime is -(14(1 + 2;3)(41 - 14;3)) < 0, under the 
d-regime is -2(151 - 18;3)(73 + 18;3) < 0, and under the c-regime, -2(5 + 2tJ)(11 - 2;3) < O. 
The corresponding conditions for the spokes under the u, d and c-regimes, respectively, are 
-(7(2 + 3;3)(82 - 21;3)) < 0, -(302 - 27;3)(146 + 27;3) < 0 and -(10 + 3,8)(22 - 3;3) < o. All 
conditions are indeed satisfied. Rearranging leads to the following R&D reaction functions 
under centralised wage setting, 
= 
(17 - 14,8)(6(a - c) - (14 - 27;3)(xj + Xk)) 
(14(1 + 2;3)(41 - 14;3)) 
(34 - 21,8)(6(a - c) + (20;3 - 14)xi + (3;3 - 14)xk) 
(7(2 + 3;3)(82 - 21;3)) 
9(13 - 6.8)(14(a - c) - (6 - 23.8)(xj + Xk)) 
2(151 - 18;3)(73 + 18.8) 
9(26 - 9.8)(14(a - c) - (6 - 20;3)Xi - (6 - 7.8)xj) 
(302 - 27.8)(146 + 27.8) 
under decentralised wage setting, and 
under coordinated wage setting. 
(3 - 2.8)(2(a - c) - (2 - 5.8)(xj + Xk)) 
2(5 + 2.8)(11 - 2;3) 
3(2 - ;3)(2(a - c) + (4.8 - 2)Xi + (;3 - 2)Xk) 
(10 + 3.8)(22 - 3.8) 
(4.63) 
(4.64) 
(4.65) 
Then, from the following conditions we can characterise the firms' investments (or R&D 
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efforts) as strategic substitutes or complements 
f)Xi(g', u) 
f)Xj 
f)Xj(g', u) 
f)Xi 
f)Xj(g', u) 
f)Xk 
f)Xi(g", d) 
f)Xj 
f)Xj (g', d) 
f)xi 
f)Xj(g', d) 
f)xk 
= 
= 
= 
= 
f)Xi(g', c) 
f)Xj 
f)xj(g',e) 
f)xi 
f)Xj(g', c) 
f)xk 
(17 - 14,8)(14 - 27,8) . 
(14(1 + 2,8)(41 _ 14,8)) < 0 lff,8 < 0.519 
(34 - 21,8)(20,8 - 14) . 
(7(2 + 3,8)(82 _ 21,8)) < 0 lff ,8 < 0.7 
(34 - 21,8)(3,8 - 14) 'if 
(7(2 + 3,8)(82 _ 21,8)) < 0 ,8; 
9(13 - 6,8)(6 - 23,8) 'ff 2 1 
2(151 _ 18,8)(73 + 18,8) < 0 1 ,8 < O. 6 
9(26 - 9,8)(6 - 20,8) 'ff 
(302 _ 27,8)(146 + 27,8) < 0 1 ,8 < 0.3 
9(26 - 9,8)(6 - 7,8) . 
(302 _ 27,8)(146 + 27,8) < 0 lff ,8 < 0.857; 
(3 - 2,8)(2 - 5,8) . 
2(5 + 2,8)(11 _ 2,8) < 0 lff ,8 < 0.4 
3(2 - ,8)(4,8 - 2) . 
(10 + 3,8)(22 _ 3,8) < 0 lff ,8 < 0.5 
= 
3(2 - ,8)(,8 - 2) 
(10 + 3,8)(22 _ 3,8) < 0 'if,8. 
(4.66) 
( 4.67) 
(4.68) 
The calculations above reveal the properties of cost-reducing investments in a star network. 
Our main results for this setting are the following. First, the R&D investments of the hub 
and a spoke are initially strategic substitutes and then turn to strategic complements when the 
spillovers are relatively large. In addition, R&D is more likely to be a strategic complement 
from the viewpoint of the hub than from the viewpoint of a spoke. Second, the cost-reducing 
investments of the spokes under coordination and centralisation are always strategic substitutes. 
However, the same is no longer true under decentralised wage setting. As explained in the 
case of the complete network, a decrease in the degree of wage setting centralisation makes 
investment a stronger strategic complement, because a firm's own investment is less likely to 
influence the production costs of rival firms. Consequently, if spillovers are sufficiently large, 
the strategic interaction between the investments of the two spokes in a star network exhibit 
complementarities when the wages are set at the firm-level. 
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Invoking symmetry for the firms at the spokes, Xj = Xk, the solution to the system of the 
R&D reaction functions is given by 
Xi(gS, u) = 
xj(gS, u) 
(17 - 141'1)(28 + 91'1(16 -7P'))(a - c) 
F 
2(34 - 211'1)(7 + 1'1(31 - 14P'))(a - c) 
F 
uuder the centralised wage setting regiIlle, 
xj(g', d) 
9(13 - 61'1)(2668 + 271'1(32 - 91'1)) (a - c) 
e 
18(26 - 91'1)(667 + 91'1(19 - 6P'))(a - c) 
e 
under the decentralised wage setting regime, and 
xj(gS, c) 
(3 - 21'1)(52 + 31'1(8 - 3P'))(a - c) 
b. 
6(2 - 1'1)(13 + 1'1(5 - 2P'))(a - c) 
b. 
( 4.69) 
(4.70) 
( 4.71) 
under the coordinated wage setting regime, where F = 4900 + 1'1(22400 - 118531'1 + 981'12(37 -
121'1)) > 0, e = 4468900+91'1(94000-91'1(3533-61'1(191-361'1))) > 0 and b. = 3172+1'1(1128-
4331'1 + 61'12(15 - 41'1)) > O. Substitutions yield the rest of the equilibrium solutions for the star 
network g' 
qj(g', u) = 
24(28 + 91'1(16 - 7P'))(a - c) 
F 
96(7 + 1'1(31 - 14P'))(a - c) 
F 
7(1 + 21'1)(41 - 141'1)(28 + 91'1(16 - 7P'))2(a - cJ2 
F2 
28(2 + 31'1)(82 - 21,9)(7 + 1'1(31 - 14P'))(a - c)2 
F2 
*( S ) 244(12 + 1'1(56 - 251'1)) (a - c) 
w g,u = F 
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(4.72) 
under centralised wage setting, 
rr; (g', d) 
qi(gS,d) = 
qj(g', d) = 
336(2668 + 27iJ(32 - 9iJ))(a - c) 
8 
1344(667 + 9iJ(19 - 9iJ))(a - c) 
8 
9(151 - 18iJ) (73 + 18iJ)(2668 + 27iJ(32 - 9iJ))2(a - ;;)2 
8 2 
rrj(gS,d) = 36(302 - 27iJ) (146 + 27iJ) (667 + 9iJ(19 - 6iJ))2(a - ;;)2 8 2 
wi(g',d) 
wj(gS, d) = 
under decentralised wage setting, and 
448(2668 + 27iJ(32 - 9iJ))(a - c) 
8 
1792(667 + 9iJ(19 - 6iJ))(a - c) 
8 
qi(g',c) = 8(52 + 3iJ(8 - 3iJ))(a - c) 6. 
rr;(gS,c) 
rrj(gS,c) 
qj(gS,c) 32(13 + iJ(5 - 2iJ))(a - c) 
6. 
= 
(11 - 2iJ)(5 + 2iJ)(52 + 3iJ(8 - 3iJ))2(a - C)2 
6.2 
4(22 - 3iJ)(1O + 3iJ)(13 + iJ(5 - 2iJ))2(a - cJ2 
Wi(g8,C) = 16(104 + iJ(44 - 17iJ))(a - c) 
6. 
8(208 + 3iJ(28 - 11iJ))(a - c) 
= 6. 
wj(gS,c) 
( 4.73) 
(4.74) 
under coordinated wage setting. The effective R&D of the hub firm i is given by Xi + iJ(Xj +Xk), 
and the effective R&D of a spoke firm j is given by Xj + iJxi + (iJ/2)Xk. Then one can easily 
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obtain total effective R&D as 
3(476 + 2688</> + 653</>2 - 3626</>3 + 1176</>4)(a - c). 
F ' 
E*(gS,u) 
9(104052 + .8(162416 - 3.8(13003 + 54.8(191 - 36.8))))(a - c). 
e ' 
E*(gS, d) 
E*(gS, c) = (468 + 712</> - 301</>2 - 270</>3 + 72</>4)(a - c) ~ 
Finally, total employment is given by 
L*(gS,u) 
L*(gS,d) 
L*(gS,c) 
= 168(12 + 56</> - 25</>2)(a - c). 
F ' 
= 1008(2668 + 3.8(248 - 75.8))(a - c). 
e ' 
8(156 + 64</> - 25</>2) (a - c) 
~ 
4.3.3 The partial network 
( 4.75) 
(4.76) 
In the partial network there are two types of firms: two linked firms (denoted by i and j) and 
one isolated firm (referred to as k). This leads to the following cost structures 
c + W - Xk, i # j # k; 
c;(gP, c) = C + Wi - Xi - .8Xj = C;(gP, d), 
Ck(gP, c) = C+Wk -Xk = ck(gP,d), i #j # k, 
(4.77) 
( 4.78) 
where u denotes the centralised regime, c indicates the coordinated regime and d the decen-
tralised regime. 
The resulting profit functions are given by 
(a - qi - qj - qk)qi - (c + W - Xi - .8Xj)qi - (Xi)2, 
(a - qi - qj - qk)qk - (c + W - Xk)qk - (Xk)2; 
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(4.79) 
7r;(gC, c) = (a - qi - qj - qk)q; - (C + Wi - Xi - (3Xj)q; - (Xi)2 
= 7ri(gC,d) 
7rk(gC, c) = (a - qi - qj - qk)qk - (C + Wk - Xk)qk - (Xk)2 
= 7rk(gC, d), i i- j i- k. ( 4.80) 
Maximising the profit functions with respect to the firms' outputs results in the following 
foes 
(a - c) - W - 2qi - qj - qk + Xi + (3Xj 0, 
(a - c) - W - 2qk - qi - qj + Xk o (4.81 ) 
under centralised wage setting (p = u), and 
(a - c) - Wi - 2qi - qj - qk + Xi + (3Xj 0, 
(a - c) - Wk - 2qk - qi - qj + Xk o (4.82) 
under coordinated wage setting (p = c) and decentralised wage setting (p = d). The socs are 
always fulfilled, -2 < O. Solving the system of the foes, we obtain the equilibrium of this stage 
game 
1 
4((a - c - w) + (3 - (3)Xi + (3(3 - l)xj - Xk), 
1 
4((a - c - w) - (1 + (3)(Xi + Xj) + 3Xk); (4.83) 
1 
= 4((a - c) - 3Wi + Wj + Wk + (3 - (3)Xi + (3(3 - l)xj - Xk) 
= qi(gP, d), 
1 
= 4((a - c) + Wi + Wj - 3Wk - (1 + (3)(Xi + Xj) + 3Xk) 
= qk(gP, d), i i- j i- k. (4.84) 
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Then, total output obtains 
Q(gP, u) 
Q(gP, c) 
1 
= 4(3(a - c - w) + (1 + (3)(Xi + Xj) + Xk); ( 4.85) 
1 
4(3(a - c) - L Wi + (1 + (3)(Xi + Xj) + Xk) 
iEN 
= Q(gP, d), i -I- j -I- k. ( 4.86) 
In stage three, under the u-regime wages are set at an industry level, whereas uncler the 
d-regime the employees of each firm are organised into a separate union that sets the wage for 
its own firm. Under the c-regime, an industry union chooses firm-specific wages to maximise 
the industry wage bill. The foes to this problem yield 
( 4.87) 
under centralisation, 
(a - c) - 6Wi + Wj + Wk + (3 - (3)Xi + (3(3 - l)xj - Xk 0, 
o ( 4.88) 
under decentralisation for (the union of) a linked firm and for (the union of) the isolated firm, 
respectively, and 
(a - c) - 6Wi + 2(wj + Wk) + (3 - (3)Xi + (3(3 - l)xj - Xk 0, 
o. (4.89) 
under coordination for a linked firm and for the isolated firm, respectively. The associated socs 
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read as -6 < O. Then the equilibrium of this stage game obtains 
w(gP,u) 1 6(3(a - c) + (1 + (3) (Xi + Xj) + Xk); (4.90) 
1 
28 (7(a - c) + (13 - 3(3)Xi - 3Xk + (13(3 - 3)xj), 
1 
= 28 (7(a - c) + 13xk - 3(1 + (3) (Xi + Xj)); ( 4.91) 
Wi(gP,C) 1 2((a - c) + Xi + (3Xj), 
1 
2((a - c) + Xk). ( 4.92) 
At the preceding stage, firms choose their R&D levels to their maximise profit, ITi = (qi)2-
(X;)2, i E N. Note that the output levels of the firms are given by 
q;(gP, u) 1 24 (3(a - c) + (17 -7(3)x; + (17(3 - 7)xj - 7Xk), 
qk(gP,U) = 1 24 (3(a - c) + 17xk - 7(1 + (3) (x; + Xj)); (4.93) 
qi(gP, d) = 3 112 (7(a - c) + (13 - 3(3)x; + (13(3 - 3)xj - 3Xk), 
qk(gP,d) = 3 _ 112(7(a-c)+13xk-3(1+(3)(xi+Xj)); (4.94) 
qi(gP, c) 1 S((a - c) + (3 - (3)Xi + (3(3 - l)xj - Xk), 
qk(gP,C) 1 S((a - c) + 3Xk - (1 + (3) (x; + Xj)). (4.95) 
Performing the relevant maximisations gives rise to the following foes for a linked firm and for 
the isolated firm, respectively 
(17 - 7(3) (3(a - c) - (7 -17(3)xj - 7Xk) - 7(1 + (3)(41 - 7(3)x; = 0, 
17(3(a - c) - 7(1 + (3)(Xi + Xj)) - 287xk = 0 (4.96) 
under centralised wage setting, 
9(13 - 3(3)(7(a - c) - (3 - 13(3)xj - 3Xk) - (151 - 9(3)(73 + 9(3)x; = 0, 
117(7(a - c) - 3(1 + (3)(x; + Xj)) - 1l023xk = 0 (4.97) 
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under decentralised wage setting, and 
(3 - ,8)((a - c) + (313 - l)xj - Xk)) - (11 - 13)(5 + t3)Xi = 0, 
3((a - c) - (1 + t3)(Xi + Xj)) - 55xk = 0 (4.98) 
under coordinated wage setting. The soc for a linked firm under the c-regime is -7(1 + 
1')(41 - 71') < 0, under the d-regime is -(151 - 91')(73 + 9,8) < 0, and under the c-regime, 
-(11 - 1')(5 +1') < O. The corresponding conditions for the isolated firm under the u, d, 
c-regimes, respectively, are -287 < 0, -11023 < 0, -55 < O. Indeed, all conditions are satis-
fied and therefore the focs above are necessary as well as sufficient for an (interior) optimum. 
Rearranging the focs yields the R&D best response functions 
under centralised wage setting, 
= 
(17 - 7,8)(3(a - c) - (7 - 17,B)xj - 7Xk) 
7(1 + 1')(41 - 71') 
17 
= 287(3(a - c) - 7(1 + ,B) (Xi + Xj)) 
= 
9(13 - 3,B)(7(a - c) - (3 - 13t3)xj - 3Xk) 
(151 - 913)(73 + 91') 
117(7(a - c) - 3(1 + t3)(Xi + Xj)) 
11023 
under decentralised wage setting, and 
(3 - ,8)((a - c) + (313 - l)xj - Xk)) 
(11 - t3)(5 + 13) 
3 
55 ((a - c) - (1 + ,B) (Xi + Xj)), 
(4.99) 
( 4.100) 
(4.101) 
under coordinated wage setting. Then, we can easily characterise the firms' investments as 
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strategic substitutes Or complements as follows 
8Xi(gP, u) 
8xj 
8Xi(gP, u) 
DXk 
DXk(gP, u) 
DXi 
(17 - 7fJ)(7 - 17fJ) . 
= - 7(1 + fJ)( 41 _ 7fJ) < 0 Iff fJ < 0.4118 
= 
7(17-7fJ) VfJ 
7(1 + fJ)(41 - 7fJ) < 0 
119 
= - 287(1 + fJ) < 0 VfJ; 
8Xi(gP, d) 
= DXj 
8Xi(gP, d) 
= DXk 
8Xk(9P, d) 
= i)xi 
DXi(gP, c) 
iJXj 
DXi(gP,C) 
iJxk 
i)xk(gP, c) 
DXi 
9(13 - 3fJ)(3 - 13fJ) 0 iff fJ 0.2308 
(151 - 9fJ)(73 + 9fJ) < < 
27(13 - 3fJ) 
(151 _ 9fJ)(73 + 9fJ) < 0 VfJ 
351 
- 11023 (1 + fJ) < 0 VfJ; 
= 
(3 - fJ)(3fJ - 1) . 
(11 _ fJ)(5 + fJ) < 0 Iff fJ < 0.33 
(3 - fJ) 
(11 - fJ)(5 + fJ) < 0 VfJ 
3 
-55 (1 + fJ) < 0 VfJ· 
(4.102) 
(4.103) 
( 4.104) 
The simple computations above reveal that in a partial network the R&D efforts of the linked 
firms benefit from complementarities, independently of the mode of labour market organisation. 
These complementarities are likely to arise when the spillover parameter takes on sufficiently 
high values. As already discussed, the R&D effort of the linked firms is more likely to be a 
strategic complement when the degree of wage setting centralisation decreases. Furthermore, 
our analysis reveals that the R&D investments of a linked firm and the isolated firm are always 
strategic substitutes. This result relates to the nature of the spillover process which captures 
the extent of knowledge transmission between the collaborating firms while no knowledge can 
spill over to the isolated firm. 
Invoking symmetry for the linked firms, Xi = Xj, the equilibrium of this stage game turns 
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out to be 
(17 - 7(3)(a - c) 
o 
17(7 - (3(10 - 7(3))(a - c) 
m 
under the centralised wage setting regime, 
xi(r1,d) = 6003(13 - 3(3)(a - c) IJ! 
117(667 - 9(3(10 - 3(3))(a - c) 
IJ! 
under the decentralised wage setting regime, and 
Xk(gT', c) 
13(3 - <!»(a - c) 
H 
3(13 - (2 - <!»<!»(a - c) 
H 
(4.105) 
(4.106) 
( 4.107) 
under the coordinated wage setting regime, where 0 = 175 - 9(3(10 - 7(3), IJ! = 1117225 -
9027{1(1O - 3{1) and H = 793 - 29(2 -{1){1. Substitutions yield the rest of the equilibrium 
solutions for the partially connected network gP 
qi(gP, u) = 24(a-c) o 
24(7 - (3(10 - 7{1))(a - c) 
m 
7(1 + (3)(41 - 7{1)(a - C)2 
0 2 
41(7 - (3(10 - 7(3)) (a - cj2 
702 
*( P ) 32(21 - (3(10 - 7(3)) (a - c) 
w g,u = 70 
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(4.108) 
under centralised wage setting, 
224112(a - c) 
IJ! 
336(667 - 9f3(lO - 3f3))(a - c) 
IJ! 
4004001(151 - 9f3)(73 + 9f3)(a - c)2 
1J!2 
99207(667 - 9f3(lO - 3f3)j2(a - cj2 
1J!2 
298816(a - c) 
IJ! 
448(667 - 9f3(10 - 3f3)) (a - c) 
IJ! 
under decentralised wage setting, and 
w;(gP, c) 
wj,(gP,c) = 
lO4(a - c) 
H 
8(13 - (2 - f3)f3) (a - c) 
H 
169(11 - f3)(5 + f3)(a - cj2 
H2 
55(13 - (2 - f3)W(a - c) 
H2 
8(52 - (2 - f3)f3)(a - c) 
H 
16(26 - (2 - f3)f3)(a - c) 
H 
(4.lO9) 
(4.1lO) 
under coordinated wage setting. The effective R&D of the linked firm i is given by Xi + f3Xj, 
and the effective R&D of the isolated firm k is its own R&D output, Xk. Then, one can easily 
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obtain total effective R&D as 
E'(gP, u) 
E'(gP,d) = 
E'(gP, c) 
Finally, total employment is given by 
£'(gP,u) = 
£'(gP, d) 
£'(gP, c) 
4.3.4 The empty network 
3(119 - (10 - 7(3){3)(a - c) 
m 
9(26013 + 1217{3(1O - 3(3))(a - c) 
IIJ 
(117 + 23(2 - (3)(3)(a - c) 
H 
24(21 - (10 - 7(3){3)(a - Cl 
m 
1008(667 - 3{3(1O - 3(3))(a - c) 
IIJ 
8(39 - (2 - (3)(3)(a - c) 
H 
(4.111) 
(4.112) 
In the empty network firms do not maintain any collaboration ties. Thus we have the following 
cost structures 
c; (g", u) = C + W - Xi; 
c;(g",c) = c+ Wi - Xi = C;(g",d), i of. j of. k. 
Ensuing profit functions are as follows 
'lri(gC, u) 
'lri(gC, C) 
(a - qi - qj - qk)qi - (c + W - Xi)qi - (x;)2; 
(a - qi - qj - qk)qi - (c + Wi - Xi)qi - (Xi? 
= 'lri(gC, d), i of. j of. k. 
( 4.113) 
(4.114) 
(4.115) 
(4.116) 
Maximising the expressions above with respect to the firms' outputs gives rise to the foes 
(a - c) - W - 2qi - qj - qk + Xi = 0 (4.117) 
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under centralised wage setting (p = u), and 
(a - c) - Wi - 2qi - qj - qk + Xi = 0 (4.118) 
under coordinated wage setting (p = c) and decentralised wage setting (p = d). The socs 
are given by -2 < 0, so the foes are necessary as well as sufficient for an (interior) optimum. 
Solving the systems of the foes, we obtain the equilibrium of this stage game 
qi(qe, u) 1 = 4((a-c)-w+ 3xi- Xj- Xk); 
qi(ge,C) 1 4((a - c) - 3Wi + Wj + Wk + 3Xi - Xj - Xk) 
qi(ge, d). 
Then, total output obtains 
Q(ge,u) 1 = 4(3(a - c) - W + LXi); 
Q(ge, c) 
iEN 
1 
= 4(3(a - c) - L Wi + LXi) 
iEN iEN 
= Q(ge,d). 
( 4.119) 
(4.120) 
(4.121) 
(4.122) 
At the wage selection stage of the game, the foes under centralisation, decentralisation and 
coordination lead to, respectively 
3(a - c) - 6w + LXi = 0; 
iEN 
(a - c) - 6Wi +Wj +Wk+3xi - Xj -Xk = 0; 
(a - c) - 6Wi + 2(wj + Wk) + 3Xi - Xj - Xk = O. 
(4.123) 
(4.124) 
(4.125) 
The associated socs are given by -6 < O. Then the equilibrium of this stage game turns out to 
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be 
W(ge, u) 
wi(gC,d) 
Wi(ge,C) 
1 
= 6(3(a-c)+L x i); 
iEN 
1 
28 (7(a - c) + 13xi - 3(xj + Xk)); 
1 
= 2((a - c) + Xi). 
(4.126) 
(4.127) 
(4.128) 
At the R&D selection stage, firms choose their R&D investments to maximise their profit, 
ITi = (qi)2 - (Xi)2, i E N. Note that the output levels of the firms are as follows 
qi(ge,U) 1 24 (3(a - c) + 17xi - 7(xj + Xk)); 
qi(ge, d) 3 112 ((7(a - c) + 13xi - 3(xj + Xk)); 
qi(ge,C) 1 = S((a- c) +3Xi -Xj -Xk). 
Performing the relevant maximisations yields the following foes, respectively 
17(3(a - c) - 7(xj + Xk)) - 287xi 
117(7(a - c) - 3(xj + Xk)) - 11023xi 
0; 
0; 
3((a-c)-Xj-Xk)-55xi = o. 
Rearranging gives rise to the R&D reaction functions 
Xi(Xj, Xk, u) 17 - 287(3(a - c) - 7(xj + Xk)); 
Xi(Xj,Xk, d) 117(7(a - c) - 3(xj + Xk)). - 11023 , 
Xi(Xj, Xk, c) 3 _ = 55((a-c) -Xj -Xk). 
( 4.129) 
( 4.130) 
(4.131) 
( 4.132) 
( 4.133) 
(4.134) 
(4.135) 
The soc under the u-regime is -287 < 0, under the d-regime is -11023 < 0 and under the 
c-regime, -55 < O. We also note that R&D is always a strategic substitute, given the absence 
of technological spillovers between firms. Solving the system of the R&D reaction functions, we 
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obtain the equilibrium of this stage game 
*( e ) _ 17(a - c) 
Xi g,u - 175 (4.136) 
under the centralised wage setting regime, 
~(e d)= 117(a-c) 
x, 9 , 1675 (4.137) 
under the decentralised wage setting regime, and 
* (e) 3( a - c) 
xi 9 , c = 61 ( 4.138) 
under the coordinated regime. Substitutions reveal the rest of the equilibrium solutions for the 
empty network ge 
qi(gC, u) = 24(a-c). ~(e d)=336(a-c). *( C c)=8(a-c). 175 ' q, 9 , 1675' q, 9 , 61' 
rri(ge,u) 41(a - cj2. *( e d) = 99207(a - c)2. rr~( e ) = 55 (a - c)2. 4375 ' rr, g, 16752' ,g,c 3721' 
w*(ge,u) = 96(a - c). w~( C d) = 448(a - Cl. w*( e c) = 32(a - c) 175 ' ,g, 1675" 9 , 61· ( 4.139) 
Total (effective) R&D is then given by 
E*( e u) = 51(a-c). E*( e ) = 351(a-c). E*( e c) = 9(a-c) 
9 , 175' 9 , u 1675' 9 , 61 (4.140) 
Finally one can easily obtain total employment 
L*( e )= 72(a-c). L*( e d)= 1008(a-c). L*( e )= 24(a-c) 
9 , u 175' 9 , 1675' 9 , c 61· (4.141) 
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4.4 Stable R&D networks 
4.4.1 Pairwise stable networks 
Let us begin our analysis by examining how the stability properties of R&D networks depend on 
the various forms that wage setting institutions can take. The following Proposition summarises 
our results for the centralised wage setting case as follows: 
Proposition 10 Under centralised wage setting (p = u), the complete network ge is always 
pairwise stable. The partially connected network gP is pairwise stable if and only if the rate of 
spillover is sufficiently large, {3 :2: (3. The star and empty networks (respectively, g8 and ge) are 
never pairwise stable. 
Proposition 10 indicates how a centralised wage setting regime affects the stability properties 
of R&D networks. Our reasoning proceeds in two steps: first, we briefly discuss the intuition 
for the case of firm-level unions, which has been analysed by Mauleon et al. (2008). Then, 
we explain what might happen when labour supply is completely monopolised, as Proposition 
10 reports. Individual profits under the regimes d and u are presented in Figures 4.2 and 4.3, 
respectively.17 Our notational convention is as follows: the subscript i indicates the "hub" firm 
in the star network and the linked firms in the partially connected network; k refers to the 
"spokes" in the star network and to the isolated firm in the partially connected network. The 
superscripts c, s, p, e stand for the complete, star, partial and empty networks, respectively. 
t7Since a - c has no influence on the results) we have normalised it to one in all plots. 
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Figure 4.2: Firm-level profits under decentralisation (Source: 
Mallleon et aI., 2008) 
Under decentralised wage setting (p = d), the linked firms within a partially connected 
network enjoy a higher level of efficiency than the isolated firm. A greater efficiency implies 
lower own costs, which leads to higher output and profit. However, the resulting relative cost 
advantage of the linked firm is partially dissipated by changes in the wage level. That is, higher 
output increases the demand for labour and thereby increases the wage for the linked firms. This 
means that the increase in production (or transformation) efficiency does not exactly match the 
reduction in the firms' costs (see Banerjee and Lin, 2003; Buehler and Schmutzler, 2008). Put 
differently, there is a business stealing effect that is channelled to the linked firms via the union 
of the isolated firm because of the lower wage the isolated firm faces (i.e. wi(yP, d) > w;;(yP, d)). 
This, in turn, provides the linked firms with an incentive to offer a link to the isolated firm 
in order to improve their competitive position. Consequently, the complete network emerges 
endogenouslyas the unique pairwise stable network (Mauleon et aI., 2008)18 
18The empty and star networks are not stable. The reason is that firms which are not connected have incentives 
to link to each other in order to improve their competitive position in the product market. 
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Figure 4.3: Firm-level profits under centralisation 
In contrast, under centralised wage setting (p = u), the wage differential between the linked 
firms and the isolated one in a partially connected network gP is completely suppressed, i.e. there 
is a uniform wage rule. Hence, by setting a uniform wage the industry union internalises fully 
the aforementioned business stealing effect that is prevalent under decentralised unionisation 
(see Haucap and Wey, 2004). Because a uniform wage applies to all industry participants, it 
tends to raise the effective production costs of the isolated firm relative to the linked firms. 
Therefore, because of the resulting "raising rival's cost" effect, the competitive strength of 
the linked firms is further reinforced. Consequently, the partially connected network gP arises 
endogenously as a pairwise stable network. 
Moreover, the empty and star networks can never be stable. In the empty network ge any 
two firms have incentives to establish a connecting link in order to form a partially connected 
network. Similarly, in the star network gS the spoke firms can fully eliminate their cost dis-
advantage relative to the hub firm by offering a link to each other. As a result, the complete 
network is always pairwise stable, as Proposition 10 reports. 
These results can established by refering to Figure 4.3. 19 To see this consider first the 
complete network gC. As Proposition 10 shows, the complete network is always pairwise stable 
because no pair of firms have an incentive to delete their link. When a link is deleted from the 
l!lSee also the Appendix for a formal proof. 
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complete network, a star network g8 is formed. Denote the profits of the hub in a star network 
by 1I:i and the profits of a spoke by 11:%. Comparing the profits of a firm in the complete network 
with the profits of a spoke in a star network implies that the complete network is always pairwise 
stable, i.e. 1I:j > 11:%. This also show that the star network can never be stable since a pair of 
firms do always want to have an additional collaboration. Next consider the empty network gO. 
When a link is formed in the empty network, this gives rise to a partially connected network 
gP. Denote the profits of a linked firm in gP by 11:; and the profits of the isolated firm by 1I:r 
Noting that 11:7 < 11:;, it follows that any pair of firms have always incentives to form a link; 
this destabilises the empty network, giving rise to the partially connected network. Finally, 
consider the partially connected network gP. The partially connected network is pairwise stable 
whenever the spillover is sufficiently large, as Proposition 10 reports. To see this, we need to 
establish that there are no incentives to form a link within the partially connected network 
when the spillover is large enough (i.e. f3;:: /3). Note that the isolated firm within a partially 
connected network always has incentives to connect with a linked firm so as to become a spoke 
within a star network, i.e. 11:% > 11:~. However, as Figure 4.3 shows, a linked firm in gP has 
incentives to form a link with the isolated firm whenever spillovers are sufficiently small, i.e. 
11:; < 1I:i if and only if f3 < /3, where 1I:i refers to the profits of the hub within a star network. 
Hence, when spillovers are relatively small both a linked firm and the isolated one in gP want to 
connect with each other; this destabilises the partially connected network 20 However, notice 
that the isolated firm wants to form a link while a linked firm does not want to do so when 
f3 > /3. Because mutual consent is required for a link to be formed, this implies that the partially 
connected network is pairwise stable whenever spillovers are sufficiently large, as Proposition 
10 states. 
Our next result concerns the role of spillovers in influencing the stability properties of the 
partially connected network. It appears that the partially connected network remains stable 
as long as spillovers are sufficiently large. The critical threshold is given by /3 "" 0.4895. 
The intuition behind this result is quite simple: smaller spillovers diminish the relative cost 
advantage of the linked firms within a partially connected network. This implies that when 
20 Recall that the star network can never be stable. This follows by showing that the complete network is 
always pairwise stable. 
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spillovers are small enough, a linked firm will be willing to offer a link to the isolated firm in 
order to become the hub in the resulting star network gS. The smaller the spillover is, the more 
likely is that the partially connected network will be unstable and in that sense it will also be 
more vulnerable (with decreasing (3) - again see Mauleon et al. (2008). 
Proposition 11 Under coordinated wage setting (p = c), the complete network gC is the unique 
pairwise stable network. 
Proposition 11 states that under a coordinated wage system (p = c), the complete network 
is uniquely pairwise stable. The intuition behind the result is as follows. As explained above, 
under a decentralised regime the union of the isolated firm has an incentive to set a lower wage 
than the unions of the linked firms in order to decrease the relative cost disadvantage of its own 
firm. Similar incentives are also present under a coordinated regime, but to a lesser extent, 
because labour supply is completely monopolised. Yet, the business stealing effect associated 
with a lower wage level for the isolated firm considerably reduces the asymmetry between the 
linked firms and the isolated firm. This, in turn, destabilises the partially connected network 
gP, making the complete network gC uniquely pairwise stable. Finally, note that the empty and 
star networks are still not stable, since firms with no link between themselves have an incentive 
to connect to each other. In Figure 4.4 we plot individual profits under the c-regime. Note that 
the same logic as in Figure 4.3 can be applied to this Figure. A formal proof of the result has 
been relegated to the Appendix. 
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Figure 4.4: Firm-level profits under coordination 
216 
4.4.2 Strongly stable networks 
So far, we have focused on pairwise stable networks. This definition was natural to understand 
the stability properties of R&D networks. In this section, we consider the role of deviations 
by a coalition of firms rather than only a pair of firms in influencing the stability of R&D 
networks under alternative forms of labour market organisation. Since strong stability is a 
refinement of pairwise stability, there are two candidates for strongly stable networks: the 
complete network and the partially connected network. Our main results are summarised in 
the following Proposition: 
Proposition 12 (i) Under centmlised wage setting (p = u), the partially connected network gP 
is the unique strongly stable network if and only if (3 :2:~. (ii) Under coordinated wage setting 
(p = c), the complete network ge is the unique strongly stable network if and only if the mte of 
spillover is not too large, (3 ::; ~. 
Part (i) states that under centralised wage setting, the partially connected network remains 
the unique strongly stable network when the level of spillovers is sufficiently high. Recall that 
under centralised wage setting, the complete network is pairwise stable. However, as Proposition 
12 reports, the complete network can never be strongly stable because a two-firm coalition has 
incentives to delete its links with the third firm in order to form a partially connected network. 
Because a partially connected network is pairwise stable when the spillovers are relatively large, 
it can be strongly stable too only in that case, as Proposition 12 states. 
Result (ii) indicates that a coordinated wage setting system destabilises the complete net-
work when spillovers are sufficiently large. In this case, a coalition of two firms has incentives 
to sever its links with the third firm in order to form a partially connected network. This is so 
because when the spillover level is high enough, the competitive advantage of the linked firms is 
large enough to outweigh the (negative) business stealing effect that stems from the lower wage 
costs of the isolated firm within a partially connected network. Hence, the complete network 
endogenously emerges are the unique strongly stable network when the spillovers are not too 
large. 
In contrast, the complete network is the unique strongly stable network for any level of 
spillovers under decentralised wage setting (Mauleon et aI., 2008). Intuitively, under coordi-
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nated wage setting, the wage differential between the links firms and the isolated one within a 
partially connected network is below the corresponding level under decentralised wage setting, 
i.e. w;(gP, d) - wk(gP, d) > w;(gP, c) - wk(gP, c) for all (3 E (0,11. Therefore, the cost advantage 
of the linked firms relative to the isolated one is reduced under the decentralised regime, which 
works towards destabilising the partially connected network. Consequently, the complete net-
work is the unique strongly stable network when wages are settled at the firm-level under a 
decentralised wage setting regime. 
Noting that under decentralised wage setting the complete network is the unique strongly 
stable network, our findings imply that denser networks are more likely to emerge as the degree 
of wage setting centralisation decreases. Therefore, our results help explain the empirical evi-
dence documenting that countries have progressively adopted more flexible wage setting systems 
on the one hand, and that R&D collaboration has become a more prevalent phenomenon, on the 
other.21 Thus, the predictions of our model can be seen as an alternative foundation for the em-
pirical pattern of R&D alliance growth on the basis of the observed labour market deregulation 
towards union structures characterised by a lower degree of wage setting centralisation. 
4.4.3 Efficient networks 
In this section, we examine the efficiency properties of R&D networks under the alternative 
forms of wage setting centralisation. 
Inspection of Figure 4.3 reveals that under complete centralisation all networks are Pareto 
efficient except for the empty network. Inspection of Figure 4.4 reveals a similar conclusion for 
a coordinated wage-setting regime: in addition to the empty network, the partially connected 
network is not Pareto efficient whenever spillovers are relatively small (i.e. f3 < fJ). Finally, 
from Figure 4.2 we see that the only Pareto efficient networks under decentralisation are the 
21 Alternative explanations that have been advanced for explaining the growth in the number of R&D alliances 
relative to more traditional forms of inter-firm cooperation are: first, the increased flexibility which allows firms to 
be omnipresent, develop interdisciplinary expertise and Quickly respond to their rivals' innoV'dtions; and second, 
the fact that the legal framework across counties has undergone a process of harmonisation, which makes easier 
the enforcement of contracts that underlie the organisation of R&D alliances. The increased flexibility hehind 
non-equity forms of partnerships (versus equity forms such a.s Research Joint Ventures) stems from the fact 
that they are typically easier to establish, administer and dissolve. This has become particularly important in 
the modern business world as a result of short technology cycles and high costs of doing R&D (Narula and 
Hagedourn, 1999) - see also chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion. 
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complete and star networks (see also Mauleon et aI., 2008). 
Furthermore, Figure 4.5 allows us to compare the strongly stable networks in terms of Pareto 
efficiency. Note that j3 denotes the lower bound such that the partially connected network is 
stable under centralisation and /J denotes the upper bound such that the complete network 
remains stable under coordination. The Figure shows that the complete network (which is 
likely to arise under decentralisation) Pareto dominates both the partially connected network 
(under centralisation) and the complete network (under coordination) - and so it is the unique 
Pareto efficient network in the class of strongly stable networks. However, neither of the latter 
network architectures Pareto dominates the other. 
Profits 
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Figure 4.5: Strongly stahle networks and Pareto efficiency 
Next, we turn to study strongly efficient networks. In Figures 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 we plot aggre-
gate profits. Define {J Pt and (J P2, respectively, as the solutions to the equations LiEN '7ri(gC, u) = 
LiEN '7ri(gS, u); L iEN '7ri(gC,C) = LiEN '7ri(gS, c). Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show that {JPl and {JP2 
exist and are unique, so that the complete network leads to higher industry profit both un-
der centralisation and under coordination as long as the spillover level is not too high, that 
is, {J $ {J Pt and {J $ {J P2, respectively; otherwise, the star network dominates the complete 
network. 
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Figure 4.6: Total profits under centralisation 
It is important to note that (3 PI < (3 P2' That is, the complete network is more likely to 
induce the highest value of industry profit as the degree of wage setting centralisation decreases. 
This pattern is also confirmed by Mauleon et al. (2008) that in the presence of a completely 
decentralised system, the complete network is the unique industry profit-maximising network. 
The intuition is as follows. In the context of the complete network, the firms choose identical 
investment levels and thus remain symmetric. In this case, a high spillover rate implies that 
firms compete vigorously in the product market. Therefore, a firm's profit declines more rapidly 
when the spillover level is relatively high. Consequently, a star network may lead to higher total 
profit than a complete network because the a.symmetries between the firms are more pronounced 
within a star network, which works towards relaxing product market competition. 
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Figure 4.7: Total profits under coordination 
Furthermore, a star network is more likely to maximise industry profit when the wage 
setting system is more centralised. Greater centralisation implies that wages are less flexible 
to the firms' competitive differences, so that the firms can appropriate a higher surplus under 
a star network resulting from own higher efficiency. Therefore, a star network can generate 
greater industry profit than a complete network, which, in turn, is more likely to occur under 
centralisation than under coordination. However, industry profit is higher under the complete 
network when wages are set by firm-level unions. This reflects that wages are relatively flexible 
so that they match the firms' efficiency level, thereby reducing the asymmetries between the hub 
and spoke firms within a star network. Consequently, total profit is higher under the complete 
network than under the star network in the case of decentralised wage setting. 
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Figure 4.8: Total profits under decentralisation (Source: rVIaulcon et al., 2008) 
Together, these results and Proposition 12 reveal that individual incentives for R&D collab-
oration and the collective ones do not always coincide. Such misalignment is particularly severe 
under complete centralisation: the partially connected network is the unique strongly stable 
network, whereas it does not maximise industry profit. This conflict between strongly stable 
networks and efficient networks is less pronounced under a coordinated wage setting system 
and it is totally eliminated under a decentralised wage setting system. Therefore, in pursuing 
their own private interests, industry participants are more likely to achieve a profit maximising 
outcome that ·is collectively beneficial when the wage setting system is less centralised. Table 
4.2 summarises. 
Spillovers (0, &) I (&,1) 
Decentralisation >I< alignment between stability and efficiency 
Coordination ** alignment I conflict 
Centralisation ** conflict 
Table 4.2: The conflict between strong stability and strong efficiency 
(/3 "" 0.7686) 
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4.5 Comparison 
The issues underlying the relationship between employment and innovation are of central in-
terest in economics and labour market policy-making. On the one hand, it is frequently argued 
that research activity and technical change are the very sources of the unemployment problem. 
On the other hand, research opportunities which become more fruitful when firms enter into 
collaborative agreements, imply positive dynamic efficiency effects that contribute positively to 
the firms' growth. This latter observation suggests that employment opportunities may stem 
from technological improvements that enable firms to exploit existing market opportunities and 
enhance own market shares. 
An understanding of these views requires examination of the effective R&D and employment 
levels under the variety of forms that wage setting institutions can take. It is noteworthy that 
wage setting institutions affect firms' incentives to form bilateral links, which, in turn, shapes the 
structure of the R&D networks. Then, the network architecture that will endogenously emerge 
provides us with a natural context to analyse firms' investment and employment decisions. 
Existing empirical literature has mentioned that the interest for the investment decisions of firms 
lies within the network of collaboration where they are embedded (Powell, Koput and Smith-
Doerr, 1996). To this end, we examine firms' R&D and employment decisions within the context 
of stable networks. Specifically, we carry out our analysis for the set of strongly stable networks 
and compare our results with the case in which wages are determined by firm-specific unions 
as in Mauleon et a1. (2008). Figures 4.9 and 4.10 depict total effective R&D and employment 
levels, respectively. Define f3 El as the solution to the equation E*(gC, d) = E*(gP, u). Inspection 
of Figure 4.9 reveals that f3 El exists and is unique, so that a centralised wage system leads to 
higher aggregate R&D as long as ~ ::; f3 ::; f3 El, where ~ is the lower bound to guarantee 
stability of the partially connected network under centralisation, ~ is the upper bound to 
guarantee stability of the complete network under coordination and (3 El '" 0.5605; otherwise, 
a decentralised union structure generates a higher level of industry investment, that is, as long 
as f3 > f3 El' 
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We find that a centralised regime that leads to a partially connected network generates the 
highest level of industry investment as long as technological spillovers taken on intermediate 
values. However, this result is reversed for relatively high spillovers. In this case, a decentralised 
structure induces a complete network (Mauleon et aI., 2008). A complete network generates 
higher investment relative to a partially connected network which arises under a centralised 
structure. Thus, our result substantiates nicely the interaction effects underlying the relation-
ship between wage setting institutions and collaborative activity in the context of stable R&D 
networks. It suggests that when the spillover level is sufficiently high, competition between 
firm-level unions under a decentralised wage setting system is more effective in promoting R&D 
collaboration and thus innovation relative to the case of a centralised system, and vice versa. 
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Our second finding pertains to the levels of aggregate employment under the various forms 
that wage setting institutions can take. It appears that a complete network, which arises in the 
context of a decentralised structure, produces the highest employment level. In addition, we find 
that labour market deregulation, as reflected by the introduction of more flexible wage setting 
systems, performs worst in both respects - R&D and employment. Taken together with our 
result concerning aggregate investments, these observations yield the following insights: first, 
policy makers may face a trade-off between attaining both a high level of investment and a high 
level of employment when the spillover parameter takes on intermediate values. However, a 
decentralised union structure - inducing a complete network - appears to be most conducive to 
both investment and employment when the spillover is sufficiently high. Second, a coordinated 
wage setting system deters R&D investment and thereby reduces industry employment. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one paper that compares investment and em-
ployment outcomes under the various degrees of wage setting centralisation in oligopoly. Specif-
ically, Haucap and Wey (2004) investigate firms' investment incentives under the three modes 
of labour market organisation that we employed here when two firms race to be the first to 
discover a new labour saving (process) innovation.22 In this case, they show that a decentralised 
22 Haucap and Wey (2004) argued that the aim of potential application of antitrust rules in labour markets 
should be two-fold: to ban monopoly-unions altogether, with a view to increasing employmentj if, however, 
monopoly unions are allowed then wage negotiations should be take place under non-discrimination rules. 
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system leads to the highest employment level, which is in line with our result. Furthermore, 
Haucap and Wey (2004) demonstrate that a centralised system carries the largest investment 
incentives, although, under certain circumstances, it may be outperformed by a coordinated 
system in terms of industry employment. This finding in part contrasts with our result that a 
decentralised system leads to the highest investment level for relatively large spillover values. 
In addition, unlike their study, we find that a centralised system produces higher employment 
relative to a coordinated system, which is mainly driven by the higher efficiency resulting from 
a centralised regime. 
Why do the results differ from our model? There are three main reasons. First, our frame-
work develops a non-tournament model of R&D cooperation to analyse firms' incentives to set 
up bilateral collaborations, while Haucap and Wey (2004) consider a patent tournament. Sec-
ond, in our model the various structures of unionisation lead to different network architectures 
which are stable, and these structures of collaboration help to understand firms' investment 
decisions. This relationship between the mode of labour market organisation and firms' incen-
tives for R&D collaboration is central to our analysis. Third, the model by Haucap and Wey 
(2004) neglects technological spillovers that may occur in the course of the R&D race, whereas 
in our model the flow of technological information among firms is the very essence of R&D 
collaboration. 
Our work can also be seen as complimentary to Mauleon et al. (2008). Their paper, in 
line with ours, considers the impact of labour market organisation on the firms' incentives to 
engage in R&D collaborations. In particular, comparing two extreme scenarios of no unions and 
firm-level unions, Mauleon et al. show that a larger number of collaborations will emerge when 
labour unions are organised at the firm level. In our analysis, we consider instead two additional 
forms of labour market organisation, coordinated and centralised wage-setting, and show that 
this can have important implications for the number of alliances that will be established. In 
particular, we find that an increase in the degree of wage-setting centralisation gives rise to 
a smaller number of collaborations. Thus, our analysis may help to shed more light on how 
labour markets influence firms' incentives for R&D collaboration. 
It might be objected that the analysis in this chapter is beside the point because a decen-
tralised wage-setting system investigated by Mauleon et al. (2008) seems to perform, in most 
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cases, better than both a centralised and a coordinated wage-setting system. But Mauleon et al. 
do not address the issues that motivate us here. Considering the two extreme cases of no unions 
and firm-level unions, they find that labour market deregulation - in line with the stylised facts 
- brings about a smaller number of alliances. Contrary to this, anecdotal evidence suggests a 
surge in collaborations over recent years (see Hagedoorn, 2002). Thus, one contribution of the 
present chapter is to offer an explanation of the empirical pattern of R&D alliance growth in 
terms of the observed . labour market deregulation. Finally, the objection misses a key point 
of this chapter, which is to disentangle the influence of the level where wages are set across 
countries on total investment and employment. This in turn, provides a more comprehensive 
framework within which recent policy choices of different countries can be assessed. 
4.6 Conclusion 
R&D collaboration in high-tech sectors has increased markedly over recent years. At the same 
time, we have witnessed that many European countries progressively adopted wage setting 
institutions characterised by a lower degree of centralisation. While some counties have moved 
downwards in the centralisation dimension by adopting 'intermediate' regimes, other countries 
have moved further to a completely decentralised system whereby wages at determined at the 
firm-level. These observations leads us to construct a theory which explains the empirical 
pattern of R&D alliance growth on the basis of the observed deregulation in labour markets. 
Our results suggest that the form of labour market institutions is decisive for the profitabil-
ity of R&D collaboration and thus for the firms' incentives to form R&D networks. A core 
idea is that a completely centralised system implies a raising rivals' cost effect, which tends to 
decrease the number of alliances, making the equilibrium network structure relatively asymmet-
ric. However, as the degree of wage setting centralisation decreases, the ensuing competition 
among unions encourages R&D collaboration. Thus labour market deregulation towards more 
decentralised union structures can be seen as an alternative foundation for the fact that R&D 
networks have become a more prevalent phenomenon over the recent years. 
What are the policy implications of our analysis? Our results suggest that policy makers 
may face a trade-off between attaining both a high level of investment and employment for 
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intermediate levels of within-the-network spillovers. However, when the extent of information 
sharing is more substantial this dilemma disappears, and we find that a fully decentralised 
structure performs better in both respects - R&D and employment. Furthermore, a coordi-
nated wage setting system, which increasingly typifies the form of labour market organisation 
in several countries, appears to perform worse than both a completely centralised and/or decen-
tralised system. This seems to suggest that recent trends in Europe, as in the case of Germany, 
Belgium, Spain, Sweden, among others, should be critically reviewed as they may have adverse 
consequences on the level of industry investment and employment. 
These results should however be taken with caution due to the fact that our model is rather 
stylised. In our model, we have made three assumptions which are worthy of further discussion. 
First, we have conducted our analysis with three firms. As has already been noted by Goyal and 
Moraga-Gonzalez (2001), Mauleon et al. (2008), among others, the analysis of networks with 
an arbitrary number of firms is beyond reach. However, we can draw some conjectures about 
what one might expect to happen in that situation. We believe that the main mechanisms that 
underlie our model would still survive: in essence, how the decrease in the degree of wage setting 
centralisation can tilt the power balance between firms with a large number of links relative 
to firms with a smaller number of links, thereby inducing a larger number of collaborations 
(see also Mauleon et aI., 2008). Second, we have assumed that the determination of wages 
remains entirely at the unions' discretion, as is the case in Mauleon et al. (2008). Because the 
main focus of our analysis is on the effect of union structures on the firms' incentives to form 
collaboration links, this assumption has enabled us to disentangle the influence of the degree of 
wage setting centralisation on the firms' incentives for R&D collaboration. Cast in this light, 
our model can be seen as a building block for the analysis of more general cases.23 Finally, 
as in Haucap and Wey (2004), the determination of the alternative wage setting systems is ad 
hoc rather than endogenous to the model. The latter two assumptions have allowed us to place 
our results within the context of the existing literature and could also be seen as suggestive of 
ample room for further research. 
23 Although the present model is not set lip to accommodate wage bargaining due to complications arising in 
the algebraic derivations, this question could potentially be addressed in the context of a different modelling 
approach concerning the process of knowledge transmission. 
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4.7 Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 10. Since the term a - c has no influence on the results in all proofs 
we normalise it to 1. 
We show first that the complete network gO is always pairwise stable. Condition (ii) for 
stability is automatically satisfied since no links can be added to the complete network. Next, 
we check condition (i). No pair of firms i and j have incentives to delete their link with ij ~ gS 
because 
7(41 + 4£1(17 - 7£1))/ D2 7r;(gC, u) = 7rj(gC, u) > 
7rj(gS,u) = 28(2+3£1)(82 - 2l£i)(7+£I(31-14£1))/F2 . 
This also proves that the star network gS is not pairwise stable since firms i and j want to link 
to each other. 
Next, we show that the empty network gC is not pairwise stable. Condition (i) is trivially 
satisfied since there are no links to be deleted from the empty network. However, condition (ii) 
is not satisfied because any pair of firms i and j have incentives to form the link ij ~ gC, that is 
An analogous condition obtains for firm j. 
Finally, we show that the partially connected network gP is pairwise stable if and only if 
£I 2: $. Notice that condition (i) for stability is satisfied because no pair of firms want to delete 
their link to form the empty network with ij E gP and ij ~ gC. Condition (ii) is satisfied if and 
only if £I 2: $. This stems from 
41(7 - £1(10 - 7£1))/702 
28(2 + 3£1)(82 - 2l£i)(7 + £1(31 - 14£1))/ F2, 
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with ik E gS, ik rf. gP, and 
7(1 + 13)(41 - 7f3)/n2 
7ri(gS, u) 7(1 + 213)(41-1413)(28 + 913(16 - 7f3))2/F2. 
Note that the critical value of 13, 13, is defined as 13 == {f3 I 7r;(gP, u) = 7r;(gS, u)}, where 
13 '" 0.4895. It follows that gP is pairwise stable if and only if 13 :::: 13. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 11. We show first that gC is always pairwise stable. No pair of 
firms i and j have incentives to delete their link with ij rf. gS because 
(5 + 213)(11 - 2f3)/C2 = 7ri(gc, c) = 7rj(gC, c) > 
7r;(gS,c) = 7rj(gS,c) =4(22-3f3)(1O+3f3)(13+f3(5-2f3))2/C,2. 
This also proves that the star network gS is not pairwise stable since firms i and j want to link 
to each other. 
Next, we show that the empty network ge is not pairwise stable. Any pair of firms i and j 
have incentives to form the link ij rf. g", that is 
55 
3721 = 7ri(ge,c) < 7ri(gP,c) = 169(11-f3)(5+f3)/H2. 
An analogous condition obtains for firm j. 
Finally, we show that the partially connected network gP cannot be pairwise stable. Note 
that 
55(13 - (2 - 13)13)2/ H2 7ri.(gP, c) < 
7ri.(gS,c) = 4(22 - 313)(10 + 313)(13+ 13(5 - 2f3))2/c,2, 
with ik E gS, ik rf. gP, and 
169(11 - 13)(5 + 13)/ H2 = 7ri(gP, c) < 
7ri(gS,c) = (11 - 213)(5 + 213)(52 + 3f3(8 - 3f3))2/c,2. 
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Thus gP is never pairwise stable. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 12. We will show that under centralised wage setting (p = u) the 
partially connected network gP is the unique strongly stable network if and only if fJ :::: /3. First, 
note that strong stability is a refinement of pairwise stability, and therefore, from Proposition 10 
there are two candidates for a strongly stable network, the complete network and the partially 
connected network. Second, the complete network is never strongly stable because 
7(41 + 4fJ(17 - 7fJ))/ D2 1l't(gC, u) = 1l'j(gC, u) < 
1l'j(gP,u) = 7(1 + fJ)(41- 7fJ)/'J2, 
with ij E gP. Third, from Proposition 10 we know that the partially connected network is 
pairwise stable if and only if fJ :::: /3. It follows that gP cannot be strongly stable whenever 
fJ < /3. However, 1l't(gC, u) = 1l'j(gC, u) < 1l'i(gP, u) = 1l'j(gP, u) with ij E gP, as shown above. 
This means that the coalition of firms i and j within a partially connected network has no 
incentives to offer a link to the isolated firm k in order to form the complete network. Thus, 
under the u-regime gP is strongly stable if and only if fJ :::: /3; otherwise, no network is strongly 
stable. 
Next, we show that under coordinated wage setting (p = u) the complete network gC is the 
unique strongly stable network if and only if fJ :0; /3. Note first that since strong stability is 
a refinement of pairwise stability, then from Proposition 11 the only candidate for a strongly 
stable network is the complete network. Second, a coalition of the three firms has no incentives 
to delete its links to form the empty network. That is, 
55 (5 + 2fJ)(11- 2fJ)/C2 = 1l'i(gC,c) > 1l't(ge,c) = 3721' 
An analogous condition obtains for firms j and k. Third, we check the condition under which 
a coalition of two firms has incentives to delete its links with the third firm in order to form a 
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partially connected network gP, that is 
(5 + 2tJ)(11- 2tJ)/C2 = 7r;(gC,c) = 7r;(gC, c) > 
with ij E gP. Let 13 be the critical value of tJ defined as 13 == {tJ I 7r;(gC, c) = 7r;(gP, c)}, where 
13 eo: 0.7686. Thus, under the c-regime the complete network is the unique strongly stable 
network if and only if tJ ~ 13. Q.E.D. 
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Conclusion 
In Chapter 1 we have developed a model for analysing both the use of a public firm and 
subsidies towards R&D. We have also explored the welfare effects of privatising the public firm. 
The interest behind this derives from the fact that many countries have in one or another way 
undergone a process of restructuring and cutting down in the size of their public sector. In light 
of the widespread adoption of privatisation programs, there is a heated debate among economists 
regarding the potential benefits and costs of privatisation with a long-standing concern being 
that public firms can be used as potential instruments in addressing market failures which are 
inherent in R&D and innovation. 
Our key results are the following. First, we find that optimal R&D subsidies are always 
positive and increasing in the degree of spillovers. Our analysis thus suggests that this result, 
which has also been demonstrated by Hinloopen (1997) in a private market setting, can also 
be extended to mixed markets. Second, we have shown that in mixed markets firms should be 
recipients of higher subsidies than their counterparts in private markets. This stems fundamen-
tally from the fact that there are higher returns to the subsidy in a mixed market. Another 
important finding is that governments should aim at subsidising innovation output rather than 
R&D expenditure. In doing so the same level of social welfare can be achieved. Finally, our 
model can predict the circumstances under which the public firm should be privatised. This 
particularly is the case when the number of private firms is sufficiently large, which is in line 
with the seminal paper by De Fraja and Delbono (1989) in the absence of issues associated with 
R&D and innovation. We have thus the beginnings of an analytical framework for the study of 
different policy tools - a public firm, R&D subsidies and privatisation - in hi tech industries. 
Next we provide an overview of our objectives and findings in chapter 2. In practice, R&D 
collaboration appears to play a crucial role in enhancing firms' technological capabilities and 
thus lowering production costs. A related observation is that research collaboration is commonly 
observed among state-owned and private companies. This leads us to formalise the idea that 
firms create networks of collaboration to share the outcome of their research efforts that are 
selected independently. Our focus has been on the role of a public firm in influencing firms' 
incentives to form R&D networks. The interest behind this topic derives from the fact that 
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private and collective interests for R&D collaboration are so commonly in conflict (see Goyal 
and Moraga-Gonzalez, 2001; Song and Vannetelbosch, 2007). 
We have considered a setting with three firms that can potentially engage in R&D part-
nerships. Within this context, the structure of an R&D network is endogenously determined. 
Our objective has been to highlight the role of a public firm in influencing the structure of a 
network and the corresponding investment decisions of the firms, with a view to understanding 
the relationship between equilibrium industry structure and performance. Our main findings 
are the following: 
First, a firm's R&D effort is increasing in the number of R&D alliances and thus is maximised 
under the complete network. This result reflects increasing returns from R&D collaboration. It 
is in contrast with earlier contributions where an increase in the level of collaborative activity 
tends to reduce individual R&D effort due to incentives for free-riding on the other firms' efforts. 
Second, the complete network in which all firms are connected is the unique pairwise stable 
and strongly stable network. In the absence of a public firm, partial networks can be stable: the 
presence of a public firm destabilises partial networks (where one firm is not connected to the 
other two), making the complete network uniquely stable. This follows from the fact that the 
public firm is an aggressive competitor willing to expand its output more than a private firm, 
so that private firms may diminish the competitive advantage of the public firm by forming 
additional links. 
Third, the complete network maximises industry profits and overall welfare. This suggests 
that a public firm is likely to reduce the so commonly encountered conflict between private and 
collective incentives for R&D collaboration in purely private oligopolies. We have highlighted 
that in doing so, the role of a public firm would be more effective the smaller the market size 
and/or competitiveness of the relevant industry. Our analysis is a first attempt to tackle the 
issue of conflict between private and collective interests for R&D collaboration by exploring 
the potential role of a pUblic firm. Further developments in this area, both empirical and 
theoretical, are certainly promising avenues for future research. 
In chapter 3, we have explored how different types of wage contracts that are often observed 
in the real world impact investment, employment, profits, union utility and welfare. We have 
shown that a fixed wage contract increases R&D spending relative to a floating wage contract, 
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thus leading to a higher level of profits and union utility. Since higher efficiency implies lower 
prices, we showed that a fixed wage contract benefits consumers and the entire society. This 
result reflects the efficiency effect of a fixed wage contract: a fixed wage relationship implies 
that wages are set prior to the firms' investments, which in turn leads to a higher level of 
investment in cost-reduction. In this respect, a fixed wage contract may serve as a kind of 
disciplinary device against the union's opportunistic behaviour that is likely to emerge under a 
floating wage contract. 
Similar results have been obtained by Banerjee and Lin (2003). In our oligopoly model with 
R&D spillovers among the downstream firms (as opposed to Banerjee and Lin who implicitly 
assume perfect patent protection), a floating wage contract is less desirable from the firms' 
viewpoint. This is because spillovers appear to moderate the raising rivals' cost effect under 
a floating wage contract, thus making a fixed wage contract more attractive. Furthermore, 
contrary to Banerjee and Lin (2003), we have identified the role of spillovers as key determinant 
of the profitability of a floating versus a reference wage contract. Thus, one contribution of the 
present chapter is to demonstrate that the assumption of zero spillovers should not always be 
considered "innocuous" in this setting. We have also highlighted that the preferences of both 
parties - the union and firms - over the choice of wage contracts can fully be aligned whenever 
spillovers are not too small. 
The objective of chapter 4 has been to study the interaction between wage setting institu-
tions and endogenous R&D networks. We have shown that a decrease in the degree of wage 
setting centralisation leads to denser R&D networks. In particular, under centralised wage 
setting, a partially connected network emerges endogenously when the level of spillovers is rel-
atively high. This result arises because the industry-wide union sets a uniform wage, which 
serves to reinforce the higher efficiency of the linked firms within a partially connected network. 
The uniform wage allows the linked firms to become stronger competitors and thus marginalise 
the isolated firm. This result complements previous findings by Mauleon et al. (2008) about 
a decentralised wage setting regime that is shown to induce a complete network. Furthermore, 
in the intermediate case of coordination, the complete network emerges endogenously when the 
spillover level is not too high. We have highlighted that our results help explain the growth in 
the number of R&D alliances by looking at how the level within the industry at which wages 
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are set determines firms' incentives for R&D collaboration. 
Our analysis shows that policy-makers may face a trade-off between attaining both a high 
level of investment and employment. This particularly arises when the spillover parameter ad-
mits intermediate values: a centralised structure that leads to a partially connected network 
implies a higher investment level but lower employment level relative to a decentralised regime 
which induces a complete network. However, for relatively high spillovers this dilemma disap-
pears, and we find that a decentralised structure outperforms a centralised one, both in terms 
of industry investment and employment. Finally, we have shown that a coordinated system 
discourages both innovation and employment, so that recent trends in labour markets towards 
more flexible wage setting institutions need to be critically reviewed. 
To conclude, the key purpose of chapter 1 has been to examine the welfare implications of 
privatisation in hi-tech industries when there is competition between public and private firms. 
Chapter 2 considered the possibility of cooperation among firms in a mixed oligopoly and how 
the presence of a public firm affects the stability of an R&D collaboration network. Chapter 3 
moved away from mixed oligopolies to place the analysis into the context of unionised labour 
markets with private firms only. In particular, our focus has been on how the sequencing of 
R&D and wage setting can influence the levels of investment, employment, union utility, and 
overall welfare. Finally, in chapter 4 we looked at the role of wage setting institutions in shaping 
firms' incentives for R&D collaborations. 
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